FDR and the Supreme Court
Different interpretations have come about in relation to Roosevelt’s attempts to reform the Court. One interpretation is that there may have been something substantial in the idea of an amendment. Members of this group say that perhaps an amendment would have provided legitimacy to the proposal to reform the Court’s composition. Another view of this conflict comes from liberal minded thinkers such as Hubert H. Humphrey. This group felt that the New Deal was extremely helpful in meeting the needs of the millions who were poor, starving, and destitute in Depression Era America. Any reasonable, legal means that were used to enact this legislation would be legitimate in their eyes. A third group of writers and scholars took a critical view of Roosevelt as a person whose zeal and lust for reform went beyond the necessity for such actions. This group proclaimed the Supreme Court the winner, as they asserted their traditional status and put the over achieving Executive back into his place.
The members of the Supreme Court were largely of an era of conservatism, with many of the nine justices throwbacks to the Coolidge, Harding, and Hoover administrations. The Court was composed of four political conservatives (Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Buther), two moderates (Chief Justice Hughes, Roberts) and three liberals (Brandeis, Stone, Carduzo) with the two moderates acting as a critical swing votes in many cases. Because of the political leanings of many of the justices, the Court took on a very strong stance against intervention, resisting interference from the Executive and Legislative branch. In the case of Crowell v. Benson, the Court decided in favor of allowing greater discretion for the Court to determine “jurisdictional” facts. Chief Justice Hughes determined the necessity and the responsibility of the Court to determine certain facts in cases without bureaucratic interference. For an already overburdened federal judiciary, this decision was both an assertion of judicial rights and, more importantly, a curse to deal with many more details in deciding a growing number of cases.
Going into this maelstrom of conservative thinking, Franklin Roosevelt threw himself into the fray. Seeking the Democratic nomination in 1932, Roosevelt ran as a progressive reformer who wanted to take charge of America. He wanted to appeal to farmers, laborers, the poor, and all others affected by the Depression. He ran for the nomination on reform policies under agriculture, conservation, economic recovery, and national planning. Roosevelt was riding a very strong tide on his way to the Democratic nomination and the presidency.
A foreshadowing of events to come happened on the way to the top for Roosevelt. In his quest for the Democratic nomination, Roosevelt encountered difficulties with his stance on the 18th amendment, which dealt with prohibition. Roosevelt did not take a particularly strong stance either way, but was closet anti-prohibitionist. In order to ensure his victory, Roosevelt took a very strong anti-prohibition stand, which was endorsed by many Democrats. Roosevelt’s main ally in this effort was the Association Against Prohibition Amendment, or the AAPA. This group would later become the American Liberty League, which laid down a deluge of criticism upon the New Deal as unconstitutional.
The more important lesson learned from this aside is that Roosevelt did not seem to have a grasp of what the public wanted out of the Constitution. Early indications seemed to point to an ineptitude by Roosevelt in determining how attached the public was to the institution of the Supreme Court and the judiciary as a whole. The public would rush to the Court’s support because, as Leuchtenberg said, “The greater the insecurity of the times, the more people cling to the few institutions which seem changeless.” This lack of a gauge for the public would hurt Roosevelt a little in the future, though he gained enough political power that such a weakness would be covered by an immense mandate from the electorate.
Roosevelt swept into the White House and began immediately to reform the federal government in order to work for the people. Roosevelt’s call for “action and action now” was a mantra that would continue throughout the first term of the administration. Roosevelt sent many different pieces of legislation to Congress, including Social Security, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), and National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). All of these pieces were embraced wholeheartedly by pro-New Deal Democrats and the eager public, both whom waited anxiously to see what Roosevelt would do next. Roosevelt’s first “100 Days” produced legislation that was original in purpose and magnificent in scope. Never before had such sweeping legislation taken place and had been enacted at such a quick pace.
A stalwart force was waiting for the New Deal on its road to reform. The conservative Court engaged in a series of striking blows to the New Deal legislation, picking apart the constitutionality of many different aspects of the reform plan. A few cases came before the large push against the New Deal, specifically the gold clause case. This case dealt with the conversion of the gold dollar into paper currency and complaints from the public that the dollar standard had depreciated the value of their holdings and that the government should reimburse those who lost money in the conversion. Though this case ended up a paper victory for the Roosevelt administration, there was little consensus over the verdict. The majority decision, written by Chief Justice Hughes, stated that the government’s language of choice in contracts determined that Congressional power held strong over any change in contractual obligations. The obligation was not on Congress to pay back an amount that was parallel to inflation because it was dealing with gold dollars, not gold bullion. The Court came off as preaching to the Congress by scolding the legislature for irresponsible conduct to the public.
