Reinventing the Army Leadership System
While tradition is honored and sustained in the military, the current method of choosing leaders is an increasing source of weakness. Not only has the nature of conflict changed, but also the nature of our society. Change is difficult for any organization, but if the quality of military leadership is increased, then the quality of performance will increase, as well. I perceived two major problems with the United States Army’s rank system: the enlisted promotion system and the officer corps.
The division between office and enlisted has traditionally been one of class and education. Officers were the educated upper class, bred and taught to be aware of the situation, both historically and current. They were taught to lead and think strategically. The enlisted were the middle and lower classes, who were expected to take the ideas and plans of the officers and put them into action. As society and warfare have developed, so have the roles and responsibilities of the officers and the enlisted. The skills and knowledge base required to preform many of the jobs in today’s Army eradicates the traditional distinction between officer and enlisted. With the removal of this distinction the traditional method of promotion for both of these groups needs to be reevaluated.
The point system for enlisted promotions – for the sergeant ranks – was developed to provide an objective way to evaluate soldiers from varying jobs and posts. Points are earned for education – civilian and military – physical fitness, awards, marksmanship, and military bearing. Soldiers earn points that place them on a merit list, with more points meaning the soldier is more deserving of promotion. When the system was established, only soldiers considered ready for leadership were recommend for promotion. However, because of the large turn over in personnel, everyone who has been in the Army long enough, regardless of ability, is recommended for promotion, whether they were ready – or able – or not.
My solution is simple – and maintains some of the status quo. The first three promotions remain automatic (assuming no derogatory performance) as they currently are. The current point system for all ranks of sergeant and above are also maintained – but with the addition of a requirement that eligibility for promotion for all sergeant ranks should be based on recommendations from superiors (per current practice) and include peers and subordinates.
The inclusion of peers and subordinates in the decision is a fundamental break from the past, but is necessary due to the specialization and complexity in the broad variety of tasks assigned to enlisted ranks. Soldiers know who they can trust to lead them; they know who can handle responsibility and who can’t. When a soldier becomes eligible for promotion, statements or questionnaires should be filled out by peers and subordinates and reviewed by the command. Superiors can see the effect that a soldier’s work has had on the overall effectiveness of the unit and can predict how the soldier will continue to effect the unit once promoted. Peers work alongside the soldier, observing the actual work habits and integrity of the soldier, and subordinates directly experience and execute the decisions of the soldier. These collective statements would be reviewed by a board, and promotion eligibility based on them.
Promotion within the officer corps is also a problem. The current officer corps is mainly made up of college graduates who are commissioned after graduating from a four-year degree program (ROTC) or a military academy. These young men and women, most with the average life experience of any new college graduate and no military experience, are placed in positions of power and supervision over soldiers who are typically older and more experienced.
In addition to the experience disparity, many have been trained to believe that because they are college graduates and officers, they know more than the average soldier. This wide educational disparity may have been true once, it is no longer the case. There are many highly intelligent enlisted soldiers, both with and without college degrees, capable of leading – and often with a more sophisticated awareness of the broader management challenges facing the soldiers executing their particular skill set. This disparity of experience vs. classical education creates a dangerous situation: newly commissioned young men and women are put in charge and refuse to listen to the advice of the more seasoned sergeants.
My solution is this: draw the officer corps from the sergeant corps. Make becoming an officer an option at both the Staff Sergeant and Sergeant First Class promotion level. Have the option of allowing the selected soldiers complete their degree at that time, if they need to. By drawing officers from the ranks of enlisted leaders, you will have individuals who know what goes on in the Army, have leadership experience, and have proven themselves able to lead and to handle responsibility.
The strength, capability, and direction of any organization is determined by its leadership. In our complex environment of non-traditional conflict, the responsibilities and expectations of Army leaders – and the consequences of their actions – is greater than ever. By enforcing a complete performance-based leadership system (as well as a promotion system), the Army maintains a tradition more sacred than any particular organization chart: competition.
