How to Get Out of Iraq: A Proposal
This trend of increasing violence has caused many Americans, including ones who supported the Iraqi war when it first began in 2003, to reconsider the intelligence and practicality of keeping American troops in the country much longer, especially as more and more Americans are dying every day. On the other hand, many Americans still feel a sense of responsibility towards the fledgling post-Saddam Iraqi state; if America was to leave, would we simply be dooming the country to failure, and ultimately, a period of violence even worse than what was seen under Saddam? How should these equally valid concerns be weighed against each other? In examining this question, it is helpful to consider two opposite views: that America should withdraw immediately, and commit to being out of Iraq within six months, and that America should commit to staying in Iraq for as long as necessary, whatever that may mean. By examining these two options, it becomes clear that both have serious faults, and it appears that a compromise between immediate withdrawal and long-term occupation is the most practical and appropriate course of action.
The first option, that America should immediately announce and begin planning complete withdrawal from Iraq, and be out within six months, is fairly straightforward. America would simply declare that the troops had accomplished the goals of the mission; that is, the ousting of Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist regime, and the construction of a form of government that could govern Iraq independently; and thus had no further reason to remain in the country. While this option may at first appeal to those who feel America has accomplished its goals, or that America should have never entered Iraq in the first place, or that every day America spends in Iraq is one more day American soldiers could needlessly be killed, there are a number of logistical problems associated with this option that make it all but impossible. These problems include the realistic state of affairs of the government in Iraq, regional considerations, and the effects such a swift withdrawal from Iraq would have on American interests.
If America withdrew from Iraq immediately, it would be leaving behind a fledgling government ill prepared to deal with the troubles the Iraqi state will present. These troubles are many and varied; perhaps the most pressing of all are the sectarian and ethnic tensions that have been an underlaying problem in Iraq since the country’s conception. Under Saddam, control was held by one man, and, while Saddam certainly did much to harm and marginalize the various factions, elevating Sunni Arabs above both Kurds and Shiite Arabs, the actual tensions between these three groups was kept to a minimum. With Saddam’s stranglehold lifted, however, these tensions have once again risen to the surface. The Shiite Arabs, who make up a majority of the country’s population, are eager to exercise real power in the government, something they were not allowed to do under Saddam. The Kurds in the northern Iraqi provinces are also eager to exercise real power, although they clearly wish to do so apart from any centralized Iraqi authority, perhaps even with full independence, which would seriously hurt the financial stability of the country, as there are large oil fields in the northern provinces.. And finally, the Sunni Arabs, for many decades holding a monopoly of power within the state apparatus despite being a statistical minority in the population, are now facing a future that would have them a minority in the government as well.
With three large factions all with differing opinions in how the state should be run, the possibility of a civil war erupting is very real. (While some may argue that a civil war already has started, at the present time there are no large-scale battles being fought between factions; what some argue is civil war is in fact simply terrorist activity.) To keep a civil war from becoming inevitable, the Iraqi government must have both validity and strength in the eyes of the Iraqi people, enough so to make the people believe in and depend on the government. In order to gain this strength and validity, it must operate efficiently and appropriately, something that, up to this point, has not yet been accomplished. While it is true various versions of constitutions have been drafted, and various elections have been held, the Iraqi government itself has done little other than organize itself; no lasting decisions have been made, no acts have been passed that firmly set up the government as the real authority in Iraq.
The reason the government has been unable to accomplish much is partly because of the continuing divides in the population; no segments wants to allow other segments to have any power, and thus compromise is never reached. Another reason is the constant uncertainty the government workers operate under; terrorist factions are eager to see the government fail, and hardly a day goes by without a report of some Iraqi government official having been attacked or killed.
If the US was to withdraw immediately, the Iraqi government would never have the chance to operate as an actual government. Without US pressure to compromise, there would be little chance of the various factions actually coming to agreements on just about anything. The Kurdish issue is an excellent example; they have always wanted independence. If the Kurds gained independence, however, it would cause all sorts of problems, including a possible push by Shiites for their own independence, and an uproar from Sunnis, who would be left with little to no oil resources. The US recognizes this, and has so far been able to keep Kurdish interests, while still focused on almost complete autonomy, at least away from a goal of complete independence. Additionally, the US’ immediate withdrawal would cause a huge security problem for the Iraqi government. While more and more Iraqi security forces are being trained, there simply are not yet enough of them to guarantee the safety of Iraqi government officials. It would be almost impossible for the Iraqi government to operate efficiently under the constant threat of terrorist attacks. The US is vital, then, in helping the Iraqi government get onto its feet, and establish itself as a valid and strong force in the country.
