Rhetorical Use of Fear by the Bush Administration

The Rhetorical use of Fear by the Bush Administration to Persuade the
American People to Support the Policy of War in Iraq
Miranda Marquit
Syracuse University

Abstract

Fear has long been a powerful motivator, and various leaders have used fear and crisis rhetoric to motivate populaces to accept policies that they might not otherwise deem necessary under other circumstances. The events of September 11th, 2001, created a new view of foreign policy and what is needed. President George W. Bush has taken advantage of the new fears stemming from the attacks that led to the collapse of the World Trade Center’s tallest towers to push a foreign policy that includes preemptive war, including the Iraq War.

This paper looks at the use President Bush has made of terrorism, by using rhetoric that plays on fears of further attacks to encourage the American public to accept Iraq War, as well as countenancing a public policy shift from one of defense to one of preemptive aggression. The paper sets forth three rhetorical devices that use a vivid language of fear to motivate the public to accept policies: the idea that we are at war (an in this case one with no boundaries or time limits), the use of dichotomous language to describe “us” as opposed to “them,” and outlining worst-case scenarios as viable and imminent possibilities.

Additionally, this paper looks at the coordinated media strategy the Bush Administration uses to share its messages with the public, including the message that war in Iraq was a necessary part of the war on terror, and that Iraq presented a viable and imminent threat to America’s security.

The Rhetorical use of Fear and Crisis Language by the Bush Administration to Persuade the American People to Support the Policy of War in Iraq

Rhetoric is a vital part of any American president’s arsenal when persuading the American people to agree with policies. Persuasive rhetoric is often used to encourage the public to accept a certain view of the world, or to encourage them to support policies. Justifications for war, from the Civil War on down through the first two World Wars, as well as Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, have provided the most interesting uses of persuasive rhetoric. Often, language usage in such situations is rooted in fear, attempting to convince the populace of some impending unpleasantness if a policy is not adopted. Indeed, this practice is not limited to American presidents. Many other leaders in other governments and foreign organizations use similar rhetoric to convince their follows to accept a policy-or even take action.

This paper focuses mainly on President Bush’s use of fear to gain and maintain support for the Iraq War by linking it to terrorism and asserting that Iraq could be a source of impending acts of terror in the United States (Kosecki, Marquit and Sterne, 2004). September 11th made terrorism a very real fear in the minds of Americans, making it a useful reference point for using fear as a motivator.

This paper looks at three ways President Bush used the rhetoric of fear to gain the support of the American public for the Iraq War. It also addresses the way President Bush has continued to defend the war, as well as his efforts to maintain support for continued American presence in Iraq. Vivid language is a staple when using fear for rhetorical purposes, and President Bush makes use of vivid language for persuasion by 1) the idea that we are at war 2) the use of dichotomous language to describe “us” as opposed to “them,” and 3) outlining worst-case scenarios as viable and imminent possibilities.

First, the paper will discuss some of the previous literature and research published about the use of fear and crisis rhetoric, and of President Bush’s use of language to promote the Iraq War, as well as the importance of using media to disseminate information. An overview of the way President Bush uses media to solidify his message, especially as it relates to the Iraq War will follow a short section on methodology. Next, each of the three devices will be addressed and supported with specific examples from speeches and remarks given by President Bush. All speeches and remarks are obtained from the official transcripts available on whitehouse.gov. Finally, a conclusion will summarize the paper and address related questions that may be pursued for further research.

Literature Review

“We are in a whole new eraâÂ?¦in which we are vulnerable to attack. And that makes people very uncomfortable” (Dr. Tara O’Toole, as quoted in Lieberman, 2004).

Much has been done to analyze how presidents use rhetoric to gain support for, and then continue to justify, policy decisions, including rhetoric used during times of war. Campbell and Jamieson (1990), using material from political scientist Edward Keynes, point out that “the need for the public and the congress to legitimate presidential use of war powers for an end that has been justified” (p. 101) is the main focus of war rhetoric.

