The Civil War… Inevitable?

“From the time of Martin Van Buren through James Buchanan, men seeking the presidency had carefully avoided taking strong stands on the slave issue” [1] and had instead left matters in the hands of passionate, gifted policy makers such as Henry Clay, John Calhoun, and Daniel Webster. However, by the time Abraham Lincoln appeared on the scene during the 1858 senatorial race in
Illinois
against Stephen Douglas, slavery had become an issue that could no longer be ignored by political candidates. The great compromisers of the past were no longer around and their successors were unable to follow successfully in their footsteps. Slavery had been launched to the forefront of American consciousness and kept there by radical voices from both the North and the South, the loudest and most detrimental of which were the Southern fire-eaters who had sought out and planned secession since their appearance on the political scene. Subsequently, anyone with political aspirations “would have to tackle the slave issue head on before he took office.” [2] The Civil War therefore was inevitable not because the Southern leaders were so “hot-headed, blinkered and undisciplined” but rather due to the fact that a strong, moderate, compromising voice was not present in the political arena at the time to pacify the ideological extremes of the fire-eaters and, to a lesser extent, the abolitionists. The abysmal failure of the Crittenden Plan in 1861 which essentially appeased the South in every way (class notes) showed that compromise, which had once been practically an American art form, no longer had anyone proficient around to continue the craft.

Northern military leaders during the Civil War, however, appeared to be far more blinkered and undisciplined than their Southern counterparts and, as a result of their actions, made the Union pay dearly in terms of human life and battle longevity.

Although no stranger to occasional blunders, Southern wartime leadership was characterized by a tradition of military prowess. Confederate officers placed a strong emphasis “on the importance of leadership by example” [3] and, “if the number of complaints in soldiers’ diaries and letters is an accurate indication, the problem [of incompetent officers] was worse in Union than in Confederate regiments early in the war” [4] and most likely remained so until the tide of war shifted after Northern victory at Gettysburg. Legendary Confederate war heroes such as “Stonewall” Jackson and Robert E. Lee have been immortalized by modern Southern culture in forms ranging from bumper stickers to statues due to their uncanny bravery and strategic abilities. Thus, although certain issues concerning hot-headed, blinkered, and undisciplined activity on behalf of the military leadership plagued both sides, the North – for most of the duration of the war – was far more severely and consistently affected by the majority of them.

Hot-headed activity was evident in the form of impulsive and highly aggressive military maneuvers by leaders on the battlefield, especially in the Confederate Army. The Confederacy, although theoretically fighting a defensive war, often went on the offensive when battles broke out between the two sides. Celtic in heritage, the Confederacy carried on their historically reoccurring battle tradition. “For more than two thousand years they relied almost exclusively upon a single tactic in warfare – the charge. At Telamon, Culloden,
Gettysburg
âÂ?¦ they used the same furious assaults with the same disastrous results.” [5] However, when effective, these tactics proved to be devastating to the enemy. The surprise attack at Pittsburg Landing and the dramatic repositioning of troops by
Jackson
in preparation for the battle against Banks at
Winchester
both caught the
Union
by surprise and inflicted incredible damage upon their campaign.

A problem which repeatedly cost the North dearly was the limited perception Union leaders had of the potency of the Confederacy as a military power. After the first battle at
Manassas
, “the notion that the South could be beaten with one hand tied behind the North’s back had proved mistaken.” [6] Although both sides in the beginning shared the view that the other would be quickly defeated, the Union leaders still sustained a blinkered view of the South despite the fact that the Confederacy held various advantages over the Union army such as a superior military tradition, being on the defensive, and vast topographical knowledge of the terrain. While the North had very little intelligence on the landscaping of the South, men such as Jed Hotchkiss provided the Confederacy with priceless maps of various potential battlefields, “offering advice on ways to use the landscape to their advantage.” [7] Ultimately, as a result of the countless times Northern leaders underestimated Confederate strength, courage, and resourcefulness, “Union forces, larger and better equipped than the Confederates and occupying ground they had chosen, often found themselves overwhelmed in one part of the battlefield after another” [8] unnecessarily costing the army numerous lives.

Lastly, the lack of military discipline, noticeably greater throughout the ranks of the Union Army, expanded the cost of the war in terms of human life as well. Disciplinary issues each side shared in common ranged from the inexperience that comes along with fresh recruits to desertion and even problems with alcohol abuse. A volunteer’s term of duty likely lasted no longer than nine months and, in order to replace soldiers killed in action or those whose time of service would inevitably cease, fresh, inexperienced conscripts became necessary to replenish the ranks on both sides throughout the war.

Desertion also proved to be an issue affecting discipline within the respective armies. “Hundreds of menâÂ?¦ deserted” [9] either during or inbetween battles, oftentimes crippling regiments and forcing the induction of more inexperienced men onto the field. Although “many soldiers did not consider merely leaving camp to be desertionâÂ?¦ officers could not afford to be so lenientâÂ?¦” [10] and deserters were often punished if captured, and sometimes executed.