On the other end of the spectrum from withdrawal in six months is the option for US troops to remain in Iraq indefinitely. This option would have equally devastating effects for the Iraqi government, though in very different ways. If the US was to continue to occupy Iraq and show no signs of withdrawal, the Iraqi government would likely come to depend on the US forces as a crutch, a power that will always be there to offer support. When the US finally did leave, the Iraqi government would not have had the chance to become an independent force. An indefinite stay by the US would also cause the Iraqi government to lose legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqi citizens; the government would be viewed as an American puppet, and thus would be unable to gain the trust and support of the Iraqi people. In theory, an indefinite American stay would help the security situation, in that if American troops are in the area, there would be less of a threat from insurgents and terrorists. In reality, however, continued US occupation could have the opposite effect, brining more regular Iraqis, tired of an American presence, over to the side of the insurgents, and thus ultimately decrease security.
In the middle of these two extremes lies another option: the US announcing plans to withdraw once certain criterion are met. Specifically, the US could say they would begin a complete withdrawal once the Iraqi government had begun to operate effectively. This option would allow the US to provide security and support for the Iraqi government, but would also make sure that the US troops were never a crutch for the government, as withdrawal would be imminent. Some might argue that this option would cause the Iraqi government to purposefully avoid becoming effective in order to keep US troops in Iraq for security reasons; as mentioned previously, however, the longer US troops stayed in the country, the more likely it would become that regular Iraqis would begin to sympathize with and perhaps even join the insurgency, and the more precarious the security situation would become. By announcing a plan to withdraw once the Iraqi government was up and running, the US would be showing insurgents they were willing to leave, and give the insurgents a reason to actually support the government. Additionally, by announcing its intentions to leave, the US would be giving the various factions a reason to begin to cooperate. While to some extent the US presence is forcing limited compromise between the factions, it is also allowing the leaders of the factions to rail against the US as the cause of all of Iraq’s problems. With the US gone, the various leaders would no longer have a scapegoat, and, despite long-standing cleavages within the population, a civil war is certainly not a preferred outcome for an independent Iraq. Thus, factions and faction leaders would practically be forced into some type of compromise, not by the presence of the US, but by the threat of what US withdrawal will do to the country without a compromise.
When examining these plans of actions in terms of consequences in the Persian Gulf and Middle East regions, it is again clear that neither end of the spectrum is appropriate; it is only when a compromise between the two is considered that a viable solution is found. If the US was to immediately begin withdrawing forces from Iraq, and be out within six months, it would produce a country that would serve as a haven to terrorists in the region. Six months is not nearly enough time to ensure that Iraqi forces could provide adequate coverage of Iraq’s borders; it is also not enough time to arrange for other countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria, to provide patrols on their side of the border. While the Iraqi border may be porous now, even with US troops in the country, without US troops it would be an open hole, allowing outlaws an easy place to escape to and hide in.
Terrorists and outlaws would clearly be bad for the security of Iraq, but they would also be a substantial threat to the countries surrounding Iraq. With unprotected borders, terrorist groups that disagreed with Iraq’s neighboring regimes would be able to conduct operations virtually unfettered. Adding to this problem would be the possibility of further unrest in Iraq itself; if a civil war was to break out, Iraqi forces would be so busy fighting each other, or perhaps trying to protect the government, that there would be no possible way Iraqi forces could pay attention to outlaws living in border towns. Thus, terrorist networks would have a base of operations from which to strike against the neighboring states, such as Saudi Arabia. Immediate US withdrawal, then, could significantly harm these countries; if one of the regimes were toppled, others could follow, and the US could be facing regimes much more hostile to US interests.
Additionally, immediate US withdrawal could paint an unflattering picture of the US in the Middle East. If the US simply left, it could be seen as a defeat, a sign that the US did not have the resolve to see operations in Iraq through to completion. This could embolden the enemies of the US, both state actors that may want to challenge American positions on key issues (Iran enriching uranium) and individual terrorist actors terrorist that would see a retreat as being the ultimate affirmation of the winning power of insurgency and terrorism, (Osama bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda).
Again, however, moving to the other end of the spectrum and declaring our intentions to stay in Iraq indefinitely can have equally dire consequences both for surrounding countries themselves, and for America in terms of relations with surrounding countries. As it is, the US presence in Iraq has allowed neighboring countries a force to rail against, America acting once again as a scapegoat for everything that is going wrong in the country. If, however, the US continued its occupation of Iraq, many neighboring regimes could lose much of their credibility in verbally attacking the US when they failed to actually do follow up those verbal attacks with action. This could open those regimes up to criticisms from both political opponents and terrorist organizations, and could cause discontent in their populations. This is, of course, assuming that the neighboring regimes would not take direct action against the US; the consequences of such action, however, would be equally or even more dangerous to the respective regimes’ stability than taking no action at all.
In the same vein, by continuing to occupy Iraq America would be opening itself up to strained relations with neighboring countries. While it was mentioned previously that taking action against America would be a foolish choice, it could still occur; it would likely take the form of oil embargoes, akin to the Saudi Arabian oil embargo of 1973. Additionally, an indefinite occupation by the US could cause America to come to be seen by the people of the Middle East as a colonizing force, much as the British were seen in the mid-20th Century. This would immediately destroy any credibility the US had with even those in the region who perhaps supported the invasion in the first place.
