The Role of Elites in the Success of Democracy
There is a venerable tradition among both democratic theorists and those more actively involved in the functioning of democracies through their politics, to claim that democracy is not only responsive to the demands of its citizens but that its very existence is somehow an authentic extension of the popular will. Actions taken by democratic governments at the behest of the majority and even some form of representation offered to electorate are not sufficient evidence to justify this claim. Rather, to verify such a claim, one must examine the origins of democracies to discern whether they are truly polyarchial or are dependent on the support of the elite to succeed. To test the hypothesis that elite influence is necessary for a functional democracy, four European democracies, The United Kingdom, The Federal Republic of Germany, The Republic of Poland and The Nation of Romania will herein be examined. In each case, the variable of elite participation will be assumed independent and the variable of successful democracy dependent.
The United Kingdom
One of the oldest and most robust democracies in Europe, The United Kingdom has been a model for many fledgling democracies and takes considerable national pride in its democratic history. As such, it seems an appropriate place begin. If the elite hypothesis is correct, the first democratic initiatives in The United Kingdom should have been the product of elite political activity (criterion a) and in the absence of that activity, no successful democratic initiatives should take place (criterion d). The first elite forays into an English political system centered around the divine right monarchy began almost eight centuries ago with King John’s invitation to hear the political concerns of clergy and the nobility. If it is truly the case that democracy requires only the political muscle of the elite, than provided that there is not significant opposition from the military, democracy should take hold in every case where the elites rally behind it (criterion c). An example that would be consistent with this expectation is the signing of the Magna Carta, widely recognizes as one of the most important documents in the history of democracy. In the absence of a strong military or popular force for him to mobilize against the it, the elites were able to extract this concession from King John. Its democratic significance stems from the fact that it recognizes the right to property, limitations on the power of the monarch and the ultimate sovereignty of the law.
Boths house of Parliament were typically dominated by elite interests from the outset. The House of Lords drew its membership from the country’s high nobility and ranking religious leaders. Though the common person was as much a stranger to the House of Commons as the House of Lords, the House of Commons was more representative than its bicameral counterpart as it was filled with knights, low nobles and even distinguished citizens who were entirely without royal lineage. In 1688, with the Glorious Revolution and the peaceful joint ascendence of King William and Queen Mary to the English throne, the Parliament moved boldly to assert their democratic authority to depose and appoint monarchs. Therefore in the United Kingdom, it was indeed elites who were the first serious proponents of democracy and they did achieve their political agenda without interference, both of which are wholly consistent with the exceptions of the elite hypothesis.
In cases of popular unrest, the elite hypothesis holds that no action can take place without representatives of the national elite backing the dissenters (criterion b). The fact that universal suffrage is a relatively recent development in long history of The United Kingdom suggests that the elite indeed had a monopoly on democratic reforms or the lack thereof. The Chartist movement of 1838 however, was very much a spontaneous democratic uprising, complete with strikes and violent institutional resistance to change. It should be noted however that not until the Labour Party formed and won seats in the House of Commons did the situation really improve. Again in the 1970s, the labor force, now highly organized and used to having their way on social issues proved itself capable of exerting considerably influence on national politics. It took the boldness and determination of Margaret Thatcher, one of the most powerful Prime Ministers in Britain’s history, with the near unanimous support of the elite, to rein in the rampaging unions. This is inconsistent with the elite hypothesis, which would have required that such unrest be precipitated or at least approved of be representatives of the elite.
While the hypothesis proved accurate in the first three instances, it was clearly mistaken in the fourth. The first group to be seriously interested in democracy was the elite (criterion a), when the elites were interested in democracy they tended to have their way (criterion c) and without the support of the elite democratic reforms failed (criterion d). However, the elite proved not to be the only catalyst capable of producing democratic activity, as labor organizations had historically been able to mobilize large numbers of voters and protesters in support of their agenda (criterion b). The overall results for The United Kingdom are therefore inconclusive.
Germany
On the other extreme is Germany, a nation which in spite of material circumstances similar to that of other European nations which embraced democracy, was arguably the most antidemocratic nation on the continent for most of its history and for several years perhaps was among the most antidemocratic nations in the history of the world. Even so, as Germany eventually did embrace democratic values, it is still possible to test the elite hypothesis in this case. Since the relevant historical events are relatively recent, there is reason to believe that Germany is a very valuable case to study as it likely faced difficulties more similar to the transitional democracies of today than The United Kingdom with its multicentury process did.
On the occasions when democracy was championed in Germany, it was as expected, a political move by the elite. The three German explorations of democracy, the Frankfurt Convention, the Weimar Republic and eventually the postwar Federal Republic were all orchestrated and were in ever-increasing degrees supported by the elite (criterion a). Until the latter half of the twentieth century and only under extraordinarily dramatic conditions, there had never been any kind of spontaneous display of democratic enthusiasm on the part of the German people (criterion b). Whereas in other nations people took to the streets in support of democracy, in Germany the popular cause which rallied the masses had, ever since unification, been nationalism.
