Holy War, Inc

Holy War, Inc. represents Peter Bergen’s thesis that Osama bin Laden “âÂ?¦and his followers have exploited twenty-first century communications and weapons technology in the service of the most extreme, retrograde reading of holy war” (Bergen, 2001, p. 27). Bergen, a terrorism analyst for CNN, was the first journalist to conduct a television interview with Osama bin Laden. He currently serves as a fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C., and is an Adjunct Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University (www.peterbergen.com).

BERGEN’S THESIS

Bergen uses Holy War, Inc. to demonstrate how the terrorists that make up the organization known as al-Qaeda use modern methods to wage what is essentially a medieval form of warfare. He explains in great detail how the face of terrorism has changed, as represented by Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network, to reflect a new type of terrorist; one who is more educated, more affluent, and who uses world travel, global contacts, modern technology, and advanced business techniques to wage war.

This combination of people, technology, business practices, world travel and global contacts are each examined in Holy War, Inc. and represent for Bergen the fusion of modernity with the age old practice of terrorist activity. According to Bergen, “No single event better illustrates this fusion than the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Bin Laden’s men, some of whom had trained in the U.S. as pilots, flew passenger jets into two of the world’s most famous buildings in a martyrdom operation that would, in their view, instantly take them to paradise. They saw themselves as shuhadaa – martyrs in the name of Allah – and their attacks as acts of worship” (Bergen, p. 27). To understand the combination of modernity and terrorist activity, as demonstrated by al-Qaeda, it is necessary to examine more closely the elements of Bergen’s thesis.

EVALUATION OF THE THESIS

The heart of any terrorist organization is the people that comprise it. For al-Qaeda, according to Bergen, the terrorists that follow bin Laden are of a different breed than the terrorists of the past. Bergen tells us, “âÂ?¦the men attracted to bin Laden’s standard, like so many of the newer generation of Islamist militants, are more likely to have studied technical subjects as medicine and engineering, or had careers in business, than to have studied the finer points of Islamic jurisprudence” (Bergen, p. 29).

Additionally, says Bergen of the terrorists who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, “âÂ?¦they were generally well-educated, technically savvy young men who blended all too well into their various American communities in California, Florida, and Virginia. They did not wear the full beards of the typical Islamist militant, but were clean-shaven. They worked out at gyms, ordered in pizza, and booked their flights on the Internet. Some even drank on occasion-a grave sin for a serious Muslim but an excellent cover for bin Laden’s operatives. In short, the hijackers looked and acted like the increasingly diverse United States of the twenty-first century” (Bergen, p. 28).

Bergen spends considerable time detailing the types of individuals that comprise al-Qaeda. He particularly focuses on two well known terrorists: Ramzi Yousef, who was a leader in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and Mohamed Atta, the leader of the terrorists who hijacked four airliners on September 11, 2001, and attacked the Pentagon and the World Trade Center.

Ramzi Yousef, Bergen tells us, is the “âÂ?¦prototype of the technically savvy, worldly young men who are the shock troops of Holy War, IncâÂ?¦” (Bergen, p. 34). Yousef was educated in England as an electrical engineer and spoke excellent English, but traveled the world practicing terrorism in such places as Afghanistan, the United States, Southeast Asia, and Pakistan (Bergen, p. 34). Mohamed Atta, according to Bergen, “âÂ?¦embodies the marriage of religious zeal and technical accomplishment typical of al-Qaeda’s elite recruits” (Bergen, p. 35). Atta studied urban planning and preservation at Germany’s Hamburg Technical Institute and hailed from a religious, middle-class family in Cairo, Egypt (Bergen, p. 35).
Bergen goes to some length to provide great detail on the individuals associated with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda movement. His in-depth profiles of the leading figures, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, provide detailed characterizations of the neo-terrorists that make up al-Qaeda: young, passionately religious men who are not destitute and see a future without hope, but are in fact well-educated individuals with middle-class economic and social backgrounds.

