Failure to Anticipate: Israel Defense Forces on the Suez Front and the Golan Heights, 1973

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the principles of Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz applied to the Syrian and Egyptian attack on Israel in October 1973. The Yom Kippur War provides examples of situations where the principles of these two military strategists were both followed and ignored. Finally, the paper concludes with an assessment of what the result of the war was and a discussion about whether the principles of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are valid for modern warfare.

INTRODUCTION

At approximately 1400 hours on Saturday, October 6, 1973, Syrian and Egyptian forces attacked Israeli positions in the Golan Heights and along the Suez Canal. The Yom Kippur War, also known as the October War or the War of Ramadan, caught the Israelis completely by surprise. Before the outbreak of hostilities, it was widely accepted that any war in the Middle East would be decided in a matter of days by an overwhelming Israeli victory. Contrary to popular belief, the fighting lasted for over two weeks and resulted in heavier than expected Israeli losses. When the parties stopped fighting, the state of Israel had suffered “âÂ?¦at least 2,569 dead and 7,500 wounded” (Cohen, 95). The degree of loss cannot be overstated. The Israelis, with respect to population, suffered a loss rate “âÂ?¦more than 30 times as great as the American loss rate in World War II” (Dupuy, 603). Sun Tzu warned of hostilities that last longer than expected when he said, “Victory is the main object in war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressedâÂ?¦Thus while we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged” (Handel, 89).

The Yom Kippur War began with incredible Arab victories in the Golan Heights and along the Suez Canal. The successes were short-lived, however, as the Israelis quickly regained their composure and began to fight back. By the end of the war, the Israelis had moved nearly within artillery range of Damascus, the capital of Syria, and had re-crossed the Suez Canal and encircled the Egyptian Third Army. Despite the final military results, the Israelis did not achieve the rapid, overwhelming victory that they had expected.

So what happened? Several factors contributed to the overwhelming strategic surprise achieved by Syria and Egypt, including Israeli misunderstanding of Arab strategy, Arab deception efforts, and a critical Israeli intelligence failure. A closer examination of each of these factors will help explain why, despite the eventual Israeli military victory, Syria and Egypt succeeded in achieving intangible war objectives that were ultimately more important to long-term strategy and politics in the Middle East.

ARAB STRATEGY

During the early 1970s, the leaders of the Israeli government believed that their Arab neighbors, namely Syria and Egypt, were not ready for a confrontation with the Jewish state. The Israelis firmly believed that because Syria and Egypt had no real chance of a military victory, the two Arab nations would delay any military action until they were able to inflict heavy damage upon Israel. The famous military strategist Carl von Clausewitz warned against this when he said, “âÂ?¦the new manifestations in warâÂ?¦result mainly from the transformation of society and the new social conditions” (Handel, 6).

Israeli beliefs about the timing of an Arab attack were grounded in a theory that was known as “The Concept.” The Concept consisted of two primary schools of thought: first, that the Egyptians would not attack Israel until they had the means to strike at Israel proper (primarily with long-range bombers and surface-to-surface missiles); and, second, that Syria would only attack Israel in cooperation and simultaneously with Egypt (Cohen, 114-115). It was primarily a strict adherence to The Concept that led the Israeli government, and in particular AMAN, the intelligence apparatus, to focus on the period around 1975-76, when it was widely believed that the Egyptians would have received the hardware necessary for an attack from the Soviet Union. The Concept led the Israelis to focus on the order of battle, that is the hardware and technology on hand in both Syria and Egypt, rather than on the intentions of their enemies. Clausewitz referred to this narrow thinking when he stated, “Woe to the government, which, relying on half-hearted politics and a shackled military policy, meets a foe, who like the untamed elements, knows no law other than his own power: any defect of action and effort will turn the advantage to the enemyâÂ?¦” (Handel, 87). This statement would prove true when the Israelis met just such a foe under just those conditions.

