Iraq Nam: Part I
Part 2: Q: Has America learned its lessons from the Viet Nam conflict?
Part 3: Q: Can the United States prevail in the Iraq conflict?
Part 1:
Introduction:
An insurgency is an organized resistance to a government or authority that engages in violent actions to cause said government or authority’s downfall through destruction and armed actions against governmental and/or military entities, (as opposed to terrorists who intentionally target civilians), the ultimate objective(s) for the insurgent being to remove altogether, or acquire increased participation in, the governance of a nation or territory, to promulgate a separatist or revolutionary agenda, or to improve the plight of a constituency.
Guerrilla is a term borrowed from the Spanish ‘guerrilla’ meaning ‘little war’, and used to describe small, mobile and flexible groups that conduct tactical combat operations irrespective of an established front line. Guerrilla warfare, one of the oldest forms of asymmetrical, (David vs. Goliath), warfare, is characterized by sabotage and harassing hit-and-run attacks designed to maximize enemy casualties and anxiety while minimizing one’s own by avoiding direct confrontation as much as possible. Over a protracted period of time the insurgent hopes to sap the collective will of the protagonist. In view of the overwhelming odds usually confronting him, the insurgent considers a fight to a draw and subsequent negotiations a great victory.
Currently in Iraq, Iraqi and Coalition forces headed by the United States are facing foreign and domestic insurgents, foreign and domestic terrorists and several combinations thereof.
Part 1:
Q: Has A Conventional Army Ever Defeated a Guerilla Structured Insurgency?
A: Rarely. (Actually, very rarely.)
And, only then by perpetrating the unthinkable: thoroughly brutalizing the civilian population, the most powerful weapon in the insurgent’s arsenal. The obvious paradox being the ‘liberating’ army showering down death and destruction upon the very people for whom they have rushed in to ‘liberate’. Quashing the very freedoms they’ve sworn to uphold.
Q: Has a conventional army ever perpetrated the unthinkable against a civilian population in an effort to defeat an insurgency?
A: Sad to say� yes.
Examples are:
Zapata’s insurgents met considerable success in the Mexican Revolution from 1913 to 1920, but his strategy backfired as Mexican Government Troops, unable to distinguish his soldiers from the normal population, waged a broad and brutal campaign against civilians as well.
In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s the militaries of Latin American countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, and Peru were successful in completely wiping out guerrilla movements, but usually committing several atrocities among both civilians and armed insurgents in the process.
To counter the tactics of Boer guerillas in South Africa, the British interned Boer civilians into concentration camps and built hundreds of blockhouses all over the Transvaal and Orange Free State.
One notable failure in this regard is that of East Timor. The East Timorese guerrilla forces fought a very successful guerrilla campaign against the Indonesian Military from 1975 into 1999. However the Indonesians generally took their frustrations out on the civilian population, often torturing and killing on the mere pretence that people were ‘helping the rebels’. 100,000 to 250,000 East Timorese were killed out of an initial population of about 600,000 during the especially brutal Indonesian invasion and 24-year occupation.
The civilian population gives the insurgent stealth and invisibility. The civilian population gives the insurgent intelligence far superior to that of any clandestine organization or combination thereof and much more cost efficiently. The civilian population gives the insurgent food and shelter and even weapons. The civilian population gives the insurgent the courage and determination to fight on against seemingly impossible odds because at the end of the day the insurgent is reminded that he (or she) is fighting for his (or her) family, his (or her) home and his (or her) country. But more importantly than any other logistical advantage, the civilian population gives the insurgency new insurgents as the previously indecisive come to an agony or an epiphany and starry-eyed youths come of age.
French soldier Mignolet of Napoleon’s 1st Regiment of Tirailleurs of Young Guard wrote home during the 19th-century French invasion of Spain, (1808-1814): “We are surrounded by 40,000 Spanish brigands whom we must fight every day – and the situation gets no better, but worse. Their bands grow bigger every year, for we burn their towns and villages … “
Insurgent wars seem to unanimously involve at least three elements. An occupying force, (or at least a force perceived to be occupational), a passive segment of the population (usually targeted and brutalized by both antagonists) who does not care who is in charge as long as they can go on with their everyday lives, and, finally, an aggressive segment of the population who prefers armed conflict to any peace if peace means submitting to any form of xenocracy.