Campbell and Jamieson assert that rhetoric is so important because, as used by presidents, it is a form of institutional power. Additionally, there is ample work illustrating the place fear has as a motivation to spur the public to accept certain policies. John Locke stated: “The dread of evil is a much more forcible principle of human actions than the prospect of goodâÂ?¦what worries you masters you” (as cited in Weingarten, 2004). Catering to fears as a motivator is one of the rhetorical ways presidents can use the bully pulpit of their position to press for war. President Bush has been especially apt to make use of his presidential bully pulpit to justify the Iraq War as so many presidents of the past have taken part in “exercising influence by means of speaking” (Cook in Graber, 2000, p. 217). When the president speaks, as Campbell and Jamieson (2000) point out, he is likely to be covered by the media.

Since WWI, increased media capabilities have allowed policymakers to get their messages out. This has made wartime and crisis rhetoric, with fear as a primary base, a tool to popularize policies regarding war. The media is an increasingly important part of the overall strategy, bringing into focus the efforts to stock rallies and town hall meetings with pre-screened attendees, “soft” questions from journalists with questionable credentials at press conferences, an increase in the use of the Internet by political actors and video news releases. All of these strategies have been used by the Bush Administration to influence public perception.

Graber (2000) uses a chapter from a book by Timothy E. Cook to emphasize the importance of using media strategies. “As face-to-face communication has become more difficult with the growing reach of governmentâÂ?¦media persuasion is a more attractive and efficient use of resources” (p. 215). Additionally, as media becomes more varied and more outlets are developed, the need for coordination and consistency in message increases. Milton (1944) addresses the need for a president (he used Wilson as an example) to “send a message or speak on the single subject, in order to arouse public opinion sufficiently to compel legislative action” (p. 210). With almost weekly radio addresses, the issuance of talking points to Internet Web logs (written by bloggers) and the mainstream media, and controlled town hall meetings where only certain questions can be asked, the singularity of the message can be achieved.

The Bush Administration’s aggressive style in dealing with the media is relatively new. Polman (2005) points out that historians have taken notice of what is termed Bush’s “quest for innovative formats” (p. 1). Pinkerton, as quoted in Polman, says “It’s quite clear this White House is exploring radical alternative ways to getting its message out” (p.1). Bush appears to be making use of Wilson’s propensity to try to avoid the “filter of the Washington press” (Gould, 2003, p. 45). Gould points out that Wilson created his own apparatuses for going around the press of the time. Likewise, today President Bush does much the same by making use of the technology that has developed since Wilson’s time. Larry Gross, in charge of the Annenberg School of Communication at the University of Southern California, quoted in Polman, says that while Nixon and Clinton both hated the press, they followed the game’s basic rules. He goes on to say that Bush’s tactics are completely new. While Wilson created an office to put out public information, and released the content of speeches to the world press before giving them (Milton, 1944), Bush has made use of bloggers and has invested in creating news, as when the administration makes use of video news releases (Polman).

The pattern followed when disseminating the message of a necessary war is laid out by Campbell and Jamieson (1990):
“The justification for military intervention is embodied in a dramatic narrative from which, in turn, an argument is extracted. That argument claims that a threat imperils the nation, indeed, civilization itself, which emanates from the acts of an identifiable enemy and which, despite patient search for an alternative, necessitates forceful, immediate response. Central to this justificatory rhetoric is the president’s power to characterize the circumstances impelling action” (p.107).

The three elements set forth by this paper are seen in the above pattern. The identifiable enemy speaks to the idea of being at war, as does the idea that forceful response to some action is required. The use of dichotomous language can be addressed by the assertion that “we” have tried everything possible to rid the nation and the civilized world of the threat posed by “them,” but to no avail. The final component of the above pattern is the assertion that president’s use rhetoric to show why immediate action is needed to remove the threat.

Drawing parallels to other wars is not a new practice. Record (2002) points out that nearly every president has used analogies to “mobilize public support for decisions made or about to be made. Presidents who believe that a particular historical analogy applies to the situation at hand display a propensity to use it to reinforce their caseâÂ?¦” (p. 3). To cement the idea of war in the minds of Americans, President Bush used the examples of Nazi Germany (WWII) and the Soviet Union (Cold War) to conjure the most fearsome periods in America’s recent history of war. However, Graubard (2004) points out, the main difference between the victories in those wars and the current “global war on terror” is that the current war involves justification for pre-emptive measures: “We cannot let our enemies strike first” (Bush, as quoted in Graubard, p. 545).