Because Israeli leaders, especially Major General Zeira, the head of AMAN, had unwavering faith in The Concept, they did not pay attention to the changing political situation in the region and therefore failed to properly understand the and strategic objectives of Syria and Egypt. Michael Handel warned of this type of thinking in Masters of War when he stated, “The assessment of the enemy’s will is fraught with problems. The danger is that modern intelligence analysts and commanders may focus on that which can be measured rather than on the critical but more elusive factor of will” (Handel, 15). Clausewitz also cautioned:

If you want to overcome your enemy you must match
your effort against his power of resistance, which can
be explained as the product of two inseparable factors,
viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of
his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a
matter-though not exclusively-of figures, and should be
measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy
to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the
strength of the motive animating itâÂ?¦” (Handel, 15).

For the Arab nations, the reasons for launching a war in 1973 date back their defeat in six days by Israel in the summer of 1967. Following the Six Day War and the War of Attrition, which lasted from October 1968 until August 1970, Egypt believed itself to be in an impossible situation. The new Egyptian President, Anwar el-Sadat, inherited circumstances that included overcrowded cities from Suez refugees, a slow economy, and an Arab inferiority complex that resulted from repeated Israeli victories. President Sadat soon realized that “âÂ?¦it would be better and more satisfactory for the Egyptian people to fight a war and lose, than not to fight at all simply because defeat was likely” (Dupuy, 388).

Late in 1972, Sadat decided to go to war with Israel, knowing that the Syrians would be a willing belligerent. Egyptian objectives for the war included breaking a diplomatic stalemate with Israel, erasing the Arab defeatist inferiority complex, and destroying Israel’s security theory; Syrian objectives were simply to retake and hold a portion of the Golan Heights taken by Israel in the Six Day War (Cohen, 100). Arab plans included a decision to attack Israel on a Saturday (the Jewish Sabbath) or on a Jewish holiday, when they believed the Israelis would not be as alert (Dupuy, 391). The date decided on for war, October 6, 1973, was not only the Jewish Sabbath, it was also Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism. Conveniently, it also fell during Ramadan, the Moslem holy month, when Arab activity is noticeably reduced. The holiday may have actually helped the Israelis, though, because it made it easy to mobilize the reserves-everyone was either at home or at the synagogue.

President Sadat focused on intangible war objectives that the Israelis did not understand. The Arab nations hoped to improve their political situation over the long-term, echoing Clausewitz when he said, “The end is either to bring the enemy to his knees or at least to deprive him of some of his territory-the point in that case being not to improve the current military position but to improve one’s general prospects in the war and in the peace negotiations” (Handel, 115). Clausewitz also asserted, “In war, the result is never final, that even the ultimate military outcome of a war is not to be regarded as final and the defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date” (Handel, 16).

By focusing on politics as a crucial part of Arab strategy, the Syrians and the Egyptians followed the teachings of both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. Sun Tzu cautioned, “If not in the interests of the state, do not act” (Handel, 50). Similarly, Clausewitz warned, “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking: neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive” (Handel 13).

ARAB DECEPTION EFFORTS

Despite Israeli claims to the contrary, Syria and Egypt participated in an organized, intentional, and well thought out plan of secrecy and deception to hide their intentions from the Jewish state. In keeping with Sun Tzu’s advice that “He should be capable of keeping his officers and men in ignorance of his plans,” war strategy was kept under extremely tight control (Handel, 137). While the actual date for the initiation of hostilities, October 6th, was decided on August 22nd, army commanders were not informed until October 1st, division commanders not until October 3rd, and battalion and company commanders not until October 5th (Cohen, 101). The exact hour of attack was not agreed upon until October 3rd, when General Ismail, the Egyptian commander, visited Syria (Dupuy, 392). Sun Tzu warned commanders to “Set the troops to their tasks without imparting your designs” (Handel, 137). Accordingly, H-hour was given to the field army commanders and selected planners on October 3rd, to division commanders at 0800 hours on October 6th, to brigade and regimental commanders at 1000 hours, and to the assault battalion commanders at 1200 hours, only two hours before the attack was scheduled to begin (Dupuy, 392). These strict security measures helped to ensure absolute secrecy about what it was that Syria and Egypt had planned for the state of Israel.

