From the Alliance to the People’s Party

The transformation of grievance into reform is a delicate and elaborate process, requiring not just the wills of a great many but an infrastructure of education, action, and common good. This is made apparent by the example of the late 19th century debate as to how farmers were assured economic efficacy. The debate as to whether farmers should politicize and become a third and independent party or reform through established political channels raged for years. But in the end, the Alliance would make a drastic transition to a party aimed at insuring stability and equality for farmers. The People’s Party was the result of years of discussion, argument, and hand wringing by the leaders of the Alliance and other radical reformists. The events leading to this transformation are well chronicled in Lawrence Goodwyn’s The Populist Moment.

The late months of 1890 saw nothing of a party for the people, but rather a loose confederation of farming cooperatives in full effect in only a couple of states. The problems in establishing Alliance systems in the entire South and West were deeply rooted in sectionalism. Many of the Alliance farmers, along with Charles Macune, thought that reform could be brought about through the old party system. Many of the Southerners and Westerners had always voted Democrat, especially those historically attached to the old Confederacy. Their solution was to elect responsible and able political officials who would reform through their constituents (127). This antiquated attachment to pre-war political values would soon become dangerous to any movement for reform. Fortunately for the farmers, indignation over mistreatment by merchants and banks became too much for the farmers to sit idly by; more cooperative efforts came about as denial of credit became common (129).

Even when the Alliance, especially Nebraskans, was able to put together some political cohesion, it fell flat against the pressures of two party politics. The domination by Nebraskan Alliance members of Custer County in the 1889 elections still could not help their movement. Despite a heavy majority in the Nebraska state legislature, the rigors of compromise politics forced the Alliance representatives to pass a meager and water-downed set of reforms that did not accomplish any of their goals (143). Nebraska’s Alliance system would eventually topple during the transition to national politicization. The reasons for collapse were obvious: the state Alliance had no infrastructure or momentum toward a common goal.

The mobilization of farmers in the Alliance became much more realistic when William Lamb supplanted Charles Macune as the powerful voice of the Alliance. The conflict between the two over the politics of reform represented the agonizing struggles of the farmers themselves; the eventual rise to legitimacy of Lamb and his ideas were symbolic of a new way of thinking for the farmers of the Alliance. Lamb preached of a much more structured organization, expanding beyond passive acts of cooperation (155). His two main contributions, and probably the most important, where the idea of “lecturing school” (150) and of a “reform press” (157). These two ideas were meant to connect the farmers with a more honest and favorable media outlet and a means to connecting to the founding ideas of the agrarian revolt. These foundational ideas, mixed with a version of Macune’s sub-treasury idea, erected the independent People’s Party (158).

The success of the new party depended largely on the Alliance structure already in place (181). Places where the Alliance had originated and had been well established, like Kansas and Texas, were able to promulgate the idea of a People’s Party. But this was only a minor example of the successes of this newly independent party. The force of the movement was to be for the “industrial millions,” typically referring to urban laborers who had faced exploitation similar to the farmers. Laborers were not ready for any sort of mass insurgency, partly because they had no means of promoting their message and partly because their recognition strikes had been put down by big industry (175). From the Alliance perspective, the lecturers had nothing more to say to the industrial workers than what was in the Omaha platform, which did not directly correspond or hold much significance to the politically incapable laborers (178).

Sectionalism still encroached upon the possibilities of a uniform front. In the West, especially Nevada and Colorado, the agrarian front was not as strong as the miner’s concern for the “silver standard,” and for the most part endorsed Grover Cleveland for President in 1892, as opposed to the Populist James Weaver (185). In Wisconsin Republican rhetoric proved effective in eliminating the threats of the third party (187). In Minnesota, the agrarian movement became fractionalized by arguments of how to approach politicization. This characterized a good portion of the Old Northwest, an area where the People’s Party thought they would have a great deal of support.

The South was a different creature all together. For the most part, the movements in the old Confederacy were more than marginal and had gotten campaigns and platforms under way. The hindrance to the Populist movement in the South was the Democratic Party itself. Voter fraud and negligent practices characterized many of the local and state elections in the South in the early 1890s. One example of this was the gubernatorial race in Alabama in 1892, the first test of the Populist movement on a large scale. The election featured Reuben Kolb, the reform candidate and former agricultural commissioner, and incumbent Thomas Jones. The election results gave Jones the victory, but the results were later deemed fraudulent. Black voters who had been dead for years were counted in the vote for the incumbent Democrat. In areas dominated by white farmers, Jones was voted for in a land slide (188). The grasp of the old party still was strong in the deep South, though some headway was made just in the fact that the Populists had received so much support.

Things began to change following the first expressions of political activism and mobilization. Charles Macune largely became a non-factor in the Populist movement, deciding that he was not as radical politically as he wanted to believe (202). William Lamb lost hold of his position because he was involved in a libel case relating to his journal (203). At the moment when the movement was in flux and was at its weakest point, the two great leaders of the movement became inactive and invisible.

Goodwyn concludes his take on the early People’s Party with a statement about the forces of the old guard and the power of insurgency. He states that the old guard had the power of money, government, media, and traditional standing at their back. The insurgents had a contingent of small newspapers, a loose confederation of farmers who had a waning connection to the cooperative movement, and a small infrastructure (212). Indeed, this battle was not waged between two evenly matched forces. This was a large army bound to defeating a small rebel force, as is seen in the future development of this story. Who runs the nation now? The trials and tribulations of these political pioneers would answer that question for future generations.

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