Train as You Fight: The Development of the U.S. Army’s Combat Training Centers

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the development of the Combat Training Center Program as a response to the U.S. Army’s evolving training needs. The paper will discuss how the Army trained before the development of its four Combat Training Centers (CTCs), the training centers themselves, and the unique capabilities of each. Finally, the paper will conclude with a discussion of the future of the Combat Training Center Program.

INTRODUCTION

Army training has one purpose: to develop a combat ready force that is physically and psychologically prepared to fight and win America’s wars (AR 350-1, 1983, p. 1). For much of the Army’s history, training has been accomplished by individual units focusing on those tasks that are essential to the completion of their wartime missions. Training was, and for the most part still is, accomplished at duty stations around the world. At the vast majority of these Army posts, however, the resources required to conduct realistic, simulated combat training under stressful conditions are simply not available. Until 1973, Army units followed the Army Training Program, which allotted time to specific subjects but did not dictate how well soldiers had to execute specific combat-related tasks.

When General William F. DePuy, the first commander of the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), evaluated Army training methods, he realized that it was necessary to expose soldiers to realistic battlefield conditions before they experienced actual combat. General DePuy developed three new training methods: the Systems Approach to Training (SAT), the Army Test and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), and the Combat Training Center Program (Caldwell, 2000). The Systems Approach to Training describes the conditions under which specific soldier tasks are to be performed and sets a standard for how well these tasks must be executed. The Army Test and Evaluation Program establishes training standards for specific-sized elements, from squad (usually 10-12 soldiers) to battalion (usually 700-1000 soldiers) levels. The Combat Training Center Program, which is the focus of this paper, established specific places where units could go to perform force-on-force training in a field environment, under stressful and realistic simulated combat conditions, with established standards and evaluation procedures.

The Army currently has four Combat Training Centers: the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany; and the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. While each CTC is unique in its scope and purpose, all employ certain basic methods of training and evaluation that ensure each Army unit gets the most out of its scheduled rotation.

THE COMBAT TRAINING CENTER PROGRAM

According to the Combat Training Center Program Strategic Plan, “A CTC experience is the closest thing to combat our soldiers, leaders, staffs and units will ever experience. It is a battlefield where they can ‘die,’ come back to life, correct their mistakes, and fight againâÂ?¦” (www.call.army.mil). The CTCs serve many purposes for the Army, including providing commanders with an assessment of their unit’s combat efficiency, validating Army doctrine, and providing challenging training under stressful simulated combat conditions.

The objective of the CTCs is to provide “âÂ?¦highly realistic and stressful joint, inter-service, and combined arms training according to Army doctrine” (AR 350-50, 1995, p. 1). They do this by adhering to the “five pillars” of the Combat Training Center Program: that participating units will be organized as they would for actual combat; that a dedicated, doctrinally proficient operations group control all unit rotations; that a dedicated, realistic opposing force (OPFOR) be employed; that the training facility be capable of simulating combat conditions; and that there be a base infrastructure in place that can support the CTC mission (AR 350-50, pp. 1-2).

The first pillar of the Combat Training Center Program requires that participating units be organized as they would for actual combat. When a unit deploys its forces to one of the CTCs, it brings all of the personnel and equipment that would be assigned to it in the event of an actual combat mission. These assets are required to perform all of their normal logistical and administrative functions during their CTC rotation, including maintaining equipment, feeding troops, fueling operations and water support, ammunition re-supply, and medical support.

The second pillar requires a dedicated, doctrinally proficient operations group. Operations groups, which consist of support personnel, civilian contractors, and observers/controllers (O/Cs), are primarily responsible for all CTC rotations. Support personnel take care of routine administration, operations, and logistical functions. Civilian contractors are predominantly retired military officers and noncommissioned officers who have extensive experience in their respective branches. They assist in the planning, coordination, and execution of each rotation. Observers/controllers are military officers and noncommissioned officers who receive classroom and field training to certify them as subject matter experts in the various areas of combat operations (www.usachcs.army.mil). O/Cs observe individual and collective training and provide impartial evaluations to the training unit. O/Cs also conduct after-action reviews during designated pauses in CTC training. After-action reviews are open discussions that focus on a specific mission or task, identify strengths and weaknesses in its execution, and determine how to fix the things that went wrong.

The third pillar of the Combat Training Center Program requires a dedicated, realistic opposing force (OPFOR). OPFOR units are designed to represent a particular level of capability rather than a particular country. As such, these forces are organized to replicate elements of infantry, armor, mechanized infantry, airborne, and special operations units. These units are well-trained and well-equipped, using equipment and weapons systems that are visually modified to represent the types of systems that U.S. forces are likely to encounter in combat. In some cases, OPFOR units have actual equipment from the former Soviet Union. OPFOR units are free to move, attack, and defend as they see fit, in accordance with the capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, tactics, and doctrine of the armed forces of potential adversaries (AR 350-1, p. 1). Finally, the Combat Training Center Program dictates that the size of OPFOR units must be at least equal to and preferably greater than the size of U.S. forces participating in training (AR 350-1, p. 3). This forces to U.S. units to attempt to accomplish their wartime mission against a numerically superior, non-cooperative enemy force.

