Romanian Communism: The Key Players
The inter-war period was also the time where party leaders, such as Fabian, were purged and exiled from the party. Fabian, in particular, was exiled to Moscow, where out of concern for the Romanian Communist Party, he hoped to translate classic Leninist writings. His party treated him like an outcast. Koblos was treated the same way. The responsibility of this fell on the parties new general secretary Vitaly Holostenko-Barbu. Vitaly Holostenko-Barbu could not handle anyone disagreeing or criticizing. Thus, the fate of Fabian and Koblos. “With all its continuous purging, the Romanian Communist Party in 1928 was still too much influenced by its pre-Comintern memories. The party was also beset by ruinous factionalism, pathological suspiciousness, and an unsparing struggle for power.” (65)
At the time the Romanian Communists felt a threat of extinction, which led them to want to have full and total control of the party. Factions and deviations were unacceptable. The same was happening in the German and Hungarian Communist parties at the time. The time of social democratics was over. Stalin made it clear that it was a heinous crime to have anything to do with :traitors and renegades.” Thus, “the complete Bolshevization of national communist parties was the watch word.”
Vitaly Holostenko-Barbu fell from grace and the Fifth Congress was held in December 1931. Fabian got a position again in the party and began to do his translations. After the take over of the Nazi’s in Germany, many Romanian Communists who had been hiding out in Berlin moved to Moscow.
Tismaneanu describes this inter-war period this way, after much research done on the topic. He only has the ability to study the documents and interview those who are still alive, and the rest he must use his best judgment. He defines Romania’s place as not entirely unique, as Germany and Hungary were going through similar circumstances in their party. He also makes it clear that they were under many pressures from Moscow to be exactly what Stalin wanted. This meant convincing the masses to disregard the best interest of Romania, for the doctrines of the communists. There could be no more factions and party language had to be used to align the people and the party.
Because the Romanian Communist Party had four dynamic leaders, and a pivotal ousting of Lucretiu Patrascanu, I think it was important to pay such close attention to the personal relationships in the party. If this book were on communism in general, that would be different. However, this book specifically deals with Romania, and I think to fully understand the history of the Romanian Communist Party the personal relationships must be discussed.
“The purging of Lucretiu Patrascanu in 1948, followed by his trial and execution in 1954, is one of the most disgraceful episodes in the history of Romanian communism.” (113) Gheorghe Gheourghiu-Dej attacked a speech Lucretiu Patrascanu had made and accused him of not being a trustworthy person to meet with bourgeois parties. “For Gheorghiu-Dej and his intimates, Lucretiu Patrascanu was never one of theirs. They disliked his aloofness, lack of interest in party intrigues, and refusal to take advantage of special perks and privileges.” (114) This may not seem like a reasonable cause to purge a man, but at this time it did not take much. Ana Pauker had reservations about all of these convictions of Lucretiu Patrascanu, as she had known him for almost three entire decades, but she could do nothing. Though, Lucretiu Patrascanu would later be restored, it was too little too late.
“Between the time of her return from Moscow in September 1944 and the fall of 1945, Ana Pauker led the party, although she never bore the title of general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party.” (121) Interestingly and ironically, when it came down to decide who would get what position in the Romanian Communist Party, Pauker relented willingly to allow Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej to take the general secretary position. This surprised many, and upset Vasile Luca, who worshipped Ana Pauker. He thought Pauker was the rightful heir to the position. Luca even suggested that, “Gheorghiu-Dej hold the position only formally, and that in practice the real leader would be Pauker.”
It is believed that Luca’s position in this matter would be part of what cost him later. Pauker’s reasoning is said to be that she had fallen under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s spell. She really thought because of his personality he deserved the position of general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party. If she had thought otherwise, it would be a possibility that she could have saved the other half of the quartet, along with herself.
At the quartet’s start, they seemed to work harmoniously in a perfect balance of power. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was general secretary and was “in absolute control of the party apparatus.” (120) Ana Pauker was head of the Ministry of Affairs. Vasile Luca was the head of the ministry of finance, and finally Teohari Georgescu was the head of the ministry of the Interior. Both of the latter men were devoted to Pauker.
