Soviet Foreign Policy in Iran: 1945-1979

James Harlon Williams characterizes Soviet foreign policy in the Persian Gulf region as a “product of historical experience.”[1] Historically, it followed a pattern or strategy of “expansion, consolidation, and preservation.”[2]As Imperial Russia expanded its borders during the course of the Great Game in Asia, it emerged as the most powerful Continental power in Central Asia. Quickly thereafter, moved to consolidate and preserve that power through political shoving matches with .[3]While the Russians significantly pushed their borders southwards towards , the British countered Russian influence in order to protect British India. The idea of as a “buffer” state acted as the way the British used to prevent Russian penetration towards the Persian Gulf.[4] Since the British resisted a stronger Russian presence in the Gulf, employed a series of proxy conflicts while averting war with . Playing a game of power politics dominated Russian and British diplomacy. From the mid-19th to the early 20th centuries both sides asserted their political dominance in . Their goal was to dominate the enemy as much as possible yet averting war at all costs. Engaging in a head to head war would not be beneficial to either or from an economic and military perspective. In doing so, the tsar abandoned hopes of obtaining a warm water port in the Gulf.[5]

Using the Great Game example in as a “20th Century Cold War” comparison, Stalinist foreign policy reflected a confrontational attitude to consolidate or ‘contain’ political influence within while shutting out Western influence.[6] “Containment,” not to be confused with the Truman Doctrine conceptualization of Soviet encirclement, meant the consolidation of Soviet influence over . This pro-Soviet relationship excludes Western influence. In doing so, the Soviets needed to protect their southern borders by creating a stronger with their help.

Being able to protect ‘s southern border meant developing mutually beneficial plans for friendlier relations for each country. sought to stimulate economic growth with while negotiating likeminded economic trade benefits.[7] Friendly Soviet and Iranian participation lessened the chance for their regional enemies to threaten Iranian and Russian economic interest in the Gulf region. Constructing effective plans for border security and economic sustainability predominated Stalinist Middle Eastern objectives 1945-1953.

The Soviet Union employed a policy of containment through their Cold War ideological struggles with the West. The containment policy sought to reduce the prospect that political or economic opponents could gain greater influence than the Soviets could on their Southern borders. The Soviet thirst for a greater influence in the Gulf shaped the way Soviet leadership attempted to create policy and ensure stability in the region. Yet this idea of stability was shaped in ways that benefited the Soviets more than anyone else. But why did the want to so whole heartedly influence policy in ? In this study, I will discuss the ways Soviet foreign policy evolved in from a policy of containment from 1945-1953 to a policy of economic and political sustainability from 1953-1979.

Soviet foreign policy in developed in three distinctive stages according to Shahram Chubin.[8] Although the specific policies fluctuated over time, the overall goal remained clear; Moscow’s desire to gain more economic control over than the West could.[9] In defining control, motivations were not always ideologically driven. Soviet goals reflected more of a policy for mutual growth with . These stages progressed from 1945-1962, 1962-1973, and 1974-1979.

The first period characterized a coercive Soviet diplomacy which eroded Iranian trust. Worsened relations pushed the Iranians further towards a pro-West stance, notably the . The Baghdad Pact, the Bilateral Pact of 1959, and the question over foreign military bases in challenged the Soviet policy intimidation thereby deteriorated relations between the two countries.[10]

Relations steadily improved in the second phase where Soviet influence reached its zenith and began the second downward spiral in the third phase. The trend towards amicable relations began when the Iranian government assured the Soviet government that foreign bases would not be built in . Also, Soviet diplomacy moved away from confrontational politics or tactics of intimidation and towards a policy of cooperation thereby aiding to improved relations with . 1974-1979 marked the third phase of Irano-Soviet relations. During this time frame, asserted her independence away from the Cold War superpowers. In doing so, armed herself to the teeth and engaged in a competitive relationship with the Soviet Union.

