The Grand Chessboard

The Grand Chessboard represents Zbigniew Brzezinski’s plan for the United States in its relations with key nations that make up the region known as Eurasia. Brzezinski believes that Eurasia, which stretches across the entire European and Asian continents, is the key arena where America will have to be engaged and will have to lead other nations in the course of a comprehensive strategy for international relations with Europe, Russia, and the Far East, the major players on the Eurasian stage.

Brzezinski’s grand plan is not really a Eurasian strategy per se, but a strategy designed to maintain American dominance around the world. While many aspects of Brzezinski’s thesis are valid, there are significant gaps in his grand strategy that ignore key facts and regions, particularly the Middle East. This paper will begin with a brief overview of Brzezinski’s thesis, and will explain the relative decline of European power and the rise of American global dominance. It will then discuss Brzezinski’s explanation of why Eurasia is important and his plan for an American strategy for relations with Europe, Russia, and the Far East. Finally, the paper will conclude with an assessment of Brzezinski’s text as a whole.

BRZEZINSKI’S THESIS

Brzezinski’s thesis is best described in his own words: “The formulation of a comprehensive and integrated Eurasian geostrategy isâÂ?¦the purpose of this book” (Brzezinski, 1997, p. xiv). As mentioned before, this strategy is really designed to maintain American dominance on the global scene. Brzezinski recognizes this in his introduction to the book when he says, “âÂ?¦the issue of how a globally engaged America copes with the complex Eurasian power relationships-and particularly whether it prevents the emergence of a dominant and antagonistic Eurasian power-remains central to America’s capacity to exercise global primacy (Brzezinski, pp. xiii-xiv).

Brzezinski is well qualified to present a grand strategy for the United States in its relations with other nations. He has held an impressive array of positions that would well prepare him for developing a comprehensive and integrated strategy for the United States, including Counselor for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University, National Security Advisor to President Carter, Member of the National Security Council – Defense Department Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy under President Reagan, Member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under President Reagan, and Co-Chairman of the Bush National Security Advisory Task Force (www.wanttoknow.info/brzezinskigrandchessboard).

Before presenting his grand strategy for the United States in its relations with the nations that make up Eurasia, Brzezinski provides a detailed account of the decline of European power after World War I. As he says, “Thereafter, Europe would become increasingly the object, rather than the subject, of global power politics” (Brzezinski, p. 5). He explains how the sheer devastation of World War I began the decline in European power, and how that decline was complete after the conclusion of the Second World War: “The European era in world politics came to a final end in the course of World War II, the first truly global war” (Brzezinski, p. 5). It was in this setting that American power began to dominate, with the Soviet Union as the world’s other major power and chief American rival, in a bipolar setting that would last until the collapse of the Soviet Union almost half a century later. Brzezinski goes on to explain that the Cold War was ultimately won by the United States because of its “Political vitality, ideological flexibility, economic dynamism, and cultural appealâÂ?¦” (Brzezinski, p. 7). As Brzezinski says, “The collapse of its rival left the United States in a unique position. It became simultaneously the first and the only truly global power” (Brzezinski, p. 10). While the United States was the only remaining superpower after the end of the Cold War, it was not the only nation with power. The global scene at the end of the Cold War was what Samuel Huntington referred to as a uni-multipolar system. According to Huntington, a uni-multipolar system is a system consisting of “âÂ?¦one superpower and several major powers” (Huntington, 1999).

THE UNITED STATES AS A GLOBAL POWER

“The last decade of the twentieth century has witnessed a tectonic shift in world affairs. For the first time ever, a non-Eurasian power has emerged not only as the key arbiter of Eurasian power relations but also as the world’s paramount power. The defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union was the final step in the rapid ascendance of a Western Hemisphere power, the United States, as the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power” (Brzezinski, p. xiii). So begins Brzezinski’s account of the United States as the world’s only superpower. Brzezinski goes into some considerable detail when he describes the position of the United States as the world’s great power. He describes at length comparisons between current American power and previous empires, but points out a difference when he says, “âÂ?¦America’s current global supremacy is distinctive in the rapidity of its emergence, in its global scope, and in the manner of its exercise. In the course of a single century, America has transformed itself-and has also been transformed by international dynamics-from a country relatively isolated in the Western Hemisphere into a power of unprecedented worldwide reach and grasp” (Brzezinski, p. 3).