A second, and more lethal scenario, involves two sides of a family feud in the midst of, or on the verge of, a civil war. And an ‘enlightened’ third power, or powers, who, for the most noble and altruistic of virtues, (or who has at least convinced their constituencies of such high-minded causes), or because the power has presciently peered into the future and has miraculously seen its own peril, is willing to supply armaments to the ‘good’ guys and/or rush in with a full-blown armed military intervention to ‘save’ the helpless innocents from their evil-meanie brethren.
But, as history and hindsight always reveal the truth in far superior ways than do the testimonies of battalions of news correspondents or plethoras of press conferences, ultimately, in spite of the human toll of action or inaction, time always reveals that the nations of the earth only go to war for one reason and one reason onlyâÂ?¦ the control of natural resources. (In fact, I will guarantee you, (as was pretty much confirmed by the words of the then 42nd President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton when asked why the United States would not intervene in Nigeria in 1995, “America has no friends. America only has interests. And it is not in the interest of America to see American soldiers fighting and dying in NigeriaâÂ?¦” (or Rwanda, or South Africa, or Chad, or Sudan, or AngolaâÂ?¦) when Africa discovers enough oil, America will ‘(re)-discover’ Africans.)
In all instances, if not quashed quickly, an insurgency transforms from an entity that has emerged from a culture to becoming a sub-culture of its own. The only way to contend with an insurgency at that point is to appease, wipe out or put the fear of God in nearly every man, woman and child.
Not to mention, modern insurgencies are far too expensive monetarily for modern armies. Set off a homemade bomb and you’re out about a thousand dollars maybe. Get a first rate battlefield tank destroyed and you’re out $60 million. Same with a $1500 dollar stinger missile versus a $20 million dollar attack helicopter.
With that being said, here are history’s foremost insurgency related incidents followed by words from Poet William Wordsworth, (1770-1850), a dire warning for any nation or power who wishes to travel down that dark tunnel that offers no light at the end of itâÂ?¦ save a very dark and bloody one.
Spain over France, 1808-1814:
The word ‘guerilla’ was first coined by the English assisted Spanish when resisting Napoleon’s expansionist policies during the Peninsular War of 1808 to 1814. Last I looked there is a clearly defined border between the two countries and the primary language in Lisbon is still Spanish, so it doesn’t appear that things worked out very well for Napoleon and his guys. In fact, this was one of the most successful partisan wars in history and Napoleon himself is quoted as referring to the loss of thousands of French troops at the hands of an (always too politically and sanguinely expensive to contend with) insurgency as ‘an ulcer’. The Spanish countryside belonged to the guerrillas, who held down as many as 250,000 of Napoleon’s troops at any given time and inflicted an estimated 137,500 casualties over the course of the invasion.
Previous to that:
American Colonists over Great Britain, 1754-1783:
Between 1754 and 1783 American colonists significantly implemented guerilla tactics in bleeding away the yoke of the British Empire and its formidable ground forces.
Since then, many other powers, including other world powers, have been brought to their knees, or at least kicking and screaming to the negotiating table, by tenacious, ideology driven insurgent movements.
South Africa over Great Britain, 1899-1902:
After the British defeated their armies conventionally, Boer commandos reverted to mobile warfare and guerrilla tactics in the Second Boer War in South Africa 1899-1902. Eventually, the Boer guerrillas were forced to surrender, but the British granted them generous terms in order to bring the war to an end thus demonstrating how effective guerrilla tactics could be in winning concessions from a much more powerful military opponent. Counting those killed in action, those dying from wounds, dying from disease, who died in captivity or from accidental deaths, the British lost over 93,000 men over a 5-year period.
Ireland over Great Britain, 1919-1921:
Over the centuries the conflicts between Ireland and the United Kingdom have covered the full spectrum of the types of warfare. After a military defeat in 1916, the Irish Republican Army resorted to guerrilla tactics involving both urban warfare and flying columns in the countryside. The British security forces were fought to a standstill and the government of the United Kingdom agreed to meet to negotiate an end of hostilities 1921.