Tracing the dynamics of foreign relations between and the Soviet Union the Azerbaijani Crisis of 1945-1946 provided the grounds for the Cold War, the beginning of the first phase of foreign relations,[11] and ‘s emergence into the new global order.[12] The importance of the crisis delineated Iranian attitudes that prevailed from 1945 through 1962. Russian support for popular nationalist separatist movements in and Kurdistan weakened ties with Tehran. The became concerned over Soviet support in the region and believed that predominate Soviet influence in could harm the oil trade. The countered the Soviet military presence in with an ultimatum on 9 May 1946[13] informing the Kremlin that military force would be used if the Soviet occupation did not to cease. By 9 May 1946, Soviet troops withdrew from thereby allowing Iranian troops, previously guarded in their barracks by Soviet troops, to supervise free and fair elections in and Kurdistan. In moving Iranian troops northward, they successfully quelled the separatist movements.[14] With Russian troops gone, the election in 1946 produced a constitutional majority to reject ‘s sought after oil concessions.[15] This skillful used parliamentary action as a resolution for the oil concessions the Soviets sought. Without free elections in and Kurdistan, the resolution for oil concessions could not be ratified. The parliament rejected the motion for oil concessions as a way to check Russian advances.

In the aftermath of 1946, the crisis in not only eroded trust in the Soviet Union (in a Cold War context) but the Iranians also found themselves distrustful of Soviet intentions. The Iranian government effectively capitalized upon the Cold War animosity of the superpowers.[16] Placating Washington’s fears of the “Soviet threat” one which the Shah never actually recognized as a real threat to Iranian Security, he negotiated aid from the , greatly contributing to the building of ‘s military apparatus from 1950’s through the 1960’s.[17] Thanks to the ‘s (anti-Bolshevik) aid, during the 1970’s became the 5th strongest military power in the world.

The downward spiral of Soviet Iranian relations continued though the nationalization of Iranian oil crisis 1951-1953. The Soviet government became suspicious of American oil companies. Fearful that the American companies would replace the British oil companies in , the Soviets played a careful game of diplomacy. After failed Soviet diplomatic efforts in retaining independent Kurdish and AzerbaijaniRepublics, as well as the inability to check Iranian parliamentary powers for the oil concessions, the Soviet government’s policy towards became conservative.[18]The Russians backed away from an aggressive foreign policy, fearful of provoking open confrontation with the . The skillful mediation of the oil crisis between Mossadegh and with the British, in 1950-1953 was reason enough to check Soviet pressures.

From 1953-1962 Iranians still felt distrustful of Postwar Stalinist diplomacy and moved closer towards a affiliation for economic support. Iran’s membership in the Baghdad Pact in 1955, the bilateral agreement with the U.S. in 1959, and the question of missile bases in Iran 1955-1962 all acted to increase United States economic and military security policy through out Southwest Asia.[19] The Iranians reminded of the aggressive foreign policy pursued by the Russians during the Allied occupation in 1942 roused their fears that they may not sustain their own sovereignty because of a Russian pressure. Similarly, Iranian distrust of Soviet diplomacy in 1945-1946 culminated with the issue of separatist movements in and Kurdistan. For military aid, accepted what the offered.

After Stalin’s death in 1953, Soviet relations improved but fell short of the gains made by the and its efforts in securing a pro-Western . The Soviet Union faced a difficult period transition as they searched for a new leader, Nikita Khrushchev. He thus embarked upon his domestic policy of de-Stalinization.[20] The Premier brought a willingness to improve security within the ‘s southern border states of , , and .[21] But the had already lost control of Irano-Soviet relations by 1956 when they attempted to improve relations. The and committed themselves to the Baghdad pact in 1955 thus excluding influence.

She found herself backed by Washington’s approval in signing the Baghdad Pact[22] on 11 October 1955. The result of joining the Baghdad Pact marked a major Iranian move towards a pro-Western camp and out of Soviet influence.[23] Yet Washington undermined this effort in not signing the Pact. U.S. Ambassador Gallman stated in his memoirs, “in this ambiguous way the State Department was saying that joining the Pact would only arouse Israeli misgivings and sharpen Egyptian opposition.”[24] Regardless of Washington’s formal signature to the Pact, they nevertheless participated in various economic, anti-subversive, and military committees. Harold Macmillan, ‘s foreign secretary confirmed these suspicions stating that if it were not for the Arab-Israel tension, the would have joined the Baghdad pact.[25] In 1959, the ‘s unwillingness to sign the Pact resulted as one of the causes for the Pact’s failure to be an effective force in the region. Without the ‘ binding signature for a security agreement, the fate of the signers remained a fate of their own.