Two other cases acted as precursors to the true assault on the New Deal. The Court dealt with the petroleum industry in the “hot oil” cases. In their decision given on January 7, 1935, the Supreme Court found the petroleum provisions in the National Industrial Recovery Act to be unconstitutional because they were not in accordance with the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. Before this ruling, the executive branch could have regulated interstate trade of petroleum products if they did not meet quota standards. These standards were set in order to create an even playing field for petroleum producers. The Court used this ruling to further decimate the President’s ability to control the economy and allow the free market to fix itself.
The other case that would act as a foreshadowing of the discussion over the judiciary was the repeal of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934. The act’s intention was to provide for a pension fund for railroad employees that had reached a certain level of seniority. The act was met with enthusiasm by the floundering rail industry, which was hard hit by economic woes. The Court, however, struck down the act by a 5-4 decision. The reasoning was based again in the interstate commerce clause and denied Congress the right to disperse funds in such a fashion as it had intended for the industry. The dissenting opinion, authored by Chief Justice Hughes, stated that the worst part of the Court’s decision was that it denied Congress any of its legislative rights by limiting its ability to help commerce through law. The frustration as becoming apparent for the moderate and liberal justices and it was apparent that any New Deal legislation would face the extreme scrutiny and utmost criticism of the Supreme Court. This was to be the battleground for the defeats of 1935 and 1936.
Now knowing the prelude to Court reform, it is possible to explore the most applicable cases in the debate over judicial reorganization and reform. The first case is the Schechter case, in which the Court was to determine whether Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act was too sweeping in its authority to state legislatures. The case in particular dealt with live poultry codes in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. These codes determined sanitation, hours, wages, and other particulars dealing with the poultry industry in these states. The Court decided against these codes and the legislation as a whole on May 27, 1935. Chief Justice Hughes said in his opinion that the codes were dealing with intrastate commerce, which was outside of the jurisdiction of the commerce clause in the Constitution. He also stated that the NIRA was meant to create rules of fair competition, not rules of fair practice. This distinction would carry through to many of the economic plans for the New Deal; Roosevelt wanted to even out the playing field for the millions impoverished by depression while conservatives sought a return to the big business practices of the 1920s.
The second case dealt with one of the cornerstones of the New Deal, the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The specific issue the Court was asked to address was the processing tax provision of the act, which provided all of the funding for the programs helping agriculture. The Supreme Court decided in October 1935 by a 6-3 majority that the provisions were unconstitutional. They were found unconstitutional in what Justice Stone in his dissent called “a tortured construction of the Constitution.” The majority opinion agreed that the tax provision was within regulatory parameters and that an enormous amount of money was to be raised by said taxes. The sticking point in the legislation, according to the majority, was that the funds were being allocated not to the government as a funding source but back to farmers, apparently against the purpose of taxation according to the Court. The Court thwarted a huge cornerstone to the New Deal and, in the process, frustrated farmers and pro-New Dealers alike.
Supreme Court reform came to existence not in one burst but as an evolution of discussions and examinations by the Roosevelt administration. Roosevelt and his close associates started to explore options to reorganize the judiciary in the winter of 1935. This was on the cusp of the first few volleys by the Supreme Court to dissect the New Deal. While the temptation to jump right into the fray was probably tempting for Roosevelt, there was an election drive within a year and most definitely the need to work through the systems already in place. This was a need driven by the desperate times that existed due to the Depression and by the reliance of the American people on icons such as the Constitution and the Supreme Court. Roosevelt needed to show that the need for Court reform was not only within his power but was also the best thing for the nation.
As was demonstrated in earlier pages, there were several cases for the Roosevelt administration to base their claims for reorganization. The cornerstones for their liberal reform package were being knocked from underneath them and the house that Roosevelt built was in danger of collapsing. This being said, Roosevelt had Attorney General Homer Cummings initiate research on possible avenues of reorganization available to the administration. Cummings devoted the entire resources of the Justice Department from early 1935 until the birth of the legislation in December 1936. Cummings was the highest-level confidant on the Court issue for Roosevelt and was a capable political tactician. Cummings and Roosevelt would forge a partnership that would hold strong through the end of the reform campaign.