These neo-terrorists are, according to Bergen, “âÂ?¦bona fide world travelers” (Bergen, p. 197). They travel the globe making contact with other terrorists who are part of al-Qaeda and with terrorists who represent other militant groups. The ability to travel around the world enables al-Qaeda members to communicate with individual terrorist cells and is an integral part of the group’s planning, coordination, and execution of terrorist attacks. Bergen also discusses the travel habits of al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden, to demonstrate the marriage of modernity and terrorist activity: “Bin Laden’s methods of travel are equally modern: when he lived in Sudan, he generally kept a couple of pilots on call. And when he traveled from Pakistan to Sudan with his family and followers in 1991, they made the trip in his personal jet” (Bergen, p. 29).

The brief discussion on the ability of al-Qaeda terrorists to travel the globe is important because it helps demonstrate the global nature of bin Laden’s organization. Bergen discusses at great length the global reach of al-Qaeda and likens the group to a multinational holding corporation, with bin Laden as the Chief Executive Officer, that has “âÂ?¦truly gone global” (Bergen p. 196). He goes on to say, “Bin Laden’s network-which also values technical proficiency, albeit of a rather specialized kind-is as cosmopolitan as the cosmocrats’. Consider the range of places in which it has principally operated: Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Kenya, Tanzania, Kashmir in India, and Chechnya in Russia. Al-Qaeda has also attracted followers in the United States-in New York, Boston, Texas, Florida, Virginia, and California; and in the United Kingdom-in London and Manchester. Bin Laden adherents have been arrested in places as disparate as Jordan, Seattle, France, Uruguay, and Australia” (Bergen, p. 196).

Bergen does an excellent job of detailing the global nature of al-Qaeda. He describes how the group has grown by saying, “During the time al-Qaeda was based in Sudan, the group forged alliances with a range of other militant organizations: Egypt’s Islamic Group and Jihad Group; Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group; the Libyan Fighting Group; a Yemeni group, Saif Islamic Jannubi; and the Syrian organization Jamaat e-Jihal al-Suri” (Bergen, p. 86). Bergen attributes much of the group’s global nature to an increasingly globalized culture in which, “âÂ?¦bin Laden’s ideas are influencing the beliefs and actions of militants from Yemen to Kenya to England” (Bergen, p. 37).

He goes on to say, “âÂ?¦bin Laden’s organizationâÂ?¦is as much a creation of globalization as a response to it. The network was formed in the crucible of an international conflict between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan-a war that drew in Pakistanis, Americans, and Saudis, along with Muslims from all over the globe” (Bergen, p. 196). Finally, Bergen says, “On February 22, 1998, bin LadenâÂ?¦announced the formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders.

Cosignatories of the agreement included Ayman al-Zawahiri of Egypt’s Jihad Group, bin Laden’s most trusted lieutenant; Rifia Ahmed Taha of Egypt’s Islamic Group; and the leaders of Pakistani and Bangladeshi militant organizations. All were brought together under one umbrella for the first time” (Bergen, p. 95). The global nature of al-Qaeda supports Bergen’s thesis because it demonstrates the modern nature of the terrorist organization. Traveling terrorists plan, coordinate, and execute attacks through the cooperation of individual cells in multiple countries around the globe.

Another critical component of Bergen’s thesis is the application of business principles and techniques to the al-Qaeda terrorist organization. Bergen describes how al-Qaeda set up numerous business enterprises, including trading companies called Wadi al-Aqiq and Ladin International, an agricultural company called al-Themar, a leather company called Khartoum Tannery, a trucking company called al-Qudurat, the al-Hijra Construction Company, the Blessed Fruits Company, and a company called al-Ikhlas, which dealt in sweets and honey (Bergen, p. 80).

Bergen goes on to discuss how the terrorist group treats its finances like a global business enterprise by maintaining bank accounts “âÂ?¦at banks in Cyprus, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Dubai, Vienna, and London” (Bergen, p. 80). Additionally, “âÂ?¦bin Laden also applied business techniques picked up from his years working for the family company. During the 1980s Afghan War, he set up offices in Pakistan and the United States; raised funds in Saudi Arabia; recruited fighters from every country in the Muslim world; and used the resources of his family company to build bases inside Afghanistan for his holy warriors” (Bergen, p. 29). Bergen goes on to give examples of bin Laden and his associates opening offices around the world, exporting fighters as if they were a commodity, and providing funding to other groups involved in the business of terror. Bergen’s discussion of the individual members of al-Qaeda, the global presence of the group, and the business-like manner in which al-Qaeda is run leads to a discussion of perhaps the most critical element in Bergen’s thesis: the use of modern technology by al-Qaeda members as they conduct their holy war.

