Civil War in Somalia: Why Did the United States and the United Nations Interfere?
INTRODUCTION
On June 8th of 1991 the United States celebrated a relatively easy end to Operation Desert Storm. During this same period Africa’s Somalia was in a heap of trouble. The country was in chaos due to political strife; Somalian President Siad Barre’s reign had recently been ousted by other clans. However, these clans soon became bitter enemies fighting for power. Clan warfare ruled the streets in light of a nonexistent government. Geographically, it was coping with drought and all the hardships that come along with it, such as low crop yields and little drinking water. In Newt Gringrich’s book To Renew America, there is a excerpt which I believe pinpoints the fundamental trouble with Operation Restore Hope. Gringrich recalls a friend, Owen Roberts, discussing his anger at the deployment of U.S. soldiers into Somalia. Roberts is quoted,
“We will temporarily stop the warlords […] We will temporarily feed the people. Then we will leave and the situation will decay again because we will not have taught the Somalians the rule of law, the concept of self-reliance, the principles of free markets, or any of the conditions of a healthy self-governing country. What a waste!”
Africa during the Cold War years can be likened to a game of chess, with its players trying to think a step or two ahead of the game. Somalia was, as I see it, nothing more than a played-out pawn piece between the United States and the Soviet Union. Siad Barre had been enjoying good business relations with the Soviet Union until sometime in the 1970s when he sent aid to Somali rebels in Ethiopia. Ties were cut with Siad Barre because the Soviet Union could make better use of helping out Ethiopia than Somalia. Now comes in the United States. We made a deal with Barre that if he’d give us entry to Soviet-made military buildings, then we would give him some assistance. Eventually, the United States also broke ties with Barre when he started showing his greediness for power by using his influence to stage fights between different Somali clans (Volman, p. 5).
A decade later, Somalia is still struggling to survive as a country. Its political arena struggles with clan-based diversity and individuals whose greed is outweighed only by revenge. Somalia’s economic status is all but null and void in today’s fast-paced globalized world. This research paper will attempt to explain why Operation Restore Hope was futile. Where is the mantra of Operation Restore Hope now? Should the United States and the United Nations take all the blame for this botched mission?
MISSION IMPOSSIBLE
America declares itself to be a country of ideals and strength. Whether it’s called neocolonialism, narcissism, or brotherly love: we, as dutiful Americans, feel obliged to take control of international situations. In many instances, such as in Somalia, we strut our military prowess. A ‘might makes right’ attitude does have a hokey sort of merit to it. For example, Vietnam must have seemed like a good opportunity for the United States to ‘strut its stuff’ against communist powers. Perhaps it’s comparable to a parent beating his or her child. In the beginning, it may seem like the easiest way to control the kid. But the child attains more strength and intellectual capacity each year. It’s usually only a matter of time before he or she devises a plan, whether by force or by intellect, to stop the beatings. Consequently, the parent’s long struggle has been decidedly futile.
Intervention in Somalia began in August of 1992 when the United Nations representative for Somalia asked its fellow members for help. The Security Council responded with what is known as UNOSOM I or, back then, as Operation Provide Relief. This mission was to be strictly humanitarian, a keep-the-peace kind of affair. After all, the main function of the UN is to “maintain international peace and security” (Thakur, p.389). UNOSOM I proved to be useless in the wake of Somalia’s dead government. Without the backing of a strong government, international aid supplies were stolen and humanitarian workers were basically just walking targets for robbers and the warlords they too often were allied with (Semb, p. 474).
On December 3rd of 1992 Operation Restore Hope was in the makings. The Security Council, after agreeing that Somalia was in terrible trouble, voted in a resolution that would “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian operations in Somalia” (Semb, p. 474). A few days afterward, the United Task Force (UNITAF) stepped up to the plate. UNITAF, which was led by the United States, started Operation Restore Hope. The United States, with approval from the United Nations, sent 27,000 troops to Somalia (Jentleson & Britton, p. 395). The goals of Operation Restore Hope were to “deliver relief supplies, help distribute food and medicine, and help protect relief supplies the UN is sending to fight famine […] Initial polls showed upwards of 70% support” (Jentleson & Britton, p. 401). The media often inaccurately portrayed Operation Restore Hope as a resolution to Somalia’s lack of water and shortage of food. In truth, many of Somalia’s problems were due to political greediness, not geographical hardships (Roberts, p. 439).
