Mid-Republic Reforms of the Roman Military
The ancient Greeks utilized the phalanx arrangement with a great deal of success, and the Romans, who derived in part from the Greeks, worked with tradition. Many of the societies surrounding the Mediterranean utilized this fighting arrangement or even simpler arrangements. The Romans, despite their emphasis on tradition, would eventually come to dominate because they had the ability to examine the status quo and build upon it. They also utilized their love of order to form precise arrangements, eventually creating a precise machine.
Rome utilized the phalanx formation until at least the early Republic (Edwards 596). But the Romans found that such a rigid, inflexible formation was poorly suited to the Italian terrain, and they adopted the maniple formation in the fourth century B.C.E. This became the standard unit of arrangement until the reforms of Marius (Shelton 245). The Imperator now arranged the infantry into double companies, each subdivided in turn into centuries, and formed into staggered lines. This now allowed for soldiers to move forward to reinforce the front line by filling in any gaps.
The Romans had light cavalry before they acquired the socii, or allies, but were never very comfortable on horse; they were most at home on their own feet as infantry, and as Rome acquired more allies and tributaries, the cavalry came to consist almost entirely of foreigners, with non-Roman and often non-Latin commanders (Edwards 596).
In fact, some allies came to be known for their skills as auxiliary units. The Numidians, who switched allegiance from Carthage to Rome during the Second Punic War, began a tradition of sending their superb cavalry as auxiliary units to the infantry. The Romans rewarded them with official friendship and later, protection (Watkiss 9-10). Cavalry also came from Cisalpine Gaul and the Narbonensis, as well as Spain, with the superb Spanish horse stock (Edwards 596). The cavalry only assisted the infantry during direct battle fairly quietly, but were most valuable in pinning the enemy into a tight space, or harrying the enemy in flight or in skirmish (Edwards 598-9).
The Romans abhorred chaos; they established a clear chain of command from the ruling Consuls and Proconsuls down to the Centurions and squad leaders. Every man in the army knew who his direct commander was, and every commander reported upwards (Edward 599-600). Chiefs of nations often commanded, nominally or in fact, those nations’ auxiliary units (Watkiss 12).
In battle, the least experienced soldiers bore the brunt of the attack, with the veterans behind them forming the backbone. Soldiers received arms and armor based on their experience, the length of time they have served, and their social class (Shelton 246). The least experienced soldiers, unproven, were lightly armed for swiftness at the front. On the other hand, the more experienced soldiers, who had seen prior campaigns and thereby received their share of booty, are also given heavier armor for the hand-to-hand combat once the front line began to crumple under the onslaught. They carry larger shields than the frontrunners, and a sturdier helmet as well as a breastplate and greaves. As the Roman army developed into a standing military, the Senate standardized both pay and rations, and even passed official raises (Shelton 251).
Skilled generals helped to form the Roman military into a formidable fighting machine. Gaius Marius rose from a rustic Italian family to become one of the greatest generals Rome had ever seen. At a time when Rome was enduring a vicious cycle of a diminishing group of landowners available for conscription and a growing need for an army, he introduced reforms when he disregarded tradition to recruit for the army regardless of whether a man owned land or not in order to ensure his victory in Africa over Jugurtha (Scullard 49). In addition to this disregard of tradition, he standardized the number of men within a maniple or unit of cavalry, and built upon the maniple by creating larger battalions of maniples, or cohorts (Edwards 597).
Three generals during the mid to late Republic shaped the Mediterranean through their military reforms and successes. Marius’ original reforms laid the basic blueprint for the crafting of the precise machine that would come to dominate the known world, while simultaneously solving the massive unemployment crisis (Shelton 244). In the war against Jugurtha, Marius enacted many of his reforms in order to accomplish a goal, essentially thinking out of the tradition-oriented box. His successes in Africa, combined with Metellus’ stagnation, combined to build for him popular support, which propelled him to the consulship (Scullard 49). With the power that the Roman people always gave to winners, he could not only enforce his radical reforms, but build further upon them by adapting his strategy of attack. Marius’ tactical reforms continued in his successes against the Germans in part because of his development of the cohorts (Scullard 55).