Despite U.S. efforts to build a regional security system through the Baghdad Pact, Iraq’s withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact (after their revolution in 1958) dissolved the effectiveness of the Pact as a defensive force as a U.S. anti-communist containment policy.[26] The Eisenhower Doctrine, and it’s pledge for military support in the Middle East checking Soviet aggression, led to the adoption of the Bilateral Pact of 1959. The void created by the Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact further exacerbated the issue of Lebanese independence. troops landed in to secure Lebanese independence. Fearful over stability in the region, Secretary Dulles offered to sign the bilateral agreements with , , and thereby reinforcing the security arrangement.

On 5 March 1959, the and the signed the bilateral security pact in Ankara, in opposition to Soviet pleas for Iranian rejection of the pact. Meanwhile, Mohammed Reza Shah committed himself to building his countries armed forces. Securing a budget conceivable to substantially increase the effectiveness of the armed forces, financing came from the ‘ military aid. First, the Shah needed to convince the U.S. of Iran’s vital importance as a “front-line state” in preventing the spread of Soviet power.[27]

In creating the illusion of a Soviet threat, the Shah’s moved towards the Baghdad Pact with and thereby unnerving Moscow. The , comfortable with her aligned security agreement with ‘s periphery neighbors, could not help but continue the same relationship with through the bilateral pact. In this sense, the Shah’s skillful diplomacy with the during negotiations for the Baghdad Pact enabled the success of perpetuating a similar security arrangement with the bilateral pact. From 1953-1963, U.S. military aid to Iran totaled to $500 million, thus demonstrating how much Washington believed they needed Iran as a security investment.[28] The Shah then quelled dissident Tudeh support with the aid and created the state security apparatus SAVAK in 1957.[29]

Military aid, oil agreements, technical, and military support evidenced the extent in which gravitated towards the . Despite such support from ‘s enemy, tried to maintain amicable relations with her powerful neighbor.[30] This reactionary tightrope walk of Soviet appeasement acted well enough to keep the carrot stick desirable enough for Soviet tastes. Through the remainder of the decade and up to September 1962, the Soviets condemned the Baghdad Pact and bilateral agreements as “unfriendly” acts. The Shah in his 1956 visit to Moscow assured Khrushchev that the harbored no aggressive intentions towards the . Also, the Shah placated Soviet worries that that had not been forced into the Baghdad Pact by any force that may pressure her to use her bases against the .[31] In 1957, the Shah once again pledged he would not use missiles against his powerful neighbor.

After July 1958, with talk of joining the bilateral pact the Soviets pressed the Iranian question of foreign assistance and military bases in as an attempting to push them away from the West. The Soviet response typified their post-war behavior, claiming that the breakdown of discussion on the matter military bases indicated that missiles were to be installed. While Soviet policy makers knew the would not place nuclear devices into the hands of an unstable Iranian government, a clear definition of Iranian intentions for military expansion reflected Soviet insecurity. A matter of normalization, the Soviets wished to force the Iranians into a conciliatory relationship of stability on Soviet terms.[32] Fanatic for a pledge in 1962, Soviet leadership accepted ‘s pledge, “not to permit rocket bases of any sort on its soil.”[33] Accepting the pledge demarcates Soviet willingness for to continue her formal commitments with the West. Russian acceptance demonstrated the extent to which the Soviets no longer cared whether detached from the West.[34]

After ‘s acceptance of ‘s non- aggression pledge, a second phase of Irano-Soviet relations began from 1962 to 1974. Soviet diplomacy no longer pursued a course of intimidation; rather they chose to emphasize cooperation.[35] Fear of nuclear on the joint borders caused to reexamine their policy with . In response, the Shah did not want the Russian’s preoccupied with an anti-balance of power on his border. With Russian attention focused elsewhere, the Shah would have difficulty increasing trade ties. Therefore, providing a calm southern flank for the Russians proved amicable to boosting both of their economic relationships.[36] The Soviets, learning from their mistakes from the Baghdad Pact, bilateral agreement, and the question over military bases then employed a new course of diplomacy to try and achieve their goals. The pledge to non aggression ushered in a period of mutual cooperation with economic growth for the Soviet Union and the Iranians.