The idea of being at war, and the idea that the global war on terror is a new kind of war, has been documented by Graubard (2004). He asserts that President Bush saw the attacks of September 11th, 2001 as a new war in which his Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, insists, “exit strategies could not be immediately fashioned” (p. 542). Graubard asserts that as early as the action taken against the Taliban in Afghanistan President Bush exaggerated dangers, creating the idea that we are in a full-fledged war that continues today against terrorists and “rogue nations” alike, rather than pursuing the enablers of the 9/11 attacks as a matter of criminal prosecution.

The use of negative language to describe the enemy as “them” is necessary to setting up a dichotomy. This is one of the most powerful ways that fear is used. It plays upon how we feel about the enemy, and it makes them more sinister and less human, creating stereotypes in the public. The idea of stereotyping is closely linked with setting up an “us” versus “them” dichotomy, with “them” being describe as inherently evil. The Clinton Administration, during actions regarding the former Yugoslavia, regarded Slobodan Milosevic “as a Balkan Hitler” (Record, p. 119). Such terms, involving labels that conjure fear and loathing, inspire an emotional response in the hearers, rather than one that is rational.

Labeling is an integral part of creating stereotypes. Barkun (2003) talks about associations that people make when they hear about fundamentalists, and relates to the overarching use of fear that goes hand in hand with stereotyping: “âÂ?¦an act of labeling for the purpose of condemnation, with little regard for the beliefs to which the label is attached” (p. 56). Perhaps one of the best examples of labeling Iraq was lumping the courntry into an “Axis of Evil” with Iran and North Korea during Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address. The speechwriter, David Frum, according to Reynolds (2003) chose to use the term “Axis” because “No country on Earth more closely resembled one of the old Axis powers than present-day Iraq” (Frum, as quoted in Reynolds, p. 1). Additionally, the word “evil” carries with it its own fearful connotations. A label of this magnitude serves as a reminder of the most justifiable war against a threat generally considered the most extreme in recent history.

It is also important to note that there are other leaders who use the idea of “others” to demonize the United States. Cullison (2004) uses letters obtained from an Al-Qaeda computer to illustrate how Osama bin Laden uses the same tactics to set up America as the “evil other”: “These governments imposed regimes that contradict the faith, values, and lifestyles of the people” (p. 70). Stern (2003) points out that bin Laden listed “atrocities and injustices committed against Muslims, mainly by Western powers” and that he aimed to publicize how the world has been split “into two camps-believers and infidels” (p.2). The exact same techniques are used to drum up support on both sides of the war, and on both sides of many policy issues.

Finally, the idea of raising worst-case scenarios as the most likely of things to happen is an important part of using fear to gain support for policies, especially with regards to war. Past-president Wilson used language that equated the German government with the downfall of American security by producing a fabricated letter to imply an immediate threat to America (Campbell and Jamieson, 1990). Additionally, former president Truman, in justifying American involvement in South Korea, relied on rhetoric that implied South Korea’s fall would mean a worst-case scenario involving “Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our shoresâÂ?¦it would mean third world war” (Record, 2002, p.1). Similarly, Bush’s use of the language of fear was meant to convince the public that another terrorist attack was imminent, and used frequently by the present administration to gain public support for the Iraq War (Kosecki, Marquit and Sterne, 2004).

Methodology

This paper is designed to analyze President Bush’s speeches and identify language that uses fear to motivate people to accept a normally unacceptable policy, preemptive war in Iraq, as well as his use of the media to disseminate his messages. The speeches used as examples can be found at whitehouse.gov and were chosen according to the following criteria:

1.Major speeches and press conferences given between September 11, 2001 and April 28, 2005. Major speeches are defined as
a.those televised and meant for the American public at large, and/or
b.include question and answer sessions at the end of prepared remarks
2.Speeches and press conferences that involve justifying the Iraq War (both before and after it started, and major hostilities were declared at an end)
3.Examples of use of media include remarks given in interviews, during radio addresses, town hall meetings, newspaper coverage and Internet information given out by the administration
Speeches and press conference were read and relevant passages were highlighted. Notes made next to highlighted passages indicate which of the three categories (assertion that the country is at war, outlining worst-case scenarios as imminent, and the use of dichotomous language to set up “us” as good and “them” as evil) each relevant passage falls into.