Brzezinski explains that American dominance in the world today is based upon leading the globe in four key domains of global power: “âÂ?¦militarily, it has an unmatched global reach; economically, it remains the main locomotive of global growth, even if challenged in some aspects by Japan and Germany (neither of which enjoys the other attributes of global might); technologically, it retains the overall lead in the cutting-edge areas of innovation; and culturally, despite some crassness, it enjoys an appeal that is unrivaled, especially among the world’s youth-all of which gives the United States a political clout that no other state comes close to matching. It is the combination of all four that makes America the only comprehensive global superpower” (Brzezinski, p. 24).

While certainly some conditions have changed since his book was published in 1997, American dominance on the world scene remains an undisputable fact. However, that dominance is increasingly being challenged by other nations, such as China, or by a conglomeration of nations acting together, such as the nations of the European Union. Despite potential challengers to American supremacy, the United States is still the sought after prize for many people in the world. No other nation inspires such hope and promise.

American global leadership, with help from the spread of globalization, projects the values and ideals of the United States throughout the world. Andrew Bacevich writes, “Uniquely among all the nations of the world, the United States comprehends and manifests history’s purpose. That purpose is freedom, achieved through the spread of democratic capitalism, and embodied in the American Way of Life” (Bacevich, 2001). Brzezinski seems to agree with Bacevich when he writes, “American supremacy has thus produced a new international order that not only replicates but institutionalizes abroad many of the features of the American system itself. Its basic features include

Ã?· A collective security system, including integrated command and forces (NATO, the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty, and so forth); Ã?· Regional economic cooperation (APEC, NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement]) and specialized global cooperative institutions (the World Bank, IMP, WTO [World Trade Organization]);
�· Procedures that emphasize consensual decision making, even if dominated by the United States;
�· A preference for democratic membership within key alliances;
Ã?· A rudimentary global constitutional and judicial structure (ranging from the World Court to a special tribunal to try Bosnian War Crimes)” (Brzezinski, pp. 28-29).

Brzezinski believes in American engagement and American leadership, a sentiment shared by Colin Powell and quoted by Bacevich: “We are attached by a thousand cords to the world at large, to its teeming cities, to its remotest regions, to its oldest civilizations, to its newest cries for freedom. This means that we have an interest in every place on this Earth, that we need to lead, to guide, to help in every country that has a desire to be free, open, and prosperous” (Bacevich, 2001).

However, as Bacevich states, “The prospect of a world remade in America’s image does not strike all with equanimity” (Bacevich, 2001). This thought is echoed by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who writes, “The United States is at present the world’s only superpower and is commonly regarded by friends and foes alike as arrogant and lacking in objectivity toward itself” (McNamara & Blight, 2001). Huntington expands on this thought when he writes, “On issue after issue, the United States has found itself increasingly alone, with one or a few partners, opposing most of the rest of the world’s states and peoples” (Huntington, 1999). Continued American global dominance is not a foregone conclusion.

Bacevich writes, “âÂ?¦opponents fall into one of three distinct categories. In the first are those, such as adherents of radical Islam, who advance an altogether different view of history’s purpose and their own distinctive claims to truth” (Bacevich, 2001). He goes on to say, “The second category of opposition to openness includes those who reject universalism of any stripe and cling ferociously to their own particularistic vision” (Bacevich, 2001). Here Bacevich is referring to groups such as the Kosovar guerillas who attempted to form a Greater Albania. Finally, according to Bacevich, the last group of opposition “âÂ?¦includes various parties intent simply on grabbing their share of the loot” (Bacevich, 2001). This group would consist of software pirates, CD and video bootleggers, and drug traffickers, all opposed to American leadership, American dominance, American values and American rules.