Another legitimate, albeit relatively minor, threat to the success of both sides came in the form of alcohol. Liquor plagued the [Confederate] army” [11] and “drunken officers seem to have been a serious problem in some [
Union
] units.” [12] One sergeant in an Illinois regiment depicted most of the captains as a “set of rum suckers” [13] while an enlisted man in the 18^th Pennsylvania Cavalry “attributed the army’s ‘inglorious defeats’ to ‘whiskey and incompetent officers.'” [14]

The area in which a lack of discipline inevitably proved to be most costly was the inexperience of Union commanding officers, a detriment which unnecessarily increased the expenditure of human lives and quite possibly the length of the war as well. The inexperience of Union commanders reduced the efficiency of the army as a whole and subsequently led to poor surveillance, communication, strategizing, and ultimately frequent leadership changes.

A lack in military leadership experience combined with the
Union
‘s blinkered view that the Confederacy was simply inferior in every way led to communication errors and poor surveillance implemented by the
Union
. Even when accurate reports detailing enemy positions were sent to Union officers, officials at times refused to believe them. “To one colonel who chattered nervously about thousands of rebels out in the woods,
Sherman
reportedly said: ‘Take your damned regiment back to
Ohio
. Beauregard is not such a fool as to leave his base of operation and attack us in ours.” [15] Due in part to both the Union’s underestimation of the effectiveness of Confederate strategy as well as the Confederacy’s knack for impulsive and aggressive troop maneuvering, the Union Army often found itself caught off-guard and almost completely unprepared. The assault at Pittsburg Landing, for example, almost took
Sherman
and his troops completely by surprise because he refused to believe that the Confederates could only be two miles away. Moreover, the
Union
‘s own sloppy system of communication often left it vulnerable to various unexpected Confederate attacks. For instance, Patterson, “confused by orders from Washington that left it unclear whether he should attackâÂ?¦ wrongly believing himself outnumbered by the enemy, chose the safer course of maneuver” [16] during his Manassas campaign. Blunders such as these cost the
Union
dearly in both lives and time expended throughout the war.

Effective military strategy was also not apparent during crucial times throughout the war. At times, northerners felt that there was “too much inactivity by our military leaders, they seemed to not know what to do.” [17] Such indecisiveness proved to be costly right at the start of the war as illustrated by Patterson, who due to lack of sufficient military intelligence, moved too slowly and lost the advantage in numbers the Union would have certainly had during the first battle at Manassas. Moreover, in
Antietam
, when presented with the opportunity to strike and severely cripple the Confederate Army with a 40,000 troop advantage, McClellan unfortunately hesitated, thus costing the Union more lives, time, and ultimately himself his own job. Inadequate leadership often required replacement; however, “with the U.S. Army undergoing confusing changes in leadership and location, it proved to be a good time for the Confederates to attack.” [18] Due to the combined impact of all the military deficiencies hampering the Union Army, the coordinated assault maximizing the strength of Northern manpower
Lincoln
had envisioned ultimately remained a virtual impossibility for most of the duration of the war.

The outbreak of the Civil War was inevitable. Without any legislators or politicians remaining with the talent to effectively compromise, no one had the ability to mediate between the extreme factions of the North and South and the country was subsequently torn asunder. Most of the war pitted “great valor in the Union ranks and mismanagement by their commanders against stout fighting and effective generalship on the Confederate side.” [19] Although each side struggled with some similar issues, the damage caused mainly by the inefficiency of Union leadership proved time and time again to be catastrophic.
Lincoln
ultimately made the decision to release the Emancipation Proclamation, banking on the notion that the European powers would not get involved in a Confederate war supporting slavery while at the same time gambling “that the South would be defeated before the North abandoned him and his party.” [20] Fortunately for the North and the millions of enslaved, his plan worked; however, not without the expense of countless lives and four years of the most brutal battling ever to occur on American soil.

[1] Roger L. Ransom, Conflict and Compromise: The Political Economy of Slavery, Emancipation, and the American Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 161.

2] Roger L. Ransom, Conflict and Compromise 161

[3] James M. Mcpherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 59

[4] James M. Mcpherson, For Cause and Comrades 56

[5] Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die 190

[6] Edward L. Ayers, In The Presence of Mine Enemies: The Civil War In The Heart Of 1859-1863 (
New York
: W.W Norton and Company, 2003) 309

[7] Edward L. Ayers, In The Presence of Mine Enemies 379

[8] Edward L. Ayers, In The Presence of Mine Enemies 379

[9] Edward L. Ayers, In The Presence of Mine Enemies 357

[10] Edward L. Ayers, In The Presence of Mine Enemies358

[11] Edward L. Ayers, In The Presence of Mine Enemies 247

[12] James M. Mcpherson, For Cause and Comrades 56

[13] James M. Mcpherson, For Cause and Comrades 56

[14] James M. Mcpherson, For Cause and Comrades 57

 [15] James M. McPherson , The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) 408
 

[16] James M. McPherson , The Battle Cry of Freedom 339

[17] Edward L. Ayers, In The Presence of Mine Enemies 328

[18] Edward L. Ayers, In The Presence of Mine Enemies 302

[19] James M. McPherson , The Battle Cry of Freedom 571

[20] Edward L. Ayers, In The Presence of Mine Enemies 391