Bergen’s discussion of al-Qaeda’s use of modern methods concentrates on three primary technologies used by bin-Laden and his associates in the conduct of their terror campaign: communications technology, the Internet, and the media.
Al-Qaeda uses some of the most modern forms of communications technology available on the world market today. An Aviation Week article on al-Qaeda’s communications capabilities stated, “âÂ?¦they are actually among the world’s sophisticated practitioners, and their wireless networks serve as the central nervous system of al-Qaeda’s military reconnaissance and command structure” (Aviation Week, 2002). The article goes on to support Bergen’s assertion about al-Qaeda’s use of modern technology by describing the U.S. experience in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan: “U.S. communications intelligence specialistsâÂ?¦detect dozens of wireless telephone calls to al-Qaeda command groups every time an allied unit drives through a village” (Aviation Week, 2002). The article continues, “The commander that controlled al-Qaeda’s reaction to Operation AnacondaâÂ?¦was a veteran of the fighting against the Soviet Union and simultaneously used at least five radio operators and communications channels, each involving one or more languages for each ethnic group involved (Arab, Pakistani, Uzbek, Afghan, etc.). The wireless telephonesâÂ?¦tied the observer corpsâÂ?¦to the al-Qaeda and Taliban combat forces and the overall tactical commander” (Aviation Week, 2002).

To support his thesis regarding the use of modern systems in the conduct of al-Qaeda’s jihad, Bergen tells us that, “The head of the secretive U.S. National Security Agency said that bin Laden has better technology for communications than the United States. The Saudi militant’s followers communicate by fax, satellite phone, and e-mail. They encrypt memos on their Macintosh and Toshiba computers. And in the mid-1990s members of al-Qaeda made a CD-ROM containing hundreds of pages of information about various kinds of weaponry, as well as instructions on how to build bombs and conduct terrorist and paramilitary operations” (Bergen, pp. 28-29).

To further illustrate this, Bergen tells us, “When bin Laden declared war on Americans in 1996, he described U.S. soldiers stationed in the Middle East as ‘the Crusaders,’ as if the crusades of the Middle Ages were still being fought, and signed his declaration ‘from the peaks of the Hindu Kush mountains of Afghanistan,’ a place barely touched by the modern world. That declaration of war was written on an Apple computer and then faxed or e-mailed to supporters in Pakistan and Britain, who in turn made it available to Arabic newspapers based in London, which subsequently beamed the text, via satellite, to printing centers all over the Middle East and in New York. Thus, a premodern message was delivered by postmodern means” (Bergen, p. 28).

Alan Cullison supports Bergen’s discussion of computer technology in an article for the Atlantic Monthly, in which he describes how he purchased two al-Qaeda computers in Kabul. An examination of the hard drives of the computers, according to Cullison, yielded documents that “âÂ?¦included budgets, training manuals for recruits, and scouting reports for international attacks, and they shed light on everything from personal matters and petty bureaucratic sniping to theological discussions and debates about the merits of suicide operations” (Cullison, 2004). Cullison went on to say, “There were also video files, photographs, scanned documents, and Web pages, many of which, it became clear, were part of the group’s increasingly sophisticated efforts to conduct a global Internet-based publicity and recruitment effort” (Cullison, 2004).

According to Bergen, “The Internet has had as great an impact on Holy War, Inc. as it has on many other concerns. The recruitment videotape made by al-Qaeda in 2001 was converted to DVD format, which makes it easy to copy by computer, and was made available in several chatrooms. There are also Web sites devoted to bin Laden and jihadist sitesâÂ?¦which deliver a wide range of products and services” (Bergen, p. 38).