Huntington takes a somewhat different approach in describing opposition to the United States and American leadership on the global scene. Huntington states, “Countries respond in various ways to American superpowerdom. At a relatively low level are widespread feelings of fear, resentment, and envy” (Huntington, 1999). He goes on to say, “At a somewhat higher level, resentment may turn into dissent, with other countries, including allies, refusing to cooperate with the United States on the Persian Gulf, Libya, Iran, extraterritoriality, nuclear proliferation, human rights, trade policies, and other issues” (Huntington, 1999). Finally, says Huntington, “The highest level of response would be the formation of an antihegemonic coalition involving several major powers” (Huntington, 1999).

Brzezinski recognizes this fact and theorizes that any potential rival will rise from the region known as Eurasia. As mentioned previously, his strategy for dealing with Eurasia is designed to maintain the dominant global position that the United States now enjoys. His ultimate fear is that a decline in American dominance will ultimately lead to international chaos. His final thought before explaining why Eurasia is key is clearly laid out in his book: “The sudden emergence of the first and only global power has created a situation in which an equally quick end to its supremacy-either because of America’s withdrawal from the world or because of the sudden emergence of a successful rival-would produce massive international instability” (Brzezinski, p. 30).

WHY EURASIA?

Brzezinski believes that any potential rival to American hegemony will come from the vast area known as Eurasia, and it is in Eurasia that America must remain preeminent. As he writes in The Grand Chessboard, “For America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia. For half a millennium, world affairs were dominated by Eurasian powers and peoples who fought with one another for regional domination and reached out for global power. Now a non-Eurasian power is preeminent in Eurasia-and America’s global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained” (Brzezinski, p. 30).

One of the problems with focusing on Eurasia is the sheer size of what Brzezinski purports to be one continent. In reality, Eurasia stretches across two complete continents: Europe and Asia. Despite his recognition of the complexity and size of the Eurasian landmass, Brzezinski still maintains that Eurasia as a whole is the key to continued to American dominance. “Eurasia is the globe’s largest continent and is geopolitically axial. A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world’s three most advanced and economically productive regionsâÂ?¦.About 75 percent of the world’s people live in Eurasia, and most of the world’s physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for about 60 percent of the world’s GNP and about three-fourths of the world’s known energy resources” (Brzezinski, p. 31).
The task Brzezinski proposes is a monumental one. Brzezinski proposes a grand strategy for the United States to manage relations over a landmass that spans two continents with vastly different cultures. Brzezinski recognizes that politically he is not talking as if Eurasia is one nation when he says, “Cumulatively, Eurasia’s power vastly overshadows America’s.

Fortunately for America, Eurasia is too big to be politically one” (Brzezinski, p. 31). Still, he proposes separate strategies for the countries making up Eurasia and combines them into one overarching grand strategy for the whole of Eurasia. Despite the fact that Eurasia is not and never will be one politically, Brzezinski makes good use of charts on population, land area, and Gross National Product that make it appear, on paper at least, that Eurasia is one nation. Nevertheless, for Brzezinski it is Eurasia as a whole that is key to his grand strategy for the United States. He clearly lays this concept out when he says, “But it is on the globe’s most important playing field-Eurasia-that a potential rival to America might at some point arise. Thus, focusing on the key players and properly assessing the terrain has to be the point of departure for the formulation of American geostrategy for the long-term management of America’s Eurasian geopolitical interests” (Brzezinski, p. 39).

What then is the United States to do? According to Brzezinski, “âÂ?¦for the United States, Eurasian geostrategy involves the purposeful management of geostrategically dynamic states and the careful handling of geopolitically catalytic states, in keeping with the twin interests of America in the short-term preservation of its unique global power and in the long-run transformation of it into increasingly institutionalized global cooperation” (Brzezinski, P. 40). To do this it is essential to focus on the key players in Eurasia, namely Europe, the states of the former Soviet Union, and the Far East.