Additionally, examples of media use were also noted. Some of the examples of a coordinated media strategy include using multiple mediums to spread the same message. Weekly radio addresses given by President Bush, controlled press conferences, pre-screened town hall meetings, video news releases, news feeds for bloggers and targeted Internet sites are some of the ways messages to the American public are disseminated. The wide use of media was especially prevalent during the 2004 Presidential Election, during which he spoke a great deal about keeping America and the rest of the world safe from terrorists. All examples of media use referred to in this paper were chosen because they involved strategies to transmit as unified and powerful message as possible, without being challenged or addressing opposing views.

Examples of Media Use

President Bush’s administration has a coordinated media strategy that allows him to share his message, virtually unfiltered in many cases. Just as Wilson recognized the importance of addressing the same issue in many different forms, and to stay with that issue until the point was gained (Milton, 1944), President Bush understands the necessity of focusing on one thing at a time. At the time of this paper, town hall meetings, press conferences and radio addresses focus on the President’s Social Security plan. He has focused on his Medicare prescription plan as well. The focus of this paper is how President Bush focused on convincing the public that war against Iraq was necessary, and how he continues to defend the decision.

The President’s Radio Addresses are a good example of media effort. Almost every Saturday, President Bush follows the tradition of past presidents and makes an address to the nation. This gives him a platform from which to share his message without questions from reporters. Additionally, it allows him to set the agenda and speak for how long he wishes, on whatever topic he chooses. Three radio addresses, given approximately the same time each year in 2003, 2004 and 2005, illustrate how President Bush continues to justify the Iraq War.

On March 15, 2003, his radio address laid out a case for war (as previous addresses had done up to this point, moving from words about the broader war on terror to encouraging support for the invasion of Iraq): “He is among history’s cruelest dictators, and he is arming himself with the world’s most terrible weapons.” A year later on March 20, 2004, the President’s address justified the Iraq War: “The fall of the Iraqi dictator has removed a source of violence, aggression and instability in the Middle East.” He went on to say that “thugs and murderers” are still in Iraq, and that the U.S. must hold its course. He then created a link between Iraq and the threat to America: “They also hate and target every country that stands for democracy, and tolerance, and freedom in the world.” Finally, on March 19, 2005, President Bush continued to defend the Iraq War: “We knew of Saddam Hussein’s record of aggression and support for terror. We knew of his long history of pursuing, even using, weapons of mass destruction, and we know that September the 11th requires our country to think differently.”

Radio, however is not enough alone in today’s technologically advanced world. Television is a far reaching medium, and used widely. As part of a coordinated effort, press conferences and speeches meant to be shown on television and covered in newspapers are essential in disseminating the message. However, these provide less control than the radio addresses. Kaid, Gerstle and Sanders (1991) point out how important image control is important to a politician. In a comparison of French and American politicking during campaigns, Kaid, Gerstle and Sanders find that “Staging themes are clearly more prevalent in U.S. news stories” (p.141). In order to take full advantage of this, press conferences, and their cousins, town hall meetings, are staged to make the President seem accessible and “in touch with people who he most needs to convince of his policies” (“With a Hush and a Whisper,” 2005, p. 1).

Part of Bush’s early strategy to control press conferences was to hold them infrequently, and limit the question and answer portion. However, the story of Jeff Gannon (whose real name is James Guckert) shows the reliance of the Bush Administration on staged events. While Gannon was unable to receive a congressional press pass (Polman, 2005), the White House had been allowing him a “day pass” nearly every day for almost two years. He represented GOPUSA.com and its news service Talon News. The Bush Administration was not paying Gannon, but, as Republican strategist Rich Galen says, “They new perfectly well what was going on and who he was writing for” (quoted in Polman, p. 2). Gannon, asserts Media Matters for America, was routinely called on to ask loaded questions by both the President and his press secretary, Scott McClellen (“‘Go ahead, Jeff'”). Additionally, notes The Frontrunner, quoting New York Times columnist Frank Rich, “Jeff Gannon is now at least the sixth “journalist” to have been a propagandist on the payroll of either the Bush administration or a barely arms-length like Talon News while simultaneously appearing in print or broadcast forums that purport to be real news” (“Incidents Lead to Examination,” p. 1).

Related to news conferences are town hall meetings. These are billed as ways for a politician to connect with the public. President Bush has made use of these meetings, but they are usually not conducted in the traditional open style. Meant to be covered by television and print news, the purpose is to show the President responding to questions from the audience. However, during the 2004 presidential campaign, many news organizations reported that President Bush required signed loyalty pledges for rallies, and that questions at town hall meetings were submitted and screened in advance. The control of which people are allowed into rallies and town hall meetings allows Bush to project a favorable image, and avoid uncomfortable questions.