According to Dr. Avi Shlaim, “The Arabs went far beyond mere secrecy and resorted to active deception designed to create a misleading impression concerning their capabilities, plans and intentions” (Dupuy, 391). In addition to strict security measures, the Arabs employed several measures designed to deceive the Israeli government. Sun Tzu places great emphasis on the role of deception in warfare when he states, “All warfare is based on deception” (Handel, 121). Syrian and Egyptian deception efforts were intended to reinforce Israeli beliefs in their own superiority and in Arab inferiority while allowing for strategic and tactical surprise. Clausewitz puts little stock in achieving surprise. This is reflected in his statement that:

While the wish to achieve surprise is common and,
indeed, indispensable, and while it is true that it will
never be completely ineffective, it is equally true that
by its very nature surprise can rarely be outstandingly
successful. It would be a mistake, therefore, to regard
surprise as a key element of success in war. The principle
is highly attractive in theory, but in practice it is often held
up by the function of the whole machine (Handel, 128).

One reason for the failure of the Israeli government to anticipate the onset of war in 1973 was that the Israelis did not take Egyptian President Sadat seriously. Sadat had threatened war before, in 1971 and again in 1972. Neither time had the Egyptian state gone to war. In 1973, Sadat reinforced the Israeli belief that there would be no war by refraining from making bellicose statements in his speeches. The Israelis should have immediately been suspicious, if they believed Sun Tzu when he said, “When the enemy’s envoys speak in humble terms, but he continues his preparations, he will advance” (Handel, 136). The Israelis also saw the release of 20,000 Egyptian reservists on October 4th and the sending off of soldiers on the pilgrimage to Mecca on October 5th as further signs that no war was imminent.

Clare Hollingsworth, a reporter for the London Daily Telegraph, wrote a piece detailing “âÂ?¦the poor maintenance of equipment in the Egyptian Army and the resultant lack of preparedness” (Herzog, 228). On September 26th, just ten days before the commencement of hostilities, routine press releases by Syria and Egypt publicized the concentration of troops on both the northern and southern fronts for annual military maneuvers (Dupuy, 392). On the same note, a news article that discussed “âÂ?¦the neglect and deterioration of Soviet equipment in the Canal Zone” appeared in a Lebanese newspaper (Dupuy, 392).
The most drastic event to occur before the war may or may not have been part of the Arab deception plan. No one is entirely sure. On September 29th, Palestinian gunmen held up a train at the Czech-Austrian border. They took hostage five Jews and an Austrian customs official (Herzog, 237). The situation drew world attention away from the Middle East and the Israeli government, along with everyone else, was completely absorbed.

According to Chaim Herzog, a former Israeli military official, “The EgyptiansâÂ?¦mounted a classic ‘misinformation’ campaign, which proved to be effective. It was based on a careful analysis of the preconceived ideas in Israel and expressed from time to time by Israeli military leaders” (Herzog, 228). Dr. Avi Shlaim supports this view when he says, “These efforts were part of an imaginative, intensive, and well-orchestrated strategy of deception which brought rich rewards. Particularly effective was the exploitation of Israeli weaknesses by deliberately acting in such a way as to confirm the Israeli leaders’ known belief that the Arabs were not ready and not willing to go to war” (Dupuy, 392). These views that Syria and Egypt used deception to reinforce Israeli beliefs about Arab inferiority support the advice of Sun Tzu to “Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance” (Handel, 124).

ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

The failure of the Israelis in October 1973 was a failure to anticipate that the forces of Syria and Egypt would attack through the Golan Heights and the Suez Canal. Anticipation is primarily a function of intelligence, and the Israelis were known to have one of the best intelligence organizations in the world. However, a belief in Israeli superiority over Syria and Egypt and strict adherence to The Concept led to an intelligence failure that was nearly catastrophic. Clausewitz warned against relying too much on intelligence when he stated, “The only situation a commander can fully know is his own; his opponent’s he can only know from unreliable intelligence. His evaluation, therefore, may be mistaken and can lead him to suppose that the initiative lies with the enemy when in fact it remains with him” (Handel, 108-109). Sun Tzu cautions, however, that, “When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal” (Handel, 139).

The Israeli superiority belief was based on two factors: faith in their intelligence assets and their knowledge of the balance of forces with Syria and Egypt. The Israelis, with good reason, had a great deal of faith in their intelligence resources. It was widely assumed that the onset of hostilities would be anticipated by approximately two days. This would allow the Israeli mobilization network time to call up reserve forces and give the Israeli Air Force time to launch a preemptive strike. Clausewitz warned against intelligence sources, saying, “Many intelligence reports are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertainâÂ?¦” (Handel, 121).

As for the balance of forces, the Israelis had every reason to be confident. In 1973, the Israeli combat effectiveness superiority was nearly two-to-one (Dupuy, 598). On August 10, 1973 Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, speaking to the Israeli Staff College, said, “The balance of forces is so much in our favor, that it neutralizes the Arab considerations and motives for the immediate renewal of hostilities” (Dupuy, 406). Chief of Staff David Elazar echoed this sentiment when he commented on the balance of forces in the Golan Heights: “We’ll have one hundred tanks against eight hundred-that’s enough” (Cohen, 106). The Israelis, by underestimating their enemy, contradicted Clausewitz when he said, “âÂ?¦men are always more inclined to pitch their estimate of the enemy’s strength too high than too low, such is human nature” (Handel, 109). Sun Tzu also warned about underestimating the enemy: “He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him” (Handel, 138).

The Israelis were also blinded by their strict adherence to The Concept. The unwavering belief that the Egyptians would not attack without the means to strike at Israel proper led the intelligence apparatus, as well as many other departments within the government, to ignore warning signs that should have tipped the hand of Israel’s enemies.

In September, an air battle occurred to the north of Israel’s border. Syrian fighters attacked an Israeli reconnaissance plane, resulting in the downing of twelve Syrian fighters and one Israeli plane (Cohen, 105). Israeli leaders believed that the Syrians might try some sort of attack, and that was the reason for troop build-ups near the Golan Heights. As troops began to accumulate near the Suez Canal as well, AMAN offered two explanations: first, that the Egyptians were preparing for a major exercise (Tahrir 41); and, second, that the Egyptians thought hostilities might break out because of the air battle between the Syrians and the Israelis (Cohen, 105).

Other troop movements were explained away by AMAN as well. Every year since 1968 the Syrians had ended the summer training period by occupying positions near the Golan Heights during fall maneuvers (Dupuy, 406). When Syrian troops repeated these movements in August and September of 1973, it was considered routine. Additionally, beginning in late 1972, the Egyptians carried out monthly maneuvers near the Suez Canal (Dupuy, 391). But by the end of September, AMAN was aware of troop accumulations along the Suez Canal that could not be ascribed to Tahrir 41 (Cohen, 106). Meanwhile, the Syrians had continued troop build-ups in the north and had forward deployed combat aircraft. On October 3rd, AMAN reported that Syrian Surface-to-Air Missiles had been moved away from Damascus and toward the front (Cohen, 107). Additionally, live ammunition had been issued to Egyptian forces. Aerial photography showed tremendous Egyptian troop concentrations along the Suez and the Egyptians conducted practice mobilizations of school training units, a practice that had been conducted on numerous other occasions. According to Clausewitz, troop movements, by their very nature, provide ample warning and negate any attempt at surprise:

Preparations for war usually take months. Concentrating
troops at their main assembly points generally requires
the installation of supply dumps and depots, as well as
considerable troop movements, whose purpose can be
guessed soon enough. It is very rare therefore that one
state surprises another, either by an attack or by
preparations for war�Cases in which surprises lead to
major results are very rare. From this we may conclude
how considerable are the inherent difficulties (Handel, 128).

