The Nature of Virtuous Friendships
Aristotle cites three types of friendship: that for utility, that for pleasure, and the virtuous type. Friendships for utility are based on a person being useful to another in some way – whether for money, favors, etc. Friendships for pleasure are similar in that they are also based on what person can do for another – based on the pleasure he brings him/her. Both types of friendship are one-sided and “incomplete.”
A virtuous friendship, on the other hand, is quite different. This sort of relationship is based on aspects of selflessness and equality between friends. First, one must do good towards a friend purely for the sake of the friend. There is no other desired outcome but for the friend’s happiness. Next, one desires the friend’s existence purely for the friend’s sake and not for reasons of utility, pleasure, or the like. One must also spend time with the friend without ulterior motives of gaining something in return. In addition, one must be in accord with his friend, meaning they both desire the same things and can agree on how to go about achieving them. For instance, “..a city is said to be in concord when [its citizens] agree on what is advantageous, make the same decision, and act on their common resolution.” (1667a 27-29) Finally, one must be empathetic to his friend’s joys and sorrows, equally sharing in the burden of these emotions.
The virtuous person, by Aristotle’s definition, is one who first desires and works for his own survival and wishes to do well for himself. He also spends time alone with himself. Due to a necessary balance between rationality and awareness of another person (evident in both thought and action), he controls his own decisions and does have not have conflict within himself over these decisions, and he maintains a consistency in the things with which he does and does not find pleasure. This follows with Aristotle’s theory that habitually just actions are the definition and justice, rather than random acts.
Within these two definitions, there are direct correlations. First, just as a virtuous friendship requires that one wish his friend’s existence for his friend’s own sake, so must a virtuous person desire his own existence. Just as one should do good to a friend, so must one desire to do well for himself. As one must spend time with a friend with lack of selfish motive, so must one spent time with himself. Just as you and your friend should be in concord in your decisions, both having control over your reasoning, so must a virtuous person. Finally, just as one must share fully in his friend’s sorrows and joys, a virtuous person should consistently find pleasure and pain in the same things (which would include those pleasures and pains of his friend). Aristotle summarizes these points by saying, “âÂ?¦one is a friend to himself most of all. Hence he should also love himself most of all,” (1168b 9-10) and “These are features [of a friendship] most of all of one’s relation to oneself; and so too are all the other defining features of a friend, since we have said that all the features of friendship extend from oneself to others.” (1168b 4-6)
In conclusion, Aristotle argues that “virtuous friendships” are analogous to a virtuous person’s self-love. Each aspect of a virtuous friendship directly correlates to a virtuous person’s relationship to himself, and a person’s understanding of the love for himself ultimately allows him to be a better friend to others.