Jewish Exiles over Great Britain, Palestine, 1945-1948:
When British mandates restricted European Jews fleeing anti-Semitic violence from immigrating in increasing numbers to Palestine, Jewish Palestinians began to use a type of guerrilla warfare against the British for two purposes: to bring in more Jewish refugees, and to turn the tide of British sentiment at home. The resultant creation of the state of Israel in May, 1948 might be considered one of the greatest achievements of guerrilla warfare.
Indonesia over the Netherlands, 1945-1949:
Indonesian partisans inflicted four years of guerilla misery on the Netherlands leading to Indonesia achieving its independence in 1949 in the Indonesian War of Independence.
Algeria over France, 1954-1962:
In 1954, Algerian guerrillas launched a nearly decade long campaign of urban and rural warfare in a war of independence against France finally succeeding in pushing the French out in 1962. French military authorities listed their losses at nearly 18,000 dead (6,000 from non-combat-related causes) and 65,000 wounded.
Viet Nam over the United States, 1954-1973:
After France’s attempted re-colonization of Indochina was defeated in 1954 by the Viet Minh, an agreement to temporarily partition the country in two with a de-militarized zone (DMZ) was reached at the Geneva Conference in 1954. The Vietnam War ostensibly began as a civil war between the feuding governments of North Viet Nam and South Viet Nam. Although having military advisors on the ground as early as 1954, the United States did not formally enter the Vietnamese Civil War until 1958. After fifteen years of protracted fighting, major direct U.S. involvement ended with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. Civilian and military casualties were massive. 4 million Vietnamese civilians. 58,000 U.S. military. 1 to 1.5 million North and South Vietnamese military combined.
Angola over Portugal, 1961-1975:
Angola declared independence in November 1975 after a 14 year guerrilla war to overthrow a puppet fascist government established by Portugal with a military coup.
Mozambique over Portugal, 1962-1975:
Unlike other European nations after WWII, Portugal sought to maintain colonial control over many of its distant provinces including Mozambique. But the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique initiated an armed campaign against Portuguese colonial rule in September 1964. Mozambique became independent on June 25, 1975 after 10 years of sporadic, but bloody guerilla warfare.
East Timor over Indonesia, 1975-1999:
The East Timorese guerrilla forces fought a very successful guerrilla campaign against the Indonesian forces from 1975 into 1999.
Afghanistan over The Soviet Union, 1978-1989:
The Soviet Union entered Afghanistan in December of 1979. Under the combined weight of increasing international pressure and the loss 15,000 soldiers to the Afghan Mujahideen resistance, the humiliated Soviets withdrew ten years later, in 1989.
Poet William Wordsworth, a former radical turned conservative, showed a surprising early insight into guerrilla methods in his pamphlet on the Convention of Cintra.
“It is manifest that, though a great army may easily defeat or disperse another army, less or greater, yet it is not in a like degree formidable to a determined people nor efficient in a like degree to subdue them, or to keep them in subjugation-much less if this people, like those of Spain in the present instance, be numerous, and, like them, inhabit a territory extensive and strong by nature. For a great army, and even several great armies, cannot accomplish this by marching about the country, unbroken, but each must split itself into many portions, and the several detachments become weak accordingly, not merely as they are small in size, but because the soldiery, acting thus, necessarily relinquish much of that part of their superiority, which lies in what may be called the enginery of war; and far more, because they lose, in proportion as they are broken, the power of profiting by the military skill of the Commanders, or by their own military habits. The experienced soldier is thus brought down nearer to the plain ground of the inexperienced, man to the level of man: and it is then, that the truly brave man rises, the man of good hopes and purposes; and superiority in moral brings with it superiority in physical power.” (William Wordsworth: Selected Prose, Penguin Classics 1988, page 177-8.)
Judge for yourself. Does the very message from history itself bode well for the United States’ experience in Iraq? Has a conventional army ever really defeated a guerilla-structured insurgency?
Next:
Part 2:
Q: Has America learned its lessons from the Viet Nam conflict?