The process of judicial reorganization took a back seat during the 1936 presidential campaign. Roosevelt’s mettle and integrity were tested on this topic by later conservatives, who thought that he was holding out on the policy because it would have jeopardized his reelection. Roosevelt and his staff held back on pushing for change because they wanted to let the decisions of the Court speak for themselves. He had put up many of his New Deal policies and the Court rebuked them harshly; in Roosevelt’s eyes, this was the only course of action that would allow for judicial reform. Roosevelt was inept at judging the temperament of the American public in dealing with prohibition. At this point, even the casual observer of history should note the subtle ingenuity of Roosevelt in dealing with electoral politics. Roosevelt knew that the results would speak for themselves and he reduced any rhetoric of change until the voters of America gave him a strong mandate.
Franklin Roosevelt emerged relatively unscathed from the election of 1936. The American electorate favored the liberal changes that Roosevelt was pursuing as well as the limited successes he had to that point. The Roosevelt administration, especially Interior Secretary Harold Ickes and Home Cummings, saw the election results as a mandate for the now growing need for Court reform. They had been piecing together bits of constitutional law and precedent in order to determine what Roosevelt could have done to modify the court systems. They came upon four different ideas, all with their merits and disadvantages. The first option was to amend the Constitution in order to give expanded powers to the federal government, circumventing the repeated roadblocks to national recovery. Another option was to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as well as the lower courts, to hear certain cases. A third option was to require more than a simple majority to decide a case, eliminating swing votes and reflecting a more definitive vision of the Constitution. The final option was termed “court packing,” or placing more justices on the Court. “Packing” the judiciary required assigning a new junior justice to the Court when a current justice was not able to complete their duties. The “court packing” plan would rise above the other options as the winner in the reorganization derby but would face a long struggle.
Just after Christmas of 1936, Franklin Roosevelt and Homer Cummings engaged in many different conversations. Roosevelt and his closest confidants discussed how to present the judicial reorganization plan to the nation. They decided to start with some baiting during the State of the Union address in late January. Cummings and two of his assistants, Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corcoran, put together a statement laced with both criticism of the judiciary as well as a promotion of new reform packages to counteract ones deleted by the Supreme Court. Roosevelt also showed some ambivalence in a statement on January 22, 1937, to the national press, saying that any legislation to reform the judiciary was “iffy”. This was all precursor to the political bombshell that Franklin Roosevelt would soon drop.
February 5th, 1937, was the dawn of a new relationship between the federal government and the Supreme Court. The Court’s composition and its nature had indeed been commented on in the past 150 years of the United States but not to the degree that it was addressed by the Roosevelt administration. Instead of a portion of the government or a secondary player, the Supreme Court was now seen as the enemy of progress, as a political player, and as the roadblock to helping a nation out of a quagmire of conservatism.
Franklin Roosevelt revealed his plans to a shocked American press after sending his reorganization plan to Congress. In his address, he essentially read a letter from Homer Cummings that detailed the need for reorganization of the judiciary. Cummings displayed a long list of complaints that were all vital to the argument for reform. The first complaint was that the delay in justice as a defect in the system. All of the new cases that came to the Court dockets put pressure on the justices to render decisions expediently. The second complaint was that while there was a history of reform movements for the Supreme Court, most were met with derision and backlash. None was as substantive as the Roosevelt plan to reorganize and adjust the judiciary. Homer Cummings went on to say, “the evil is a growing one,” which required quick action and cooperation by Congress and the Court.
Roosevelt’s next move was to discuss this issue directly with the American people in his Fireside Chat of March 9, 1937. By this point, he had already heard many criticisms of the plan from the media and from many conservatives and moderates on Capitol Hill. With this in mind, Roosevelt explained the realities of reform and the situation at hand. He first said that the legislative approach that his administration endorsed would take a considerable amount of time. However, he reconciled this with “the need to meet the unanswered challenge of one third of a Nation ill-nourished, ill-clad, ill-housed.” Roosevelt would use the three-horse plow analogy in this discussion and many others to describe the relationship of the Court with the other two branches of the government. The Supreme Court was going beyond its constitutional bounds and was acting, according to Roosevelt and other critics, as a legislative body instead of a judicial body. The Court was not pulling its part of the plow and leaving the other two horses to do the work.