By March of 1993 the United States had dramatically scaled down their number of forces within Somalia. We were ready to call it a day and let the United Nations take over. Thus began UNOSOM II, which stressed building up the Somalian nation. Law and order, roadways, and a government representing its people were the foundation for this mission. But we weren’t out of the woods yet.
BACKLASH
UNOSOM II had some pretty lofty goals. It strived to lead Somalia onward to the righteous path of Western civilization. That’s just fine and dandy – until one realizes that Somalians aren’t puppeteers. Somalia is a nation based upon the politics of long-standing clans. To make matters more difficult for this mission Somalians did not trust Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who was the UN Secretary General at that time. Boutros-Ghali was known to be an advocate for Siad Barre (Zunes, p. 1).
UNOSOM II has, of course, since failed to take control of Somalia. There were too many hoodlums with armed with some serious toys (courtesy of the United States during the Cold War years – when we supported Barre because we thought he’d help us out in the long run). What little troops (is the amount ever really ‘little’?) the U.S. had left in Somalia were basically fighting for their lives instead of saving lives. In Mogadishu, Somali civilians wanted U.S. forces out of their city and were not afraid to fight for what they wanted. After a horrendous deadly occurrence resulting in the deaths of 18 U.S. Marines and hundreds of Somalis, the United States finally evacuated its forces in March of 1994. The United Nations followed suit a year later (Zunes, p. 1).
HOLLOW ANSWERS
Now I come back to my original two questions. Where is the mantra of Operation Restore Hope now? Should the United States and the United Nations take all the blame for this botched mission?
I can remember watching the progression of Operation Desert Storm on the evening television news. So how come I don’t remember news of Operation Restore Hope back when it was in its actuality? What put Operation Restore Hope on a backburner and Operation Desert Storm to the frontlines? Was it just luck of the draw? I seriously wish I had taken a keener approach to the political aspects of life back when I was a teenager.
Many of the journals I read about this Somali incident took the stance that the United States and the United Nations had the responsibility of what had happened. I did, however, come across a passage in a journal that put a different light on the matter.
“Reacting defensively to suggestions that the United States should do more to resolve the Somali civil war, one American diplomat evacuated from Mogadishu admitted that ‘it’s easy to blame us for all this’. but, he insisted, ‘this is a sovereign country we’re talking about. They have chosen to spend [U.S. military aid] that way, to hurt people and destroy their own economy, and now they are reaping the consequences'” (Volman, p. 6).
The aforementioned passage does sound logical, at least on a superficial level. Yet, there’s something wrong with its message. It bothers me that this American diplomat thinks Somalia is the ultimate culprit because they made corrupted use of U.S. aid. Shouldn’t the U.S. have been more careful about whom it lends aid to? I can understand that during the Cold War years the U.S. wanted to secure relations with other countries just in case the Soviet Union decided to play hardball. What I don’t understand is why would the U.S. want to gamble on a such a wildcard as Somalia. We knew Barre was not the most trustworthy of leaders, yet it was greed and fear which determined our actions. I find this circumstance eerily similar to the United States’ relations with Saddam Hussein throughout the years.
I don’t think anyone can ever really predict to-a-tee how an international effort will progress. It’d be like trying to guess the outcome of a national hockey league game. First period may bring a score of 3-0, but by third period it could switch to 3-5 without the spectators knowing what hit them. And the only people who “supposedly” knew how the outcome would be are lying through their teeth, looking for publicity.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jentleson, Bruce W., and Rebecca L. Britton. “Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of
Military Force.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 4. (Aug., 1998), pp. 395-417.
Roberts, Adam. “Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of
International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 69, No. 3. (July, 1993), pp. 429-449.
Semb, Anne Julie. “The New Practice of UN-Authorized Interventions: A Slippery Slope of Forcible Interference?” Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 4. Special Issue on Ethics of War and Peace. (July, 2000), pp. 469-488.
Thakur, Ramesh. “From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia.” The Journal of Modern African
Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3. (Sep., 1994), pp. 387-410.
Volman, Daniel. “Africa and the New World Order.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1. (Mar., 1993), pp. 1-30.
Zunes, Stephen. “Somalia as a Military Target.” Foreign Policy in Focus, (Jan. 11, 2002).