A STRATEGY FOR EUROPE

According to Brzezinski, “America’s geostrategic stake in Europe is enormous. Unlike America’s links with Japan, the Atlantic Alliance entrenches American political influence and military power directly on the Eurasian mainland” (Brzezinski, p. 59). He further states “Europe also serves as the springboard for the progressive expansion of democracy deeper into Eurasia” (Brzezinski, p. 57). For this reason, Brzezinski believes that a unified Europe in the form of the European Union is in the best interests of the United States. He asserts that “âÂ?¦America should not convey the impression that it prefers a vaguer, even if broader, European association, but it should reiterate, through words and deeds, its willingness to deal eventually with the EU as America’s global political and security partner and not just as a regional common market made up of states allied with the United States through NATO” (Brzezinski, p. 76).

The key players in Western Eurasia (Europe), according to Brzezinski, are France and Germany. Since the very beginnings of the European Union, France and Germany have often found themselves at odds over just how the European Union should be structured and over the amount and type of control the Union should have over individual countries. When The Grand Chessboard was published in 1997, Brzezinski was already seeing the problems that were beginning to arise in the formation of the European Union as a potential player on a global scale. Left to themselves, Brzezinski writes, “âÂ?¦Europeans run the risk of becoming absorbed by their internal social concerns” (Brzezinski, p. 72-73). He goes on to say, “This condition creates for the United States a special opportunity for decisive intervention. It necessitates American engagement on behalf of Europe’s unity, for otherwise unification could grind to a halt and then gradually even be undone” (Brzezinski, p. 60). Therefore, according to Brzezinski, “âÂ?¦unambiguous and tangible American support for Europe’s unification must be sustained” (Brzezinski, p. 74).

Brzezinski does not address two important realities: first, that many European nations, particularly France and Germany, have not exactly been receptive to American influence in Europe; and second, that it is not necessarily in the best interests of the United States to help the European Union become a superpower counterweight to American hegemony. Others have noted the rise of the European Union as a potential counterweight to the United States, including Huntington who wrote “Undoubtedly the single most important move toward an antihegemonic coalitionâÂ?¦antedates the Cold War: the formation of the European Union and the creation of a common European currency” (Huntington, 1999).

Under Brzezinski’s plan, “For Europe, the ultimate consequence would entail a true partnership with America rather than the status of a favored but still junior ally” (Brzezinski, p. 74). Yet, Brzezinski seems to contradict his own goal of maintaining American dominance in Eurasia by advocating the rise of the European Union as a global power. He states “Success in its political unification would create a single entity of about 400 million people, living under a democratic roof and enjoying a standard of living comparable to that of the United States. Such a Europe would inevitably be a global power” (Brzezinski, p. 57). Yet later in the book, he states that, “The central issue for America is how to construct a Europe that is based on the Franco-German connection, a Europe that is viable, that remains linked to the United States, and that widens the scope of the cooperative democratic international system on which the effective exercise of American global primacy so much depends” (Brzezinski, p. 71).

Perhaps the answer is that Brzezinski’s unified Europe would use its status and leverage as a global power to work with the United States in the advance of Western values and ideals throughout Eurasia. That scenario is quite unlikely, especially given the propensity of the French and German governments to counter American dominance in any way that they are able. With Europe as the bridgehead, Brzezinski’s next stop on the map of Eurasia is the area that used to comprise the former Soviet Union.