A Newsweek article about an Arabic Web site known as Azzam supports Bergen’s assertion about al-Qaeda’s use of the Internet. The article says that, “Some intelligence sources believe the Web site mayâÂ?¦contain hidden instructions for al-Qaeda terrorist operatives” (Hosenball, 2001). Additionally, the article says, “British and U.S. intelligence sources suspect some of the site’s lurid jihad photos and graphics contain secret messages embedded through a technology called steganography, for which free software can be downloaded from the Internet” (Hosenball, 2001).

However, according to Alex Salkever, “âÂ?¦the string of attacks that police and intelligence agencies have averted since September 11 tells a interesting tale. From seizing a bomb-materials cache in Belgium to uncovering a possible plot to gas the U.S. Embassy in Rome with deadly cyanide, the success in thwarting threats has been truly breathtaking. Considering the difficulties in getting agents on the ground inside small terrorist cells that function within tight-knit militant Islamic communities, the likely alternative is that al-Qaeda has been hacked quite nicely” (Salkever, 2002). If Salkever is correct, a major component of Bergen’s thesis may be made irrelevant. While the Internet is only one component of the modern technology described by Bergen, it represents an advanced form of technological communication capability that al-Qaeda has relied upon heavily to coordinate and plan its terrorist attacks.

The final major component of Bergen’s discussion of technology deals with al-Qaeda’s use of the media. Bergen tells us that bin Laden, in 1997, “âÂ?¦gave his first television interviewâÂ?¦to CNN from one of his hideouts near Jalalabad” (Bergen, p. 94). According to Bergen, bin Laden “âÂ?¦demonstrates a keen understanding of the media’s insatiable need for new pictures and statements” (Bergen, p. 232). Nothing demonstrates this better, as Bergen discusses, than when the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom, the attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan: “At the very moment that tens, perhaps hundreds, of millions of people around the world were glued to the grainy green nightscope picture of the bombing raids in Afghanistan, the world’s most wanted man popped up in the middle of the coverage to revel in al-Qaeda’s success” (Bergen, p. 233). He goes on to say, “It was a supremely confident performance and a perfect illustration of Holy War, Inc. in operation-utilizing the satellite uplinks of the world’s television networks to beam a global message of holy war” (Bergen, p. 233).

CONCLUSION

Peter Bergen provides an in-depth discussion of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization. He accomplished his purpose of explaining how al-Qaeda uses modern methods to wage a premodern form of warfare by drawing on first-hand interviews with people who have been involved with Osama bin Laden. His journalistic credentials are no more spectacular than any other network terrorism analyst, but he traveled to the lands most utilized by bin Laden and his followers. He went into the heart of the home of the Taliban and met bin Laden himself.

Bergen devotes entire chapters to the development of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. He provides incredible detail in support of his thesis by examining very closely the reasons for al-Qaeda’s existence and the men and groups that support its goals. His focus on the global nature of the group is evidenced by his detailed discussions of bin Laden’s time in Sudan and Afghanistan, the influence of Egyptian radical groups on al-Qaeda, and the connections between al-Qaeda and terrorist activities in Great Britain, the United States, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Chechnya. While much of the material presented is openly available, his use of knowledgeable sources lends a credibility to his work that is found in few other places. This book is recommended reading for anyone wanting to understand why al-Qaeda is at war with the United States. It is easy to read and provides a level of detail that will enlighten the minds of those who take the time to understand it.

WORKS CITED

Al-Qaeda Uses Secure Links To Track U.S. Troops in Combat. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11/25/2002, Vol. 157 Issue 22, p56. Retrieved from Ebscohost database on the World Wide Web: http://ebscohost.com.
Bergen, P. (2001). Holy War, Inc. New York: The Free Press.
Cullison, A. (2004). Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive. The Atlantic Monthly, September, 2004. Retrieved from Ebscohost database on the World Wide Web: http://ebscohost.com.
Hosenball, M. (2001). Warning From A Web Site. Newsweek, 12/17/2001, Vol. 138 Issue 25, p8. Retrieved from Ebscohost database on the World Wide Web: http://ebscohost.com.
Peter Bergen Web Site at http://www.peterbergen.com.
Salkever, A. (2002). Hacking Al Qaeda’s Secrets. Business Week Online, 3/12/2002, pN.PAG, 00p. Retrieved from Ebscohost database on the World Wide Web: http://ebscohost.com.