Seeking secure borders with , the Russians also sought friendly relations. Meanwhile, wanted an independent foreign policy of Washington and Moscow. Because the Kennedy Administration seemed less enthusiastic about providing aid to the Shah, he would need to get his “house in order” before the would commit more support to . For this reason, in the void of dependence, the Shah also felt inclined to seek support from the . Moscow encouraged bridge building and made closer ties with the two blocs.[37]

From 1963 until 1979, and signed sixty eight agreements sky rocketing mutual economic cooperation. These agreements typically were designed to increase: Soviet assistance for developing projects in , the exportation of oil and gas to , and the promotion of Soviet Iranian trade relations.[38] The financial backing for a steel mill in Isfahan failed through the hands of several European investors. At the end of 1964, Russian advisers were called upon to assess the prospect for financing and building the steel mill. Discussion continued with the Shah’s visit to Moscow in mid-1965. His visit left strong impression with Moscow leading to the signing of an agreement on 13 January 1966 promising for “technical, industrial, and financial” assistance between the and .[39]

Under Article 1 of the agreement, “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and shall cooperate in the construction of: a steel mill, a gas pipeline, and a mechanical engineering plant”.[40] In exchange for Soviet technical knowledge, management, and funding for the project, the Iranians agreed to repay the Soviets a percentage of 2.5 per annum of the items related to Article 1.[41] With a credit of 260 million roubles repayable in gas and other products over 12 years, this agreement extended into a 1968 to new agreement to finance the expansion of the mill, the mechanical engineering plant, and the pipeline.[42]

In the 1966 agreement, the Soviet Union agreed to build the steel plant in Isfahan

with a complete metallurgical cycle reaching an annual capacity of 500,000-600,000 tons of steel. “Production could be increased to 1-1.2 millions tons by including most notably: a by-product coke shop with one battery of coke ovens; a sintering plant; a blast-furnace plant with one blast furnace; a rolling shop with two mills for the production of sectional metal; a shop for lime and dolomite burning and production of refactories.[43]

The Russians also provided the necessary infrastructure including the extension of railways to connect with Isfahan with the coal and iron mines located near Kerman and which links with workers housing nearby.

The Russians benefited significantly from the terms of the 1966 agreement, notably the gas pipeline for the delivery of gas from to the Soviet Union.[44] To be completed by 1970, Soviets organization provided for executing planning, the shipping of equipment/machinery, and provide aid with other forms of technical assistance. Iranian responsibility to construct the piping, accessories, automatic control devices, and communications balanced the agreement providing for a long term Soviet investment. The construction of the pipeline produced a means for Iranians to pay the Soviets.[45] Offsetting Russian gas purchases favored their investment while balancing trade with .[46] Mutually beneficial to the Iranians, they did not need to tap into their foreign exchange reserves to finance future and current projects.

In 1971, the mill never started production as envisaged due to problems with coal supplies of low quality. Local ore resources in the Elborz Mountains at Shahrud had been depleted. Discoveries later that year in Tabas reinvigorated the supply. Yet the Isfahan mill remained dependent upon West German high grade coking coal imports. By 1977-1978, production reached about 700,000-800,000 tons a year. The revolution caused considerable disturbance to production goals. Falling considerably short, the March 1973 agreement boosted production output to a target of 4 million tons with a first stage of 1.9 million tons per annum.[47] And in August 1979 and renegotiated the contact to expand the mill enlarging the capacity to 2.15 million tons adding a Soviet credit of 243 million roubles.

The success of a mechanical engineering plant in Arak, as envisioned by the 1966 agreement, fell short of Irano-Soviet expectations (as did several other plans that never were finalized). With a capability of 25-30,000 tons per annum, the plant reached its standard capability at 25,000 tons in 1977. Yet by 1983-1984, production only reached 16,400 tons.[48] Seeking better opportunities, the Soviet Union and engaged in a variety of other construction projects. In June 1977, in an agreement between and the Soviet Union, they decided to build a large scale metallurgical plant at Esfarayen in Khorasan but the project never became implemented.