A STRATEGY FOR THE STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Brzezinski begins his discussion of the former Soviet states by saying, “The disintegration late in 1991 of the world’s territorially largest state created a black hole in the very center of Eurasia” (Brzezinski, p. 87). There is no doubt that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a monumental event and that the rest of the world is still adjusting to the aftermath. As Russia struggled to regain its former status as a global player, only one geostrategic option emerged for the former superpower. According to Brzezinski, “âÂ?¦the option that could give Russia a realistic international roleâÂ?¦is Europe” (Brzezinski, p. 118). Brzezinski maintains that the best course for Russia to follow is to engage Europe. Russia, says Brzezinski, “âÂ?¦is more likely to become a problem, unless America fosters a setting that helps to convince the Russians that the best choice for their country is an increasingly organic connection with a transatlantic Europe” (Brzezinski, p. 118).

As part of this engagement, Brzezinski writes that America and Europe “âÂ?¦should offer Russia not only a special treaty or charter with NATO, but they should also begin the process of exploring with Russia the shaping of an eventual transcontinental system of security and cooperation that goes considerably beyond the loose structure of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)” (Brzezinski, p. 120). The problem with this strategy is that Russia feels threatened by NATO and will probably be untrusting and unwilling to sign any special treaty or charter. As McNamara says, “Russia sees NATO expansion as part of an American post-Cold War doctrine of neo-containment, whose purpose is the encirclement and neutralization of Russia in its traditional European sphere of influence” (McNamara & Blight, 2001).

Aside from Russia, Brzezinski offers a strategy for American relations with other post-Soviet states. As Brzezinski says, “The political and economic stabilization of the new post-Soviet states is a major factor in necessitating Russia’s historical self-redefinition. Hence, support for the new post-Soviet statesâÂ?¦has to be an integral part of a policy designed to induce Russia and exercise unambiguously its European option” (Brzezinski, pp. 120-121). For Brzezinski, the post-Soviet states, especially Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine, are critical to the continued dominance of the United States in Eurasia. As such, according to Brzezinski, “It follows that America’s primary interest is to help ensure that no single power comes to control this geopolitical space and that the global community has unhindered financial and economic access to it” (Brzezinski, p. 148).

Brzezinski is on target with his assessment of the critical importance of the post Soviet states, particularly those states known as “the Stans” (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan) and Ukraine. The U.S. Department of Defense recognizes the importance of the region and is working on improving relations with those countries and expanding the American military presence in the region.

A STRATEGY FOR THE FAR EAST

Brzezinski believes that for the United States to have a comprehensive strategy for the whole of Eurasia, it needs to be engaged in the Far East: “An effective American policy for Eurasia has to have a Far East anchor. That need will not be met if America is excluded or excludes itself from the Asian mainland” (Brzezinski, p. 151). His focus for the Far East centers on Japan and China, with the former being the key to the latter. “It is only through a close alliance with Japan that America will be able to accommodate China’s regional aspirations and constrain its more arbitrary manifestations. Only on that basis can an intricate three-way accommodation-one that involves America’s global power, China’s regional preeminence, and Japan’s international leadership-be contrived” (Brzezinski, p. 192). In writing about a three-way alliance, Brzezinski seems to discount the contentious history between Japan and China and assumes that both countries will bow to American wishes, certainly not a foregone conclusion.

The ultimate strategy, according to Brzezinski, “âÂ?¦must be based on a careful strategic calculus: how to channel Japanese energy in the international direction and how to steer Chinese power into a regional accommodation” (Brzezinski, p. 185). Brzezinski is focused on keeping China a regional power and preventing the rise to superpower. This was possibly a realistic strategy when The Grand Chessboard was published in 1997, but recent developments with regard to economics, military strength, and technological advances refute Brzezinski’s 1997 assertion that China was unlikely to advance on a global level. As James Kurth says, “China’s growing economic and military strengths, and its goals regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea, have presented a serious challenge” (Kurth, 2000). Still, when the book was written, Brzezinski believed that China would remain relatively weak: “âÂ?¦even by the year 2020, it is quite unlikely even under the best of circumstances that China could become truly competitive in the key dimensions of global power” (Brzezinski, p. 164). While China is still a long way from achieving superpower status, it is showing no signs of slowing down any time soon and increasingly looks for ways to assert itself on the international stage.