In addition to the many troop movements, Egyptian officer examinations were cancelled on October 1st and a reliable intelligence warned that war was imminent (Cohen, 106). The Soviet Union began evacuating the families of its advisers from both Syria and Egypt on October 4th and Egyptair cancelled all its flights and began dispersing its airplanes. Despite repeated warnings and indications, AMAN continued to insist, until nearly the very last moment, that the probability of war was low.
While AMAN stuck to its assessment, others within the Israeli government believed that war was coming.

Zvi Zamir, the head of Israel’s Mossad, asserted his belief that war was likely during 1973. Major General Yitzhak Hofi, the commander of forces on the northern front, expressed his concerns as well. Lieutenant Binyamin Siman-Tov, an intelligence analyst on the southern front, prepared intelligence assessments on October 1st and 3rd, in which he argued that the troop deployments were preparations for an attack, not an exercise. His reports were not forwarded up the chain of command by the southern command intelligence officer, LTC David Gedaliah (Cohen, 115). Ignoring one’s military leaders violates the advice of Sun Tzu, who says, “He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victoriousâÂ?¦To make appointments is the province of the sovereign; to decide on battle that of the general” (Handel, 156).

By early evening the day before the attack, the head of AMAN, Major General Zeira, had ample indication of the coming conflict. However, he held out to the end waiting for a report from another intelligence source. This source came through, but not until October 6th. According to Trevor Dupuy, “Arab deception efforts and the Israeli intelligence failure were complete, when at 1400 on the 6th, Egyptian observers could see Israeli soldiers bathing and washing their clothes in the canal” (Dupuy, 409).

CONDUCT OF THE WAR

No discussion of the Israeli failure to anticipate the Syrian and Egyptian attack on October 6th, 1973 would be complete without at least a brief mention of the conduct of the war. In the south, the Egyptians planned a broad attack across the Suez Canal using five infantry divisions (Cohen, 101). Egyptian military planners hoped to take and hold a small piece of territory before digging in to prepare for the Israeli counterattack. In the north, the Syrians planned an assault by three mechanized divisions to capture a portion of the Golan Heights before consolidating their position (Cohen, 101). Instead of concentrating their forces, both Syria and Egypt attacked over a broad area. The hope was that by splitting forces they would force the Israelis to separate, thereby weakening their defensive capabilities. Clausewitz opposes the dispersion of forces, preferring to use all available power at the decisive point: “âÂ?¦there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one’s forces concentratedâÂ?¦to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point” (Handel, 76). The broad front strategy supports, however, the advice of Sun Tzu, who states:

The enemy must not know where I intend to give
battle. For if he does not know where I intend to
give battle he must prepare in a great many places.
And when he prepares in a great many places, those
I have to fight in any one place will be few. And
when he prepares everywhere, he will be weak
everywhere (Handel, 93).

Clausewitz and Sun Tzu both offer instruction on the Egyptian and Syrian plans to dig in and prepare for the Israeli counterattack. Clausewitz says, “The principle of continuity states that commanders must exploit an advantage by keeping the enemy under unrelenting pressure, thereby denying him respite or time to regain his equilibrium” (Handel, 99). Additionally he says, “âÂ?¦suspension of action in war is a contradiction in terms. Like fire and water they never find themselves in a state of equilibrium, but must keep on interacting until one of them has completely disappearedâÂ?¦military action ought to run its course steadily like a wound-up clock” (Handel, 104-105). Similarly, Sun Tzu states, “Keep him under a strain and wear him downâÂ?¦Exhaust him by causing him to continually run about” (Handel, 100).