The fourth pillar requires that the training facility be capable of simulating combat conditions. This means that each CTC must have controlled airspace, a large operational area (commonly referred to as “the box”), live-fire facilities (where units can use live ammunition against realistic targets in a simulated combat situation), and an advanced instrumentation system to record critical combat-related data.

The most important piece of the instrumentation system is the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System, known as MILES. The MILES is a series of eye-safe laser devices that simulate casualties for both personnel and equipment (www.jrtc-polk.army.mil). MILES transmitters are placed on all weapons systems; receivers or sensors are placed on all personnel and equipment. When a MILES-equipped weapon is fired, it emits a laser beam that is picked up by a receiver or sensor if a soldier or piece of equipment is “hit.” The sensor then emits a distinctive tone that indicates that a soldier was wounded or killed, or that a piece of equipment was disabled. Units are then forced to requisition replacement soldiers or equipment as they would under combat conditions in an actual theater of operations. Anne Chapman, the TRADOC Military History Office historian, attested to the importance of the MILES when she stated, “I believe that a major reason that the training is so effective at the CTCs can be attributed to the development of MILESâÂ?¦where soldiers can ‘shoot’ each other to gauge their effectiveness” (Caldwell).

The fifth and final pillar of the Combat Training Center Program requires that there be a base infrastructure in place that can support the CTC mission. To fulfill this requirement, each CTC facility must have sufficient barracks space to house the soldiers of participating units, an airfield capable of handling large cargo and passenger aircraft, large open spaces for unit aircraft and vehicles to stage prior to deploying into “the box,” and after-action review/briefing centers capable of accommodating entire units.

At the conclusion of each CTC rotation, the participating unit receives a take-home package (THP). The THP is a compilation of all O/C comments, unit performance data for all aspects of combat operations (including casualties, re-supply, maintenance, efficiency, etc.), and videos of the various after-action reviews. These take-home packages provide training tools for the unit’s chain of command to improve their home station individual and collective training programs.
The Army’s Combat Training Centers provide the Army with one of the most important elements in training for possible future missions. The National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and Combat Maneuver Training Center, collectively known as the maneuver CTCs, are each custom tailored to a different theater of operation in which the Army may have to conduct missions. The Army goal is to have all commanders of active duty combat maneuver brigades, battalions, and special forces battalions receive at least one rotation at NTC, JRTC, or CMTC during their command tour (www.usachcs.army.mil). The Battle Command Training Program is the Army’s capstone CTC, designed for the senior commanders who will direct the Army’s future operations. Commanders at the division and corps level execute a BCTP rotation during the first year of their command tour (TR 350-50-3, 1999, p. 2).

THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

The National Training Center is located at Fort Irwin, in the California desert. The NTC provides training for brigade and battalion task forces and is geared primarily toward heavy (armor or mechanized) units. Occasionally, selected light (infantry, airborne, special forces, etc.) units participate with a heavy unit to provide mixed mobility and joint training. The NTC encompasses 640,000 acres and provides participating units with combat scenarios in a mid- to high-intensity environment applicable to Europe, Asia, or the Middle East (CTC Program Handbook, 2000, p. 3-D-6). Fort Irwin offers over 1,000 square miles for maneuver and live-fire ranges (www.irwin.army.mil).

The NTC conducts ten rotations per year, with each rotation averaging approximately 5,000 soldiers (www.call.army.mil). Rotational units include active duty heavy maneuver forces, attack helicopter battalions, armored cavalry regiments, and divisional cavalry squadrons (FR 350-50-1, 2002, p. 3). Additionally, reserve and National Guard units sometimes participate in NTC rotations. Participating units deploy to Fort Irwin for twenty-eight days. The first few days are spent on Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) operations, which include air deployment to the NTC, drawing equipment from pre-positioned stocks, and deployment into the operational area. RSOI operations are followed by approximately two weeks of tactical operations against the 60th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment OPFOR).
Tactical operations include force-on-force training and live-fire exercises, as well as all of the support functions necessary to the sustainment of combat operations. Finally, the rotational units conclude with recovery and re-deployment operations in which equipment and personnel are returned to their home station.

THE JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER

Building on the success of the National Training Center, the Army developed a Combat Training Center for its infantry, airborne, and special operations forces. The Joint Readiness Training Center, located at Fort Polk, Louisiana, covers 96,000 acres and provides realistic, simulated combat training for brigade and battalion task forces (CTC Program Handbook, p. 3-C-6). Ten rotations (eight active duty, one special operations, and one National Guard) are conducted per year (CTC Program Handbook, p. 3-C-10). The JRTC provides units with a unique training experience because it incorporates the United States Air Force, civilian role players, media on the battlefield, and fictional host-nation forces. Each scenario is based on a U.S. task force deploying to a mythical island nation to assist in repelling a hostile invader.