The threat of “factionalism” became the real problem amongst the four. Ana Pauker and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej went to Moscow, and Stalin apparently met with Gheorghiu-Dej alone and told him not to let anyone get in his way. This was the start of what changed the face of the Romanian Communist Party. Tismaneanu states that, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej “was a born apparatchik. His was a Stalinism of instinct, not ideology.” (123)
Vasile Luca was the first one in trouble. He was accused of “deviation.” His was a deviation to the right. Ana Pauker and Teohari Georgescu were accused of having “appeasing attitudes.” (129) This was because they did not accuse their friend Vasile Luca. Luca wrote letters desperately claiming his innocence, and died in prison. Teohari Georgescu “was accused of a conciliatory stance regarding Luca’s deviation and of lacking militancy against the class enemy and revolutionary vigilance.” (130) He was revoked of his position and all responsibilities and was given a little job.
Ana Pauker was accused of not only appeasing Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu, but a “leftist-rightist deviation” as well. (131) She was placed under permanent surveillance in Bucharest and was finally able to live with her family some years later. “Until her death in 1960, she would periodically be attacked by the party’s leaders and propagandists.” (132)
With the death of Stalin, the Romanian Communist Party went from trying to be exactly what Moscow wanted, to being exactly what Moscow was suddenly against. Khrushchev denounced Stalin in his “secret speech,” and besides the purging of Lavrenti Beria, the whole tune of the party changed. Romania was continuing to purge and continued it’s use of terror well after Stalin’s death, causing them to have what Tismaneanu refers to as an, “independent stance.”
While Imre Nagy of Hungary tried to, “transcend Stalinism and reconcile socialism and democracy,” Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was at an “advantageous position for behind-the-scenes confrontations with the Khrushchev leadership.” (156-57) They were no longer on the same page as the Soviets, as Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was quite Stalinistic.
I think that Tismaneanu makes a distinction between “national Stalinism,” and “national communism,” because they are two very different things. While Ana Pauker, in my opinion would be referred to as a national communist, I believe Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej would be referred to as a national Stalinist. I think Tismaneanu makes this clear by showing us the people who were in it for what they thought were honest and true reasons, and those who were blood thirsty and determined to keep their power. This is not to say that Pauker and others were pure of heart or something, but a national communist would be one who would deviate from Stalin for the better of their country, like Imre Nagy. In this instance, as Pauker wept at the death of Stalin, she may have fallen somewhere in between.
I am persuaded that there is a difference between the two. While one does not represent good, and the other evil, they are still very different things. Khrushchev led Russia into what would now be national communism as opposed to Stalinist communism. Stalin can be accused of attempting such deviation during World War II when he reinstated the idea of nationalism again. The 70’s and 80’s were the time of Nicolae Ceausescu. Throughout this time he visited China and North Korea, and was interested in using their doctrines. He was “trying to contain the liberalization movement in Romania, curb intellectual unrest, and deter students from emulating their rebellious peers in other communist states.” (206) Intellectuals were not valuable in anyway to the party and were continuously dropped from the ranks. As Moscow continued to move away from persecution and terror, it never left Romania’s side, leaving them and Moscow at a paradox.
Not even three decades ago dissent was suppressed in Romania, in honor of the celebration of the leader. “Revisionist Marxism never came to maturity, was reduced to quixotic stances, all the more heroic since those who voiced unorthodox views could not count on solidarity or support from colleagues.” (211) Those who disagreed were made to be fearful and were isolated. “The party responded to civil disobedience with draconian measures, and religious and national minorities were harassed.”
It is so sad that while the country who started the madness was attempting to grow, though not abandon communism, Romania stuck to the failed techniques of terror, fear, and persecution. I do not think I agree that the whole of this situation can be blamed on a struggle to transition into a democracy. I think someone should have stood up to Nicolae Ceausescu, after already suffering one Stalin before him. What the death of Stalin was for the Soviets, meant virtually nothing to the way things continued in Romania. Was it all a fear of change? I find it hard to disagree with Tismaneanu when he so closely researched the subject. I wish someone would have stood up to Nicolae Ceausescu, but perhaps even so, that person may have ended up just as Stalinistic.
Tismaneanu, Vladimir. “Stalinism: For All Seasons.” University of California Press, 2003.