Roosevelt explained the Court reorganization plan in detail. The judicial system had to work for the people, not act above them. The only way that Roosevelt saw to improve the judicial situation, while maintaining the sanctity of the Constitution, was to add new blood into all of the courts. There were two overriding reasons for such a policy. The first was to move justice to a quicker and more efficient path while keeping the integrity of the Court at the highest level. The second reason was that the installation of new and younger justices would place people in judicial positions that had experiences in the modern American society and economy. Roosevelt thought that the older justices were out of touch with what the common person was going through, especially during the Depression.
Now, Roosevelt got to the core of his presentation. He went on to say, “I now propose that we establish by law and assurance against any such ill-balanced Court in the future. I propose that hereafter, when a judge reaches the age of seventy, a new and younger judge shall be added to the Court automatically. In this way, I propose to enforce a sound public policy by law instead of leaving the composition of our federal courts…to be determined by chance…” This plan, according to the president, would put the Court back into its historical and legal role as a judging, not a governing, body. Roosevelt wanted the Constitution and, more specifically, the judiciary to become part of a “living law.” Roosevelt sought to reinvigorate the liberal conscience of the nation by reforming the court system and stated that the legislative approach would be the quickest and most painless way to accomplish this goal.
At the outset of the judicial reorganization issue, the odds looked overwhelmingly in the favor of Roosevelt’s plans. Following the November sweep of national elections in 1936, the Democratic Party had overwhelming support and an apparent mandate from the American public. They ran on the same platform that had won them the 1932 elections but with the large sweep of liberal policies, the nation was clamoring for more. The House had four times as many Democrats as Republicans. The Senate seemed to be very promising, with several prominent Democrats jumping to sponsor the reorganization bill. Majority Leader Joseph Robinson and Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Fountain Ashurst were only two of many liberals to support the bill. Roosevelt supporters and non-affiliated supporters alike saw the “court packing” policy as an actual “un-packing” of the Court. They were attempting to remove conservative roadblock that were packing up the dockets with their rhetoric and political leanings. Senator Robert Bulkley of Ohio stated the goals of the liberals succinctly: “A constitution is not an idol to be worshipped; it is an instrument of government to be worked.” The fight was under way and like anything else during the Roosevelt administration, the judiciary and Congress would never be the same.
A variety of voices entered the discussion on judicial reorganization. One such voice was Robert LaFollette, the Progressive senator from Wisconsin. LaFollette’s support for Roosevelt and the reform plan was not just party based. In a speech given to NBC Radio on February 13, 1937, LaFollette described the judicial reorganization plan as an extension of the Founding Fathers’ intent. The senator explained that those who wrote the Constitution were against “judicial usurpation and refused to regard the Supreme Court as sacrosanct.” He further described the debate as an issue of special economic interests versus the will of the public. This argument set forth the popular dichotomy of the liberal wing of observers during this debate. The most important point that LaFollette made in his speech was the importance of Congress as the first line of defense against economic and social problems. In this sense, the Supreme Court was separated from the real heart of the problems in America. They were a group of nine old men who had no idea on what the realities of American life were in this era. LaFollette wanted the proposal for reorganization to pass in order to remedy this problem of judicial usurpation.
If the prevailing opinion of politicians, writers, and observers was similar to Robert LaFollette, no doubts would exist of the massive support that Roosevelt claimed. Many spoke out against Roosevelt’s plan to change the Court because of the dangerous power it would have given to the executive branch in the present and future. One such critic was George E. Farnum, a member of the Boston Bar Association and former U.S. Attorney General.
Farnum spoke at a Young Men’s Republican Club gathering on March 1, 1937. The tone of his speech was critical and presented a dire situation for the government if liberal legislation was to pass. Farnum said, “American people have abruptly arrived at a fork in the road. In one direction lies a continuance of those methods of free government with which they have been long acquainted; in the other lies unexplored territory.” The former Attorney General also said that Roosevelt tricked the American public by not running on the reorganization plan in his 1936 election drive. With this in mind, he observed that the Supreme Court was the last bastion of honesty and sanctity in the federal government. George Farnum saw the political apocalypse looming and warned fellow conservatives to take action against the seemingly greedy motivations of Franklin Roosevelt.
The public weighed in heavily on the issue of “court packing,” which affected the distribution of aid and employment to millions throughout the nation. A glimpse into American life at this point shows the true indicators of public will. Predictions, debates, and discussions were daily occurrences in the United States and a few examples will be illustrated here.