Once the attack had begun, the Syrians nearly broke through Israeli defenses in the north and the Egyptians penetrated the canal area before the Israelis began to turn the tide. In fact, the Bar Lev defensive line in the south and the Golan defensive line in the north probably prevented an Israeli defeat. By October 11th, the Israelis had crossed into Syria and by October 16th had re-crossed the Suez Canal. The initial Israeli counterattacks on October 8th and 9th suffered heavy losses, primarily because Syria and Egypt had invested a great deal in methods for countering Israeli military superiority, namely antitank missiles and rocket propelled grenades (Dupuy, 596).

A final note must be made on the order of battle along the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights. In the south, 18,000 Israelis faced an onslaught from 200,000 Egyptians (Dupuy, 401, 403). In the north, 12,000 Israelis faced 60,000 Syrians (Dupuy, 409). By forcing the Israelis to spread their forces over two fronts in order to meet the Arab threat, Syria and Egypt were echoing Sun Tzu when he said, “If I am able to determine the enemy’s dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. There, I will be numerically superior. Then if I am able to use many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal with will be id dire straits” (Handel, 92). Clausewitz also advocated the use of massive force, when he said, “In tactics, as in strategy, superiority of numbers is the most common element in victoryâÂ?¦strategy decides the time when, the place where, and the forces with which the engagement is to be foughtâÂ?¦We are left with the base concept of the engagementâÂ?¦in which the only distinguishing factor is the number of troops on either side” (Handel, 236).

CONCLUSION

Looking back at the Yom Kippur War of 1973, it is hard to believe that the Israelis did not see the war coming until the very last moment. Repeated warning signs and indications of the impending conflict were noticed by Israeli intelligence. However, these signs were ignored by virtually everyone in the Israeli government. Several factors contributed to the failure to anticipate the Syrian and Egyptian attacks, including Israeli misunderstanding of Arab strategy, Arab deception efforts, and the Israelis strict adherence to The Concept, which ultimately blinded them to the realities surrounding the Jewish state and resulted in a critical intelligence failure that was nearly catastrophic for Israel. If war, as Clausewitz asserts, is the employment of military force in support of political objectives, then “âÂ?¦there can be no doubt that in strategic and political terms the Arab states-and particularly Egypt-won the war, even though the military outcome was a stalemateâÂ?¦” (Dupuy, 602). Sadat achieved his goal of destroying the Arab inferiority complex as a result of the performance of the Egyptian and Syrian armies. As for Israel, the colossal task they faced in assessing their enemies was warned of in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz:

To discover how much of our resources must be mobilized
for war, we must first examine our own political aim and
that of the enemy. We must gauge the strength and situation
of the opposing state. We must gauge the character and abilities
of its government and people and do the same in regard to our
own. Finally, we must evaluate the political sympathies of other
states and the effect the war may have on them. To assess these
things in all their ramifications and diversity is plainly a colossal
task. Rapid and correct appraisal of them clearly calls for the
intuition of a genius; to master this complex mass by sheer
methodological examination is obviously impossible. Bonaparte
was quite right when he said that Newton himself would quail
before the algebraic problems it could pose (Handel, 60-61).

The Yom Kippur War is but one example of how the principles set forth by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz apply to modern warfare. It is clear from the illustrations laid out here that the all three belligerents, Israel, Syria and Egypt, both followed and violated the philosophies of the two military strategists. Despite the fact that their guidance was written a very long time ago, the main beliefs of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz should be studied by students of military strategy. History is replete with battles that demonstrate the viability of their ideas because their principles, which are to a great extent common sense, are well founded regardless of the time in which they are applied.

WORKS CITED

Cohen, Eliot A., and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: Vintage Books, 1990.

Dupuy, Trevor. Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974. New York: Harper and Row, 1978.

Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. 2nd ed. London: Frank Cass, 1996.

Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. New York: Random House, 1982.