Again, a better option lies between the two ends of the spectrum. If the US made clear its intentions to leave within a set time frame after the Iraqi government began to operate, many problems that would arise with either of the other options would be forestalled. A functioning Iraqi government would require a functioning Iraqi security force; this would mean Iraq was capable of patrolling its own borders. If the borders were adequately patrolled, the threat of outlaws and terrorists finding safe-havens in border towns would significantly decrease. Thus, the enemies of regimes in the region would not have as many places from which to plan attacks, and regimes themselves would enjoy a greater level of security. A pledge (and steps taken) to withdraw only once an Iraqi government was operational would also show that the US was not simply cutting and running; there would be no affirmation for the power of terrorist attacks, as withdrawal would only come once a certain, specific goal had been met, and not before.
Another problem this option would address would be the neighboring countries’ willingness to go beyond simply blaming Iraqi problems on America, and start taking a hand in finding solutions. While America would only withdraw once Iraqi government was functional, announcing a withdrawal would likely spur neighboring countries into action. If the US did withdraw, there is still the possibility of a security threat to the neighboring countries; it would be in their best interest to see a firm and stable government in Iraq. This could possibly translate into financial support from surrounding countries to Iraq’s infrastructure and security forces, which would only help hasten America’s withdrawal. This situation would be win-win for many surrounding countries, as they would be seen by both their own citizens and by possible detractors as taking concrete steps to help fellow Middle Easterners, to get the US’ troops out of the region, and to provide stability to the region as a whole.
When considering American interests as a whole, it is again clear that the middle-of-the-road option would yield the best results. As mentioned previously, an immediate withdrawal would, in some minds, affirm the power of terrorism and insurgency. This could possibly send a message to terrorist organizations in other parts of the world; if they wanted something, all they would have to do would be to kill a few thousand Americans, and they would achieve their goals. This is clearly not the message America wants to be sending to terrorist groups. Additionally, immediate withdrawal could, as mentioned earlier, prompt a security threat to the regimes of the Middle Gulf; if these regimes were to topple, there is no guarantee new governments would be open to continued oil deals with the US. Instability in the Middle East would also undeniably cause oil prices to shoot up, something that is clearly not good for American interests.
Staying indefinitely would also be bad for American interests. The longer US troops stay in Iraq, the longer you have US troops dying; it’s clearly not in America’s best interests to have soldiers killed. Staying in Iraq indefinitely could also be seen as a sign by other countries of a move towards imperialism, causing other countries to want to have less to do with the US as a whole, and perhaps disrupting relations with those countries. Again, staying indefinitely could also cause the regimes in the Middle East to become unstable, possibly driving oil prices up. Furthermore, if America had to stay in Iraq indefinitely in order to ensure stability within the country, the image of America as the one superpower could suffer immensely; how powerful can a country really be when it is unable to bring stability to Iraq?
If the US was to announce its intentions to withdraw once a functioning Iraqi government was in place, the threats to American interests posed by the previous two options would certainly be minimized. Stability of the country and the region as a whole would be more likely, and thus there would be less of a chance for disruption in the oil supply, and less of a chance for a corresponding oil price-jump. Refusing to withdraw before the Iraqi government was operational would send a message to terrorist groups that terrorist tactics have no bearing on withdrawal decisions. Other countries would see that America was willing to leave once a job was complete, and thus did not have imperialistic aims. Finally, the world image of America would not suffer, as the US would stand out as putting up a certain set of goals, achieving those goals, and peaceably leaving.
Of course, there are a number of problems with this criteria-based withdrawal approach. What if the criteria the US bases its withdrawal on are never met? What if an operational Iraqi government fails to materialize, and the US ends up facing a choice of withdrawing before the job is done, or continuing to occupy the country indefinitely? Who, exactly, gets to define what an operational Iraqi government is? How will we judge when the government is actually functioning as it should? These are all very valid questions that would need to have answers before committing the US to withdraw based on criteria. These questions, however, are not nearly as hard to deal with as the consequences of either leaving too early or staying too long; they do have answers, and finding them will be a much better course of action than immediate withdrawal or indefinite occupation.
Ultimately, there is no solution in Iraq that will solve every single problem the US faces. What is clear, however, is that announcing immediate withdrawal will certainly cause more problems than it solves, including a possible collapse of Iraqi government, a threat to the stability of regimes in the region, a threat of affirming terrorist beliefs, and an overall disenchantment of the world with the US as an unstoppable superpower. What is equally clear is that declaring our intentions to stay indefinitely will cause just as many, if different, problems, including an increased American casualty rate, strained relations with Middle Eastern and other states, a possibly inefficient Iraqi government, and an increase in Iraqi insurgents. It seems the most viable and sensible option is in between; announcing plans to withdraw once Iraq has an operational government. This would give an incentive to all parties, both in Iraq and in the region, to take steps to build up Iraq’s government, and would allow the US to withdraw without seeming to do so due to terrorist pressures. It is clear, then, that this course of action, while not perfect, is better than any other possible course of action, and should be the one the US pursues as it looks for ways to resolve the situation in Iraq.