Having perhaps done research on the curious lack of Germany democracy before the occupation began or perhaps because they had all experienced the transition to democracy themselves, the Allied Forces after the Second World War made every effort to incorporate the German elite when forging the Federal Republic in West Germany. To the largest possible extent they removed from power any officials who supported the Nazi regime and installed a new system which included a unique German brand of neo-corporatism, which gave social and business leaders the opportunity to plan important state decisions along with relevant policy maker, who ultimately have the final say. Since all of this took place under the thumb (and gun) of a truly vast allied military presence, the success of democracy when the elites support it (criterion c) is best in this case viewed as inconclusive.
The best support of the elite hypothesis however comes the over all absence of both democratic leaders and democracy in practice (criterion d). For the most part the rulers of the German principalities had little interest in democracy and instead of a middle class filled with merchants and professionals, German had instead a middle stratum of state employees, intellectuals and jurists, all of whom were, through self interest alone more likely to be statists than their capitalist counterparts elsewhere. From unification until after the Second War World, these people proved to be for modern German authorities what the Junkers had been for the Prussian military dynamo, a strong source of ideological, administrative and economic support in their rivalries against the more democratic nations of Europe.
For Germany, it is clear that the absence of support for democracy among most of the elite was as detrimental could be as possible (criteria b and d). This strongly supports the elite hypothesis. Instances of elite support and successful democratic results however are more difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from (criteria a and c). However, since antidemocratic sentiments among the elite corresponded to such a strong antidemocratic outcome for the nation as a whole, Germany is a case supporting that elites make democracy by showing that they break it as well.
Poland
One of the “third wave” democracies, Poland is interesting example of how democracy can take hold in spite of stiff opposition from the entrenched authorities. In this case, contrary to the elite hypothesis, it did not come from the elite in the traditional sense, those powerful individual who, though not members of the government themselves, have an established or implicit role of the governing process (criterion a). Instead, democracy in Poland was almost exclusively the result of single popular movement, the most powerful groundswell of its era, Solidarity. What began as a daring strike in defiance of the Kremlin-supported Communist Polish government grew in the face of vacillating government strategies, from appeasement to repression into the primary means through which the Polish people expressed their discontent and the organization which represented them in formal talks to facilitate the peaceful transfer of power (criterion b). There was however one traditionally elite force which allied with Solidarity and the eventually victorious Polish people, the Catholic Church, particularly under the leadership of Cardinal, future Pope and spiritual Cold Warrior John Paul II (criterion c). During the decades of Soviet rule, the Church functioned as an intermediary between the people and party leaders who made decisions. Along with the lack of any military intervention on behalf either party, the role of elites in addition to the popular movement in creating Polish democracy is inconclusive. To the extent however that there was a mass movement without elite leadership as discussed above and that democracy happened without overt elite involvement (criterion d) make Poland a case which contradicts the elite hypothesis.
Romania
Like Poland, Romania was added to the register of democratic nations after the collapse of the Soviet Union, though what amounted to a post-Soviet dictatorship under the “National Salvation Front Council” was what immediately followed Romania’s initial break from Communism. This period proves through omission (criterion d) the important role elites can play in facilitating the transition from authoritarian forms of government to democracy. Likewise what appeared a popular democratic uprising which lead the NSF’s ascendence proved nothing more than a propaganda demonstration staged by the NSF (criterion b). Since 1996 and the removal of the remaining hard-liners from power, a core group of elites within the legislature, the Democratic Convention of Romania, along with the Social Democratic Union and Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania, have championed democracy with previously unparalleled determination (criterion c). Along with democratic developments on the national political level, elites in the Orthodox Church have at times chosen to descend into the political fray, advocating a democratic future for Romania (criterion a). Through there have been both democratic and antidemocratic actions among the few ill-defined elites who exist, Romania is a slightly muddled case which supports the elite hypothesis.
This all too brief survey of some of the European democracies yields mixed results with regard to the accuracy of the elite hypothesis. While Poland plainly contradicts its assumptions, Germany almost as clearly verifies them with additional though less convincing support from the case of Romania and the UK can too easily to go either way depending on the events isolated for study to draw any valid conclusions. If political science were more like gambling and less like scholarship, one might get away with conservative bet in favor the elite hypothesis. That said, since political science entails a commitment to the second word as much the first, a principled refusal to conclude either way due to insufficient evidence is at this point appropriate.
A Closing Recommendation
Should any United States administrations happen to find themselves in the awkward process of nation-building in any countries in the middle east, they would therefore be well advised to pay close to attention to the sentiments and actions of the elites, though they could not afford to do this at the expense of ignoring the common person.
Work Cited:
Sodaro, Michael J. Comparative Politics – A Global Introduction. Boston: McGraw Hill, 2001.