In order for the Bush Administration to maintain control over the message at a Social Security rally in early 2005, event staffers escorted three Denver residents out of the rally because, said the Secret Service, “they had a ‘No More Blood for Oil’ bumper sticker on their car” (VandeHei, 2005, p. A4). The worry was that these participants would take the focus from Social Security and put it on Iraq, in a way that could not be controlled by President Bush. This is reflective of the cancelled town hall meeting that was scheduled in Germany during the President’s European tour in February 2005. Rather than the originally scheduled town hall meeting, the German news service Spiegel reports, a group of 20 handpicked “young leaders” (“With a Hush and a Whisper”) met with the President. Other members of the administration also practice control tactics involving screening participants and/or questions. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on her visit to France, insisted that all questions be screened beforehand (“With a Hush and a Whisper”). Both of these foreign exchanges were limited because the administration worried unpleasant questions about Iraq might be asked.

One of the most effective ways for the Bush Administration to control its message is the use of “video news releases.” These releases are packaged to look like news reports. Staged events and public relations specialists posing as reporters create the illusion that something happened when it, in fact, did not. The New York Times reported on a video news release made in Kansas City. The now-famous footage shows an Iraqi-American celebrating the fall of Baghdad. “Thank you, Bush. Thank you, U.S.A.,” he gushes. However, this person was paid to say those words, and the other portions of the news segment, showing Iraqis in Detroit, Michigan and San Jose, California, were also staged and produced by the State Department. While this is a relatively old practice (the Clinton Administration distributed prepackaged news segments), the Bush Administration has spent almost double, $254 million, what any other administration has in first term public relations contracts (Barstow and Stein, 2005).

The news releases are packaged so well that many networks and local stations edit out references to the government production, and then present them as their own work. Barstow and Stein explain how this practice benefits all parties: “Local affiliates are spared the expense of digging up original material. Public relations firms secure government contracts worth millions of dollars. The major networks, which help distribute the releases, collect fees from the government agencies that produce segments and the affiliates that show them. The administration, meanwhile, gets out an unfiltered message, delivered in the guise of traditional reporting” (p. A1). The Army and Air Force Hometown News Service is a permanent corps of reporters and producers who tailor accounts for local broadcasts. One of the segments, produced shortly after the Abe Ghraib scandal, showed positive training at the very facility where some of the Abu Ghraib abusers were trained. Additionally, this year the Pentagon began offering its news channel to satellite and cable, so that anyone can see the military’s unfiltered message (Barstow and Stein).
The Internet is also a medium used by the President to disseminate his message. The Republican Party made great efforts, especially during the 2004 presidential campaign, to tailor messages to different groups. Web sites like kerrywrongforcatholics.com addressed the concerns of a specific group of people. No religious group was left out, as there was even a site kerrywrongformormons.com. Also, the campaign made it a point to launch “a Debate Facts Internet PR effortâÂ?¦to publish a news feed to more than 5,000 conservative blogs in real time” (“Bush Internet PR Team,” p. 1). This effort mirrored the “talking points” still distributed to conservative pundits and mainstream media outlets. All of these tactics included information about the Iraq War and Bush’s efforts to put out messages justifying the war.

With a coordinated media campaign, it is possible to more effectively disseminate messages about the Iraq War and encourage the public to accept the war.

Nation at War

Much has been made of the fact that we are fighting a “global war on terror.” Indeed, this is the first time that terrorism has been seen as part of a war. Prior to 9/11, and the President’s sweeping announcement, terrorism was seen as pockets of isolated events. One of the intellectuals who contributed to the formation of policy in Bush advisors, insists that this war against terrorism is, in fact, World War IV (the Cold War was World War III). Podhoretz (2004) insists that “the great struggle into which the United States was plunged by 9/11 can only be understood if we think of it as World War IV” (p. 1).

The fear that we are at war with a global terrorist enemy also fueled the debate leading up to the Iraq War. One of President Bush’s three main justifications for the war was that it was part of the war on terror (Kosecki, Marquit and Sterne, 2004). The connection made between Iraq and the greater war on terror fed into fears that Iraq was part of the 9/11 plot (and could therefore continue to wage war against America). This language figured prominently into President Bush’s remarks about Iraq between September 11, 2001 and September 11, 2004, as nearly one third of the President’s remarks about Iraq during this time period focused on a link between Iraq and terrorism.