Earlier agreements for construction proved more beneficial to economic gains. The July 1963 Irano-Soviet economic and technical cooperation agreement facilitated a good deal of growth for both nations. Soviet assistance in the construction of a hydro-electric station on the Aras river created a border for the some of the region west of the Caspian Sea. Completed by 1971, two generating stations produced an output of 44 megawatts.[49]

With Iranian assurances for non aggression in reference to the missile base question, commercial relations with and the Soviet Union steadily improved.[50] The Shah convinced himself that Soviet dependence on Iranian oil would transform or socialize the Soviets to a more civil policy.[51] Yet stimulating the need for a perceived necessity like oil enabled the Shah to secure Russian confidence. The 1957 transit agreement came to power in October 1962. And on 27 November 1963, another agreement was reached between Soyuzvneshtrans and the Iranian Foreign Trade Corporation giving a 25 percent discount to Iranian trade through the . Soviet Trade through and to the Gulf Ports received a 22.5 percent discount.[52]

The closing of the Suez Canal in 1967 brought the Iranians and Russians closer together. Stressing the importance of the “land bridge” concept of transportation, transit routes became very important for the Soviets. In August 1964, and the Soviet Union signed a civil aviation agreement which improved Soviet movement to and from Southwest Asia.

Consumer exports from became important for Soviet trade. A three year trade and payment agreement resulted from consumer demands in and in 1964. And in 1970 a five year trade agreements negotiated another five year trade agreement in 1976. Iranian exports to the increased from 29.3 million roubles in 1962 to 283.4 million roubles in 1977. Likewise, the importance of Russian exports exploded from 14.5 million roubles in 1962 to 424.1 million roubles in 1977.[53] New Iranian consumer products like refrigerators, cars, air conditioners, and shoes created a considerable demand in the Soviet Union since Russian industry focused deeply upon heavy industry.

Trade expanded tenfold from 1966-1973 with one of the most dramatic changes coming from the arms trade. In 1966, bought military vehicles and trucks for $110 million in currency. And in the 1970’s, they purchased cross-bloc SAM-7, SAM-9, RPG-7, ZSU-57-2, and ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft weaponry.[54] And from 1962-1973, Soviet and Iranian relations improved remarkably. Trade represented a major contributing factor for improved Irano-Soviet relations. The result of closer economic ties meant ‘s looser affiliation with the West and a more attentive care of Soviet interest. Characterizing Russian attitude in attempting to flatter the Shah, ” is now strong enough to pick her friends.”[55]

On 21 November 1974 Mohammed Reza Shah visited Moscow. During his talk with L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, they discussed how they would like to continue economic trade, scientific, and technical cooperation on a long term basis.[56] As optimistic as the meeting seemed, 1974 marked the beginning of the third phase of Soviet policy. This period marked a return to a more hostile competitive relationship with the with appearing more assertive.[57] The Soviets became comfortable with an Iranian foreign policy characterized as accommodating. Post 1974, viewed their security policy in terms of military deterrence and pursued a more rigorous game with the Soviet Union and with the tinkering of oil prices. Heavily dependent on aid, Soviet’s gauged ‘s move towards the Western camp in terms of weapons procurement.

Yet several areas of conflict also acted to gauge ‘s pro-Western stance. The Shah asserted a more aggressive foreign policy in the price for oil exportation. In December 1973, the Shah quadrupled the price of oil.[58] In March 1974, in his New Years message, he announced the price increase. He also “introduced a new order more in line with the realities of the international community and the requirements of development.”[59] This new reality changed the operational system in place since 1954. The Western media began to take interest in the Shah calling him the ‘Emperor of Oil’ as dubbed by Time magazine.[60]

The effect of Western media perception fueled the Shah to become more arrogant and confident in discussions with foreign reporters yet the Shah called the move for more expensive oil “self defense.”[61] The Soviets agreed in 1974 to pay 15 roubles per thousand cubic meters.[62] In November 1977, the price for oil increased to 19.96 roubles per thousand cubic meters. By the end of October 1978, a strike stopped the production of crude oil. The following month as a new strike stopped production, the Soviets had a difficult time substituting lost resources in the wake of a cold winter. Those in Soviet Azerbaijan, , and took the brunt of the cold.