Debates on the topic of judicial reorganization and its consequences were very popular during the larger discourse about the Supreme Court. On March 11, 1937, a debate took place between Clarence J. Shearn, a lawyer from New York City, and Morris L. Ernst, an author and lawyer. Shearn portrayed the conservative sentiment in the debate, saying that Roosevelt’s plan was an attempt to give him some insulation from any failure for his New Deal programs. The reforms suggested would give Roosevelt “…six votes in favor of legislation.” Ernst, however, defended Congress and the President in their endeavors. His argument was that the reorganization plan was an attempt to fight against dubious Supreme Court decisions. This debate was one of many that acted as a middle ground between the rhetoric of government and the basic needs of the American people.
Predictions were abounding in the public sphere by many different means. Groups like the National Consumer League came out with statements in support of the president’s plan. In one statement by the League, they proclaimed that they regarded “…the proposed judiciary reform…as a legitimate means to meet the emergency created by these recent decisions…” Comments like this were votes of confidence to be sure, though lurking behind each of these statements was another comment against the President. Such commentary came from actions like the one performed by Representative Edward O’Neill of New Jersey. O’Neill sent out a poll of sentiment to his constituents, asking several questions in regards to approval for the judicial reorganization plan. O’Neill came back with the result that 56 percent of respondents were strongly opposed to the plan and only 25 percent were strongly for it. O’Neill’s results spoke to a need of his constituents toward established institutions and away from the uncertainty of the liberal proposals.
Discussion produced a great wealth of public opinion that is invaluable for this analysis. The bar associations of a great deal of states discussed the issue of judicial reorganization because of the vitality of the issue to their profession. The American Bar Association took a definitive stance, shown in poll results given on March 15, 1937. These results showed that all state bars were against the reorganization plan. The numbers were astounding: 16, 182 members were against the measure, while a mere 2,563 were for the court measure. Specifically, the state of Florida’s bar association voted overwhelmingly against the Court plan, in a 124-37 vote taken on April 4, 1937. Commenting on these results was President Frederick Stinchfield of the Florida Bar Association, who said that the result of passing this policy would be an all-powerful government. These results were very telling of the direction in which many middle to upper class citizens would throw their support; lawyers belonged to these classes and, in general, acted in politically conservative ways.
Franklin Roosevelt was no doubt vocal during this entire debate. In a speech at a Democratic Victory dinner on March 4, 1937, Roosevelt stated that the successes of the Democratic Party in the past elections were only a beginning. His vision and his motivation were to ensure for future generations a “Nation intact, a Nation at peace, a Nation prosperous,” assuming such a result would come from the reorganization plan. He compared the battle over the Supreme Court to that over slavery at the beginning of American history. That battle took over sixty years of debate before a civil war ended in emancipation. Roosevelt said that thousands were speaking in protest of what the Court was doing and this was a striking feature of American democracy. Roosevelt turned the Court debate into something that would strike at the hearts of the public: a battle between the tenets of democracy and autocracy.
The true test of how the reorganization plan would go was in the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. These hearings were to determine the constitutionality and feasability of changing the composition of the Court. The Roosevelt administration had the potential and the ability to turn these hearings into their own soapbox in which they could expound the dire need of judicial reorganization. Instead, the administration played it close to the vest in their testimony, confident of their support in the Senate. This would prove to be a mistake, especially considering the coverage given to the hearings by media outlets. The conservative forces in the Senate and in the federal government at large turned the hearings into an examination of the real motives of the Roosevelt administration. Testimony from Senator Burton Wheeler, a former ally, was scathing in attacking the reasons for reform. Wheeler went after Roosevelt for using age as the primary motive for his own personal power and his agenda as a close second motive. This debate quickly turned into a debacle, with the opposing forces bringing in speaker after speaker to attempt to discredit the Roosevelt administration. The Senate hearings began as a megaphone for judicial reorganization, but quickly turned into a podium for the status quo.
Events took an interesting turn first on March 29, with a reversal of decision by the Court in the Parrish case. This case dealt with an act in Washington state that would provide a minimum wage statewide. More importantly, it was the dawn of a new day for the Supreme Court. The key to this decision, like future reversals, was the swing vote of Justice Roberts. The reason for his change of heart was that the voice of public opinion was finally hitting home with the Court. Roberts, like other judges, did not want to have his power diminished by new associate justices. He was also, more than likely, coerced by Chief Justice Hughes (a fellow moderate) to switch his vote in order to placate the public and the Roosevelt administration. Whatever the reason, the Court was turning a new leaf in order to preserve itself.
