Information Dominance: What is It?
Information dominance is a delta: the difference between the aggregate of information available to each of two opposing military commanders. But its more than just information: Its the difference in understanding of information in the context of some specific purpose that is the crux of the definition. Information dominance then refers to a difference in what is termed Battlefield Visualization:
“Battlefield visualization is the process whereby the commander develops a clear understanding of his current state in relation to the enemy and environment, envisions a desired end state which represents mission accomplishment and then, subsequently, visualizes the sequence of activity that will move his force from its current state to its end state.“
How this delta is achieved will be addressed later in this paper. What’s central here is that the commander whose level of battlefield visualization is greater has “information dominance.” Like air power, a ground commander can enjoy levels of information dominance ranging from “information supremacy” to “information parity”; an enemy can also achieve information dominance at his expense. Information dominance can change over space and time; it also may vary by echelon. An Army may achieve information dominance at the operational level but lose it tactically.
The notion of information dominance is not new; throughout history, commanders have sought to leverage the temporary opportunity that comes from an information advantage, whether it comes from knowledge of terrain or a satellite image. But understanding this situation awareness in the context of some end state has been largely an intuitive process. Truly exceptional commanders have had it; most haven’t. What’s changed is that information technologies hold a potential for making this grasp of the battlefield and the inherent opportunities it affords more accessible to every commander, from field army to rifle company.
With enhanced technologies, such as GPS, EPLRS, the tactical internet and computers, the modern commander could gain a real time knowledge of the disposition and capabilities of his force. Raw data concerning his logistics posture and current activities could be translated into projections of capabilities within the framework of his concept of operation. And, these diverse elements of information could be correlated and analyzed in a manner that could permit the planning of branches and sequels in geometrically compressed time.
Concurrently, the commander would be presented a comprehensive view of the enemy. He would see his organizational whole: his patterns of operation and his task organization, echelonment, phasing and tempo. Moreover, by controlling the dimension of information, he could attack an enemy in a manner that would unhinge his organization, perhaps without physically destroying it.
Information Technologies will overlay the relevant friendly and enemy pictures against the backdrop of the operating environment. Topography and weather will be portrayed in either a flat, two- dimensional map display or as an interactive three-dimensional model. A commander would be capable of projecting his current situation through time and space, either to support rehearsals or to explore planning sequels. A reconnaissance would be possible within minutes at levels of resolution never thought possible (and from both a friendly and enemy perspective.)
Information technologies will never afford absolute visibility of the battlefield; but, it will be possible to establish dominance by focusing resources at a time and place of one’s choosing. Where information is massed in this manner, it will become a catalyst around which the other operating systems will get; and, it will likely set the tempo of battle.
The effect of these changes will be to move battlefield visualization from an intuitive ability towards science: a deliberate, deductive process based upon building blocks of raw data, parsed and collated by machines and merged into visual patterns that are presented to commanders as opportunities. Additionally, by linking commanders at different echelons, this same technology will permit “shared visualization”: a capability that will promote synchronized operational planning. In short, the command will see and think as one.
Information technologies will also work for the enemy. Potential adversaries will mimic or counter our capabilities in this dynamic field with inexpensive, commercially available technologies. They will look to information as both our strength and Achilles Heel. Even if they cannot match us on an global level, they will evolve operational and tactical niche capabilities in which devastating advantage could be achievable. The “delta” then will not be something that the Army can simply design into its force structure and modernization plans. Information dominance must be fought for and won through a deliberate process that is synchronized with the other patterns of operation.