Each unit deploying to Fort Polk begins with Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) operations. The ISB is the location within a particular theater of operations where a unit would prepare for tactical insertion into a combat zone (FR 350-50-2, 1998, p. 110). ISB operations provide the participating unit with an opportunity to train on deployment procedures, organization, planning, and pre-combat actions at a forward staging area. ISB operations are followed by tactical operations that include force-on-force and live-fire training, and the integration of Air Force assets in aerial re-supply, casualty evacuation, and close air support of ground forces. JRTC offers an additional tool to training units: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). Fort Polk has a state-of-the-art $13.2 million MOUT facility that includes a mock city, an airfield facility, and a military compound that provide realistic training in third world urban warfare scenarios (www.jrtc-polk.army.mil). Additionally, the JRTC’s OPFOR (1st Battalion, 509th Infantry Regiment) possesses actual equipment from the former Soviet Union, including helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Finally, rotational units conclude with re-deployment out of “the box” and back to their home station.

THE COMBAT MANEUVER TRAINING CENTER

The Combat Maneuver Training Center, located at Hohenfels, Germany, is the European equivalent of the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center. The CMTC provides combined arms training for heavy, light, and special operations units based in Europe. Fifteen U.S. units, three German units, and if time permits, other NATO units train on CMTC’s 44,000 acres each year (CTC Program Handbook, pp. 3-B-7, 3-B-9). The CMTC prepares units to fight in European combat scenarios, peacekeeping operations, and combinations of the two.

Each standard 25-day CMTC rotation begins with three days of RSOI operations (www.call.army.mil). Units then move into the tactical operations phase, which includes five days of company- and team- level situational exercises followed by fourteen days of battalion force-on-force training (www.call.army.mil). Force-on-force training includes live-fire exercises at Grafenwoehr, Germany, and a MOUT facility that represents a small European village, against the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment OPFOR. The CMTC rotation concludes with three days of recovery from the field environment and re-deployment to the unit’s home station (www.call.army.mil).

THE BATTLE COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM

The U.S. Army Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the Army’s only mobile Combat Training Center, bringing CTC training to the unit’s home station. The BCTP provides command and battle staff training for brigade, division, and corps commanders, and their staffs (ww.bctp.leavenworth.army.mil).

A BCTP rotation consists of an Initial Planning Conference (IPC), a Battle Command Seminar (BCS), a Start-of-Exercise Conference (STARTEX), and a Warfighter Exercise (WFX) (TR 350-50-3, p. 5). The IPC is a planning conference that establishes the framework for the Battle Command Seminar and begins the planning process for the BCTP rotation. It is conducted at the unit’s home station and is designed to familiarize the commander with the BCTP methodology. The BCS, which is held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, assists the commander in building his command and staff team in preparation for the BCTP rotation. Initial exercise instructions are provided and the commander’s staff uses the Military Decision Making Process to coordinate and plan their BCTP rotation. The STARTEX is conducted at the unit’s home station. It establishes the framework for the entire exercise and details the starting conditions for the Warfighter Exercise. Finally, the WFX is a multi-echelon, tactical exercise conducted at the training unit’s home station. Brigade, division, and corps headquarters units deploy to local field sites to “wargame” various combat scenarios against the OPFOR using computer simulations.
The BCTP OPFOR simulates the Northland Republic, an armor-based force patterned after various former Soviet Union models (www.bctp.leavenworth.army.mil). The OPFOR replicates the doctrine and tactics of potential adversaries using computer simulations. The OPFOR is completely “free-thinking” and fights to win.

A unique aspect of the BCTP is its senior observers. Senior observers are retired senior general officers who are personally appointed by the Chief of Staff of the Army. They coach and mentor the rotational unit’s senior leaders and staff while also providing feedback to the Army’s senior leadership (www.bctp.leavenworth.army.mil).

THE FUTURE OF THE CTCs

The Combat Training Center Program has been extremely valuable in helping the Army meet its evolving training needs. Recognizing that most future military operations will require cooperation among the various branches of the armed forces, the Department of Defense plans to build a Joint National Training Center by October 1, 2004 (Gilmore, 2002).

CONCLUSION

Through the use of realistic, simulated combat conditions, technologically advanced simulation equipment, professional observers/controllers, and dedicated opposing forces, the Combat Training Center Program provides challenging, realistic training that is as close to combat as a unit can get without actually being there.

The Combat Training Centers offer a training opportunity that cannot be replicated at a unit’s home station. The training is all encompassing, from preparing personnel and equipment for deployment to a theater of operations, to pre-combat actions at a forward staging base, to conducting tactical combat operations, to re-deploying from a combat theater. Commanders can receive unbiased feedback that is free from command influence and offers a realistic evaluation of the unit’s readiness for deployment and combat operations. The training value is without equal, and the development of the Joint National Training Center will only serve to further improve the combat capabilities of the U.S. armed forces.

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