Because Brzezinski believes that China is not a serious global threat, he advocates a policy of increased engagement and cooperation: “âÂ?¦because China is in fact not likely to emerge soon as a global power-and because for that very reason it would be unwise to pursue a policy of China’s regional containment-it is desirable to treat China as a globally significant player. Drawing China into wider international cooperation and granting it the status it craves can have the effect of dulling the sharper edges of China’s national ambitions” (Brzezinski, p. 186). This appeasement strategy will do nothing to dull Chinese ambitions. What is critical for America is to maintain a healthy economy that can compete on an international level with a Chinese economy that is amazingly robust. Kurth echoes this strategy when he writes, “The management of the new China problem therefore depends upon the management of the new global economy, and the development of any real Sino-American security cooperation depends upon the performance of the United States as the global economic hegemon” (Kurth, 2000).

CONCLUSION

Brzezinski says, “The time has come for the United States to formulate and prosecute an integrated, comprehensive, and long-term geostrategy for all of Eurasia. This need arises out of the interaction between two fundamental realities: America is now the only global superpower, and Eurasia is the globe’s central arena” (Brzezinski, p. 194). He further states “How the United States both manipulates and accommodates the principal geostrategic players on the Eurasian chessboard and how it manages Eurasia’s key geopolitical pivots will be critical to the longevity and stability of America’s global primacy” (Brzezinski, p. 195).

According to Brzezinski, “The most immediate task is to make certain that no state or combination of states gains the capacity to expel the United States from Eurasia or even to diminish significantly its decisive arbitrating role” (Brzezinski, p. 198). Brzezinski makes it sound like global engagement by the United States will help the European Union complete its integration, return Russia to an international role by association with Europe, while preventing Russian domination of other key post-Soviet states, and bring Japan and China into a three-way alliance that will foster harmony and regional cooperation. However, the reality is that not everyone is going to be happy and get along. Huntington writes “Political and intellectual leaders in most countries strongly resist the prospect of a unipolar world and favor the emergence of true multipolarity” (Huntington, 1999). A key part of Eurasia that Brzezinski ignores is the Middle East.

Already by the 1980s, the world was dealing with fomenting problems in the Middle East. Brzezinski should have realized that no Eurasian geostrategy would be complete without a plan for dealing with radical Islamic fundamentalists and the control of the world’s largest oil reserves. Even while China, Europe, and Russia command America’s attention, the Middle East is where the United States increasingly finds itself engaged and committed.

Taken as a whole, the text is a compelling read, forcing one to think about the major players spanning the two continents that make up Eurasia. Such a grand strategy, though, cannot be adequately presented in such a small number of pages. Additionally, there is no bibliography and the work smacks of personal opinion, as opposed to scholarly research, understandably slanted to the American point of view. Brzezinski discounts throughout the text the possible reactions of the nations for which he proposes this grand American geostrategy. The book comes off as full of the arrogance and crassness that much of the world accuses America of by assuming that what America wishes is in the best interest of the world as a whole. Still, the text was an interesting read, especially in light of the developments of the last eight years.

WORKS CITED

Bacevich, A. (2001). Different Drummers, Same Drum. In G.P. Hastedt (Ed.), American Foreign Policy 02/03 (pp. 18-24). Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin
Brzezinski, Z. (1997). The Grand Chessboard. New York: Basic Books
Huntington, S. (1999). The Lonely Superpower. In G.P. Hastedt (Ed.), American Foreign Policy 02/03 (pp. 33-37). Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin
Kurth, J. (2000). The American Way of Victory: A Twentieth-Century Trilogy. In G.P. Hastedt (Ed.), American Foreign Policy 02/03 (pp. 2-9). Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin
McNamara, R. and Blight, J. (2001). In From the Cold: A New Approach to Relations With Russia and China. In G.P. Hastedt (Ed.), American Foreign Policy 02/03 (pp. 25-31). Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin
Want to Know Web Site, www.wanttoknow.info/brzezinskigrandchessboard