By March 1979 the Iranians wished to renegotiate the price of oil with the Russians. They met in Tehran December 1979 to discuss the price. Offering $3.50 per thousand cubic feet, the Iranians claimed that the price paid for Canadian and Mexican gas supplied to the The Soviets refused this price. They claimed they charged no greater than $2.20 per thousand cubic feet for their gas prices in Europe. Tensions escalated on 17 March 1980 when declared they would rather burn their gas than sell it for a lower price.[63] The Russians countered by constructing a new pipeline from Tyumen to the Transcaucaus. That new supply line brought gas from newly developed fields in Astrakhan and Tengiz.

Aside from ‘s new aggressive foreign policy, certain foreign policy decisions alienated their allies. ‘s support for an Indian Ocean Common Market was limited to the participating littoral states and seemed to be counter to that of an Asian collective security force involving the Soviets. Iranian economic assistance to and acted to reduce Soviet dependency in those countries.
In 1973, 1974, and 1976, the Soviets repeatedly warned the Shah that there would be consequences to his arms build up. To get the message of across, there were several Soviet over flights of Iranian territory after 1974. After the revolution in 1978, the Soviets used their military force to impress upon and their regional neighbors a reminder of Soviet power.[64] The issue of Iranian arms build up pinched a nerve in Soviet planning. Moscow viewed the procurement of arms as a political statement. The was not concerned that would use the weapons against them but the act of build up in the face of Soviet warnings became an insult to Soviet pride. Soviet Military maneuvers conducted in January 1976 hinted to the Iranians that if their evasive conciliatory arms buildup with the west continues, that the Soviet Union may respond with military power. Make the treat become reality 2,000 tanks and around 130,000 troops entered the Transcaucaus Military District, yet the Soviets claimed the military buildup was unrelated to ‘s military programs.[65]

Drawing from Stalinist lessons, the Soviets knew that transferring military power into political influence necessitates a great deal of skill and careful planning. The worst case result of under calculated planning could move the object target into the wrong camp. This type of decision making predominated the rest of the period. Firm and swift, the Soviet’s expose ‘s weaknesses and use them practically.[66]

To pressure effectively into coinciding with Russian goals, placated ‘s enemies. The Soviets armed with weapons in 1975; attacked ‘s participation in CENTO (successor to the Baghdad Pact); indirectly supported states unfriendly to ; and welcomed the 1978 coup in whose former president had close ties with the Shah.

As political differences continued, trade relations continued to grow. By 1977 bilateral trade surpassed more than $1 billion with Soviet exports growing by 50 percent just in 1977. By the end of 1977, the Iranians became the Soviets largest non-military trading partner in the Third World.[67] Most of this economic growth occurred because of the initiatives forged from the 1963 agreement. Mutually beneficial projects created possibility for economic cooperation and growth that lasted on through the third phase and into the Islamic Republic.

The Iranian Revolution marked the end of a pro-Western . The Shah departed 17 January 1979 leaving behind a legacy of 2,500 years of monarchy. , became fearful that if Khomeini died within the two years following the revolution that the would intervene and insert a more friendly regime.[68] sought to use their wildcard in the event of a invasion. The Soviets claimed the right of intervention under the 1921 Friendship treaty with .

The Irano-Soviet Friendship treaty seemed reminiscent of major issue back in 1950-1953 Iranian oil dispute with . The U.S., afraid that if the USSR had any reason to intervene could do so under the pretext of the 1921 agreement, they worked to reduce any possibility of Soviet invasion. Likewise, the Soviets supported the Khomeini regime immediately after the revolution. With Article 6 of the friendship treaty, the Soviets can attack a third party outside of who threatens the security of the .

Reinforcing the 1921 friendship treaty, L.I. Brezhnev sent a warning to the demanding they stay out of which he declared on 19 November, 1979. In this declaration, Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union wished to maintain good relations with . In doing so, the opposed any outside interference in ‘s internal affairs.[69] The declaration also became doctrine as it closed with,

It should be clear that any outside interference, especially military interference, in the internal affairs of , a state directly bordering the Soviet Union, would be regarded by the as affected the interest of its security. [70]

In that statement, Brezhnev equates Iranian security directly with that of Soviet security further emphasizing the interest the places within .