Israeli-Egyptian Peace: A Necessary Arrangement
This perpetual conflict was abated somewhat when, on September 17th, 1978, history was made as Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Israel’s Menachem Begin signed two peace accords at Camp David, making Egypt the first Arab country to not only make peace with Israel, but, by entering into a formal treaty, to acknowledge the country’s right to exist. This was a drastic change of policy for both countries; as recently as 1973, Egypt and Israel had fought over the Sinai, a large stretch of land belonging to Egypt, but taken by the Israelis in the War of 1967. What, then, could have caused these two countries to sign a peace agreement after so many years of bad blood? There are many answers to this question, but they all stem from a desire by both Israel and Egypt to increase their security, and, in doing so, to provide a greater quality of life for their citizens.
The ability of Anwar Sadat to even consider making peace with Israel was influenced by the fact that Egyptians possessed more than just an Arab identity. Despite Sadat’s predecessor Gamal Abdal Nasser’s push to unite all of the Arab states under Egypt’s control, Egypt still maintained a distinct and unique identity; an Egyptian identity. Sadat was able to use this identity to separate the country from the Arab pledge of no peace with Israel, and, as the negotiations took place, to even use the identity to justify his abandonment of the Palestinian cause.
Sadat came to the Camp David Accords for a variety of reasons. The most important reason was that his plan for the political and economic future of Egypt required peace with Israel. Since he took power in 1952 till his death in 1970, Sadat’s predecessor Nasser had built Egypt up by nationalizing almost every industry; this provided a decent, but certainly not rich, standard of living for most Egyptians. By the end of the 1960s, however, Nasser’s strategy of nationalization had outlived its usefulness; Egypt’s population had greatly increased, and thus the subsidies the government was providing to the citizens also had to increase. Sadat was faced with a very weak economy; there was nothing left that he could nationalize, military expenditures were constantly increasing due to the security threat of Israel in the Sinai, and the cost of the subsidies Egyptians had come to expect was growing every day.
After the war of 1973, the Egyptian economy began to pick up a little, but Sadat wished to strengthen the country faster. To do this, he believed he would have to move away from the statist model that Nasser was so fond of, and bring foreign investment into the country. Investors were wary of putting money into Egypt, however, due to the unstable political situation between Egypt and Israel. Investors do not wish to see their investment constantly being destroyed by war.
In January of 1977, Sadat began to remove government subsidies, starting with the subsidy of bread. In eliminating subsidies, Sadat was trying to meet a condition the World Bank required for giving aid. Sadat’s actions, however, brought about three days of rioting in Egypt; the citizens had grown used to receiving the government bread, and had little income with which to purchase their own. Worried about being overthrown, Sadat realized that he needed to increase foreign aid quickly. The fastest way of doing this was to strengthen ties to a superpower; in Sadat’s eyes, America was the superpower to pursue. Egypt had begun to cut ties with the Soviet Union earlier in the decade, and saw America as ultimately a greater ally in building up its economy. Sadat knew that in order to win support from the Americans, he would first have to come to some type of agreement with America’s staunchest ally in the Middle East, Israel. Sadat began this process in November of 1977 when he traveled to Jerusalem to address the Israeli Knesset.
In order for Sadat’s desired peace to come about, Israel would have to be willing to sit down at the negotiating table as well. Israel was in a much better position than Egypt at this time; although the Egyptians had taken the Israeli army by surprise in 1973, Israel had, in the end, won the war, if not politically then at least militarily. The aid coming into Israel from America was immense, and Israel received the most modern weapons and supplies from American companies. Israel’s economy was not nearly as poor as Egypt’s. Why, then, would Begin, leader of the newly-elected Likud party that was in fact less willing to negotiate and give up seized territory, be willing to sit down and work out a peace agreement?
Although the Likud party was the party in control of Israel at the time of the Camp David Accords, other factors in the country played a role in pressing Begin to at least consider working towards peace. Begin was faced with a chance to make peace with Israel’s largest Arab enemy, and possibly end decades of fighting; America was clearly in favor of this, as the “shuttle diplomacy” employed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger exhibited. Kissinger hopped between Cairo and Jerusalem multiple times in a matter of weeks, looking to work out some type of arrangement. If America supported the move towards peace, a deliberate effort on Begin’s part to stop the peace process could have unfavorable consequences to American aid to Israel.