The greater of the reversals came on March 24, 1937. The Court decided in favor of the Social Security Act, specifically on issues of job insurance and pensions. Justice Cardozo wrote the opinions for the two cases dealing with the act, stating that current economic conditions required Social Security. Specifically, he said, “needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the times. The hope behind this statute is to save men and women from the rigors of the poorhouse as well as from the haunting fear that such a lot waits them when journey’s end is near.” Cardozo echoed the fears that Roosevelt supporters had been crying out for months. It appeared that Roosevelt had won the war of attrition.
The consequences of these reversals were twofold. First, a general effect was to take place upon all levels of government. Local and state governments now had powers that they had not realized in the past. This would be key in helping communities throughout America gear up for a world war and for future economic downfalls. The second consequence was more obvious and immediate. The Supreme Court gained control of its own destiny for a brief moment in history. However, the Court also became weakened because of the way in which the reversal of decisions came. After months of struggle and criticism, the Court yielded to popular opinion. The Court’s actions were an admission that it was indeed a political entity, embroiled in the same amount of posturing as the rest of the federal government. The Court preserved itself but lost some of the power it had during past conservative administrations when it was seen as an independent arbiter of the Constitution.
Roosevelt did not yield, however. The president pressed forward with his reform plans, despite the advice of his cabinet and staff members. This advice became more apparent with the pending retirement of Justice VanDevanter and potentially a few more justices. This would have allowed the president to nominate (and likely have confirmed) several of his own justices, creating a liberal majority in the Court. His advisors also wanted him to focus on other issues neglected during the court debate. The fight was not worth winning any more, according to many.
The fact that the Court reversed their decisions on a few key cases did not satisfy Roosevelt. The Court could have easily switched back to the more conservative approach they had come into the debate with. Roosevelt also wanted to insure the strength of the Supreme Court and all other courts for the future. He felt that the reform approach was not a lost cause and would be easier to pass with the decreasing pressure on the issue by the public and media.
The demise of the bill occurred in a deliberate manner after the reversals of the Court. A few factors ensured the downfall of the bill, but one in particular signaled the unilateral opinion of concession on the fight. Senator Joe Robinson was the key figure in the Senate on the pro-reorganization side. Robinson had worked for months to get a majority to pass the bill and worked after the Court’s change of heart toward a new fight for the bill. The senator was also in line to get Justice VanDevanter’s seat in the Court, which would have solidified a liberal majority in the judiciary. However, Joe Robinson passed away on July 14, 1937, of a heart attack. On July 22nd, following the funeral of Robinson, the bill was sent back to the Senate Judiciary Committee, where it was left there to perish. Robinson’s death was the death of Court reform.
Following the death of the bill, the Court would take shape in a way that Roosevelt himself could not have foreseen. Several justices retired or passed away in the period between 1937 and 1943. Franklin Roosevelt would nominate eight associate justices and a chief justice in those 6 years, guaranteeing a turnover of both experience and political ideology. Among his nominees were Hugh Black, replacing VanDevanter in 1937; Stanley Reed, the solicitor general, as a replacement for Sutherland; and Roosevelt power broker Felix Frankfurter to replace Cardozo. The Court took on a remarkably new look.
First, the Supreme Court became youthful. The average age of the new justices was 56, very young in comparison with justices from all levels of the judicial system. Second, the president’s appointees were all “vote getters,” all having held office or being involved in electoral politics in some way in the past. This was important because the Court was coming to grips with its political nature and needed leaders accustomed to the system. By this same token, the new justices had little judicial experience, having worked in politics for the majority of their careers.
The power struggle between Supreme Court and the President changed the federal government to the present day. The Court allowed the whims of public opinion to influence its decisions. The justices may have saved themselves in the short term, but over the next decade, the Court became drastically more liberal, going against the underlying motive of the chief judicial body in preserving its conservative stronghold. Roosevelt came off as an arrogant bully trying to grab more power from the holds of the last bastion of constitutional integrity. In reality, Roosevelt was not only attempting to get his own legislation passed; he was trying to reform the Court so current problems would not occur again. Roosevelt was forward thinking in his motives to change the Court. He wanted a younger, more informed group of justices who would look out for the best interests of a nation recovering from economic depression. It appeared that he was only preserving his own power when, in reality, this was unrealistic. Even if that were the case, his actions were to change the Court in the present day. The judicial branch is beholden to the other two branches of government in deciding its consistency and its viability. This necessity was born out of the judicial reorganization drive of 1937. Roosevelt locked away his legacy as an economist, a war leader, and a social reformer.