Leading up to the entrance to Iraq, the President, in his January 28, 2003 State of the Union Address, made it very clear that he considered Iraq part of the on going war on terror: “Before September the 11th, many in the world believed Saddam Hussein could be containedâÂ?¦.Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans-this time armed by Saddam Hussein.” The reference to war on terror, and the attempt to link Hussein to that war is overt in this statement, is an overt appeal to the fear that as part of the global war on terror Saddam Hussein could perpetrate a 9/11-style attack.

Even though the war has been declared over, and despite lack of evidence supporting claims that Iraq planned to attack the U.S., the President continues that this language of fear was justified. In the 2004 State of the Union Address, January 20, the President said, “The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they got.” He then went on, immediately, to talk about “the consequences of leaving Saddam Hussein in power.”

During the 2005 State of the Union Address, given on February 2, he declared, “Our country is still the target of terrorists who want to kill many and intimidate us all.” This reminded Americans that there is still a war, and that Iraq was, and is, part of the global war against terrorism. He also justified the invasion of Iraq during the 2005 State of the Union by appealing to Americans’ fears of facing another attack on our shores: “We’ve made the decision to defeat the terrorists abroad so we don’t have to face them here at home.”

By using fear to create the idea that America is at war, the President encourages the American public to accept justifications for the Iraq War, and accept policies as they relate to a war that, in the January 29, 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush insists “âÂ?¦is only begun. This campaign may not be finished on our watch.”

Dichotomous Language

The famous “Axis of Evil” portion of the 2002 State of the Union Address is a prime example of dichotomous language, designed to draw sharp contrasts and promote fear of an evil, less than human enemy. Kosecki, Marquit and Sterne, 2004, find that negative language about Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi government made up fully one third of statements about Iraq between September 11, 2001 and September 11, 2004. This indicates that President Bush actively promoted the idea that America was dealing with someone who was evil, just as he promoted America as having an historic and “good” role to play in the world, with regard to Iraq. Although it is worth noting that positive language about America (18% of mentions regarding Iraq) was used to justify the Iraq War far less than negative language (Kosecki, Marquit and Sterne).

The language of good and evil is not the province of President Bush alone. Osama bin Laden often refers to America as “The Great Satan,” and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, head of a terrorist group in Iraq, characterizes democracy as an “evil principle” (Spinner and Sebti, 2005).

A dichotomy indicates that there must be another side. The opposite of evil is good, and part of this rhetorical technique is to make “us” good, even as we term “them” as evil. Part of President Bush’s speech patterns to garner and maintain support for the Iraq War involves using positive language about America while reminding its citizens of fearful enemies. In the February 2, 2005 State of the Union Address, President Bush said, “Our nation, working with allies and friends, has also confronted the enemy abroad, with measures that are determined, successful and continuing.”

Prior to the invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein, President Bush made mention of specific instances of “bad” behavior on the part of Hussein, and alluded to the opposite “good” behavior of the United States. On March 17, 2003, while addressing the nation, President Bush said, “We have sent hundreds of weapons inspectors to oversee the disarmament of Iraq. Our good faith has not been returned.” He reinforced the idea that Americans love peace and that the fearful Iraqi dictator did not: “Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and gain-because we are not dealing with peaceful men.”

By setting up a group of “others” whose sole goal it is to bring down America, fear of evil is used to encourage the public to support questionable policies, as well as continue to support actions and involvement in other countries.

Worst Case Scenarios as Imminent

The idea that there is the threat of a worst-case scenario, and that it is imminent, is a rhetorical device that drives people to seek safety from the government to protect them. Additionally, it also encourages the belief that in such times, when danger threatens immediately, extra measures must be taken for protection. This can easily lead to acceptance of certain restrictions on liberties in exchange for what is perceived as security. The idea of a “crisis” can really change attitudes towards policies (although this has not proved to be the case regarding Social Security). When coupled with the idea of real danger to life, family and home, the public is willing to accept even war as an alternative to an imminent and decisive attack. Policies are drafted and followed in order to prevent other nations from becoming “recruiting grounds for terror, and that terror will stalk America and other free nations for decades” (State of the Union Address, February 2, 2005).

