The Three Major Forms of Objective Esthetics
On the other hand, objective esthetics undertakes three major forms in which esthetic quality is prescribed. We shall look at these major forms according to their unique properties that distinguish them from one another and from their subjective counterparts. These major forms include absolutism, pragmatism, and rational-choice. In order to present a neutral discussion of these forms, I shall refrain from offering any personal opinion or adherence towards any form.
The absolutist position is that which holds that we have knowledge of the ideal order of reality, either through divine illumination or through reason. This knowledge, it is held, constitutes a secure base for objective judgments of works of art. Kant contended that there is a harmony of the imagination and the understanding that is common to all people, and therefore judgments of taste are universal.
In the pragmatic position, an esthetic object is evalutated in terms of its capacity to produce an esthetic response. Esthetic judgment is thus an estimation of the possibilities of an object for providing esthetic experience. Granted that there are no set rules for assessing the response capacity of works of art, we can point to some properties that are likely to confer that capictiy; for example, unity, complexity, and intensity. In this sense, the judgment “I do not like it” is not equivalent to the statement “It has no esthetic properties.” The final test, however, is pragmatic: Does the object, through time, in face arouse esthetic appreciation?
The rational choice position, as set forth by Hume, states that Good art has those characteristics that please a qualified observer; a qualified observer is one who is experienced, calm, and unprejudiced. This position must cope with the difficulty that trained, sensitive art critics do not always agree and that later critics often do agree in rejecting the judgments of their predecessors. Could we agree on which critics are “qualified?” We often seem to be reduced to the circular argument that the qualified critics are the ones who have “good taste.”
Further, by considering objective esthetic judgments, we can ascribe certain moral values to the realm of esthetics. This is an axiological question: is art, or should it be, a morality producing enterprise? Idealists have typically espoused that they know what is right and proper, and quite naturally, judge the artist’s works in light of their moral conceptions. As Tolstoy said, “the obligation of art is to communicate the highest moral and religious truths.”
It should not be mistaken that such a perception of esthetics may be relegated solely to the idealists. Materialists as well may make such an approach to the morality of artwork. Many materialist philosophies, including Marxism, holds that the morality of artwork should conform to the revolutionary state. Censorship of art acts upon the interests of the state and the general welfare of the population, we can understand the necessities of such intrusive actions by the government as still morally superior to moral relativism and estheticism. By subscribing to an objective position of esthetic judgments, the state and the general population may benefit from art, giving it a greater purpose than conceived by those estheticists who seek nothing more than free expression of every unimaginable desire.