The Roman army now began to function at a more professional level. Men no longer returned home after a campaign after fulfilling their civic duty, but often they remained to serve and collect good pay, receive ongoing employment, and have the opportunity to advance (Shelton 244). The cavalry could also at this time look forward to service as a career; not only did they receive a pay scale, but they could now work toward a goal: if they survived their career to reach retirement, they could look forward to Roman citizenship, and often a bit of land, just as the Roman infantry received.
In between campaigns in this new professional standing army, the soldiers no longer returned home to the farms, but stayed in winter camps, training and awaiting the spring march. Detachments would return to towns or fortified camps of allies, or they would construct a stronghold in a strategic location in hostile territory (Edwards 602). Soldiers wintering in this way nearer to the campaign are more easily called up in the spring.
Sulla, who served as a lieutenant under Marius, watching firsthand the radical reforms. He later served with distinction during the costly Social War, enough to earn the consulship just as Marius had done (Scullard 68). Sulla and Marius, who had once served together in an incredibly talented team, now had a falling out; Sulla and Marius even went so far as to contest for Rome herself, with Sulla finally taking the initiative and appealing to the army itself, and them marching directly on the capital, forcing Marius out. During the Social War, when Rome fought her own dissatisfied Italian allies, Asia Minor stirred as Mithridates decided to move (MacDonald xxii-iii). Mithridates was ambitious, and exploited the dissatisfied rulers of Asia Minor. He was checked, although temporarily, by Sulla’s successful installation of a key ruler, friendly to the Republic. Already thwarted thus once by Sulla, Mithridates rose up again later, while Rome was preoccupied.
After Sulla’s retirement, an upstart noble named Lepidus sought to gain control of Rome. In a knee-jerk reaction, the Senate gave a politically undistinguished commander a special command (Scullard 86). But something about Pompey captured the support of the army and the people, since they appointed him to finish finally the Asia Minor menace Mithridates (MacDonald xxx). Under Pompey’s constant harassment, Mithridates, whom Sulla had curbed but not contained, committed suicide. His reorganization of the East sent huge amounts of tribute flowing into Rome, and his crafty negotiations of individual contracts with each city-state helped keep the peace.
Within a hundred years Rome had increased its area of control dramatically. With the conclusion of the Punic Wars, Rome demolished its key rival Carthage, razing it to the ground and acquiring land under direct control, as well as key allies in North Africa (Watkiss 11). The Roman military’s reorganization into larger, more distinct and easily divisible units, and its fortification with the formerly unemployed allowed it to succeed in long marches across the uninhabited regions. These reforms and good generalship also combined in successful strategy when besieging the walled towns (Scullard 49). The Gallic Wars incorporated two large provinces into the Republic, although these provinces proved the hardest to hold on to (Scullard 126-7). This conquest coincided with the development of the professional military and a subsequent attitude of acquisition.
The Roman army at the full swing of the Republic was no longer focused on defense. As the Roman Republic grew, so did the necessity of a standing professional force, which in turn supported further growth. Men no longer simply served their civic duty, but could choose to make campaigning a career, and retire with benefits. The Romans developed the Pax Romana on the initial acquisition of Italian allies, and later enforced it through the larger acquisitions of the three key areas of Asia Minor, North Africa, and Gaul. The Romans, for all their talk of tradition, radically changed the ancient world with their far-reaching military reforms that we model our military policy upon today.
Edwards, H. J., ed. Caesar: The Gallic War I. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. MacDonald, C., ed. De Imperio Cn. Pompei Ad Quirites Oratio: Pro Lege Manilia. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1986. Scullard, H. H. From the Gracchi to Nero. London: Routledge, 2001. Shelton, Jo-Ann. As the Romans Did. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Watkiss, Leslie, ed. Sallust: Bellum Jugurthinum. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1984.