The most evident use of the tactic of outlining worst-case scenarios was in the months prior to the Iraq War. While numerous comments have been made about the imminent danger posed by Iraq, remarks given in Cincinnati, Ohio on October 7, 2002, encapsulate the threat of danger as a motivator. Portions of this speech were heavily reported in television and newspapers, as well as on the Internet.

âÂ?¢”The Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons.”
âÂ?¢”While there are many dangers in the world, the threat from Iraq stands alone — because it gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place.”
âÂ?¢”The danger is already significant, and it only grows worse with time. If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today — and we do — does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him.”
âÂ?¢”Sophisticated delivery systems aren’t required for a chemical or biological attack; all that might be required are a small container and one terrorist or Iraqi intelligence operative to deliver it.”
âÂ?¢”Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his ‘nuclear mujahideen’ — his nuclear holy warriors.”
âÂ?¢”If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year.”
âÂ?¢”Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon.”
âÂ?¢”Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof — the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”
âÂ?¢”Understanding the threats of our time, knowing the designs and deceptions of the Iraqi regime, we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring.”

All of these quotes from the Cincinnati speech focus have one goal: to convince the
public that a worst-case scenario, a nuclear attack from Saddam Hussein, was in the immediate future, unless something was done. Vivid images of mushroom clouds and an Iraqi operative release a small package of V/X gas or anthrax spoke to the fears of the American people as few other words could. In fact, the threat of an imminent attack from Iraq was determined to be the main point that would ensure the good will of the American public as it headed to war.

Likewise, in Great Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair also used imminence as a reason to send British troops to support the U.S.-led Iraq War. He told Parliament that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction that could make it to Britain in forty-five minutes (Graubard, 2004).

Then-Deputy Director of Defense Paul Wolfowitz spoke with Vanity Fair about why the administration settled on such weapons of mass destruction as the main argument for rationalizing aggression in Iraq to the American public. He pointed out, in May of 2003, shortly after major combat operations in Iraq were declared at an end, that of the three reasons given for going to war at that time, the imminent threat of weapons of mass destruction was the one mostly likely to be accepted by the American people: “We settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason” (as qtd. in “Wolfowitz Comments Revive Doubts”). The administration knew that the American people would not be motivated by lesser claims.

The fear that Saddam Hussein had catastrophic weapons, as well as the ability and the will to use them at almost any time, provided more of a goad than any other argument. The war was almost universally accepted by the American public, and hardly questioned in the media. Images of 9/11, but nuclear, were used to fuel the fear that allowed such widespread support of the war.

Conclusion

Through many statements made by President Bush since 9/11, it is evident that the rhetoric of fear is used extensively to garner, and then later maintain, support for his policies. The administration hopes to persuade the American public that they should give up some civil liberties in exchange for security, as well as find ways to convince Americans to accept certain policies, such as preemptive war and aggression, as acceptable.

The justification that we are at war, with all of the fears attached to the idea, seems enough to keep most people silent, or encourage them to lend their support to policies deemed wrong during times of peace. The main problem presented by this rhetoric of fear as it relates to the “global war on terror” is that such a war has no boundaries and no limits. Additionally, the use of dichotomous language builds up a feeling of rightness in what is being done to rid the world of “evil-doers” who would threaten American safety. Finally, by putting forth worst-case scenarios as imminent and probably, support for wars, such as the Iraq War, can be gained.

Related Ideas for Further Research

Due to President Bush’s stated religious convictions, it would be interesting to see how he uses religious imagery to gain support for his policies. The idea that God wants the U.S. to be victorious, and casting terrorists and “rogue states” as evil, the stage is set for a religious war. A content analysis or study of the use of religious references and how it relates to the war on terror could be revealing.

While working on this paper, it was noticed that many speeches, radio addresses and prepared remarks for press conferences contained many of the same phrases. An analysis of the re-use of phrases that work well in certain settings, as well as how using the same terminology keeps the President on a consistent message, could provide insight on how the President’s prepared remarks differ from question and answer sessions.

Also, discontent with the media coverage of the Iraq War, and the reasons for the Iraq War, has been expressed. A study of media coverage of Bush’s media image after 9/11 and leading up to the Iraq War, and how it compares with the President’s media image before and since, could shed light on whether or not the media failed in its watchdog role prior to the entrance into Iraq.

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