Begin also had to face a bottom line: keeping the Israel military fully deployed was expensive. It drained Israel’s economy, taking working citizens and transplanting them into the field. The military was clearly necessary for Israel’s safety, but without a strong economy, the military would soon become impossible to support. If Begin could make peace with Egypt, and give the Egyptian territory back, he could relieve the Israeli forces that were currently occupying the Sinai. Peace with Egypt would also mean a secure Southern border, and the ability to divert troops to the Syrian threat in the North. Begin, then, despite being in a position that would allow him to ignore Egypt’s desire for a start to a peace process, saw that Israel could ultimately benefit from a peace agreement. Still, because of Israel’s better political and economic status, Begin was able to come to the peace talks from a stronger position, and was able to hold out on negotiations, as evidenced by his refusing to agree to certain provisions about returning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Palestinian authority. Sadat, who needed the peace more than Begin did, ultimately gave up on Egypt’s Palestinian concerns in order to ensure the peace agreement would be signed.
When the Camp David Accords were completed, both Egypt and Israel benefitted. Israel had an even stronger relationship with America, increased foreign aid, peace with Egypt, and the ability to remove the largest Arab state as a threat. In return, Israel had to relinquish the Sinai and agree to the principle of Palestinian autonomy. Egypt had peace with Israel, had regained the Sinai, and had significantly strengthened relations with America, receiving a great amount of foreign aid. The efforts made by Sadat to liberalize Egypt’s economy did not cover quite enough ground, and unfortunately the economy remained shaky; foreign investment did increase, however, and Egypt’s political situation stabilized. (Sadat was later assassinated in 1981; his successor, however, benefitted from the peace with Israel and the increased US aid, and ruled for a long span.)
Syria was in a position much like Egypt’s, pre-Camp David: poor American relations, and territory, the Golan Heights, held by Israel. If Egypt so clearly benefitted from making peace with Israel, receiving a vast amount of foreign aid, and having the Sinai returned, why didn’t Syria and other Arab states work to make peace with Israel?
Syria refused to make peace with Israel for a variety of reasons. First, the Syrians didn’t have as unique an identity to appeal to as the Egyptians had. Second, Syria didn’t just want its lost territory back; it also wished to remain the dominant player in Palestinian affairs. This meant taking a hard line on territories like the Gaza Stip and the West Bank, and even continuing to insist that Israel didn’t have a right to exist. Syria couldn’t open negotiations with Israel without recognizing the legitimacy of the government, and Israel refused to consider negotiating with Syria until Syrians recognized Israel. No peace between the two countries was possible at this time.
Saudi Arabia and Jordan were two other countries that could have possibly followed Egypt’s lead and worked to make peace with Israel. Jordan had already had a decent relationship with Israel; King Hussein went so far as to warn Israel that Egypt and Syria were preparing a sneak attack in the 1973 war. However, Jordan was under immense pressure from Iraq to the East, Syria to the North, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from within, to refuse to make peace with Israel. Jordan also wasn’t willing to negotiate without specific provisions relating to Palestinian autonomy.
Saudi Arabia, which had fairly good relations with both America and Egypt, seemed in a good position to make peace as well. But, with the collapse of the Shah’s government in Iran despite support from America, and the rising power of the Islamic movement, Saudi Arabia’s strategic situation changed. Syria and Iraq were able to convince Saudi Arabia not to enter any type of agreement with Israel; peace with the Jews would seriously anger the Islamic movement, and, as the Shah’s recent collapse illustrated, good ties with America could not guarantee a government’s stability.
While several countries missed chances to make peace with Israel, the Camp David Accords still left a lasting impression on the Middle East. Egypt was no longer a threat to Israel and Israel no longer a threat to Egypt; military spending in both countries could be cycled into other areas of the economy. US aid to Egypt and Israel increased, strengthening both countries’ positions in the region and the world. The Camp David Accords paved the way for the Jordanian-Israeli peace talks in 1994, and for the future negotiations between the PLO and Israel. Ultimately, the Camp David Accords worked to stabilize the Middle East, and the effects are still being felt today.
