Transitional Zimbabwe: The Political Consequences of Independent Africa

With these words, a newly independent Zimbabwe took its first steps towards life after colonialism. The Zimbabwean public saw the promises of new regimes and changes in the social and economic structures as a foregone conclusion. Indeed, “socialism for the blacks,” an idea that was formulated by the first ruling party, was something that black Zimbabweans could sink their teeth into. But little did these optimistic constituents, as well as their optimistic leaders, know that some twenty five years later their country would have gone through as much turmoil and angst as it had the previous century. Robert Mugabe and his ruling party have been compared to the fascist regime of Benito Mussolini during World War II, an imposing, totalitarian government out to crush their opponents. I contend that this analysis is an oversimplification of the political problems of Zimbabwe; many of the issues originated before independence and there were many other parties involved that have caused directly and indirectly the problems that Zimbabwe faces today.

In the elections of March 9th-11th of 2002, Robert Mugabe received enough votes to return to the office he has held since April 18th, 1980, the day Zimbabwe became independent. Much turmoil and controversy surrounded the election because of electoral corruption and strong arm tactics by Mugabe’s regime. Mugabe and the ruling ZANU party used several techniques to win this election. First, ballot boxes were set up in disproportionately high numbers in rural areas, which have been sympathetic to Mugabe. Mugabe used a two-prong approach to his constituency; gangs friendly to the ruling party would terrorize the white minority in order to draw up lingering resentment by black Zimbabweans to their previous colonial oppressors. These gangs would also terrorize the black opposition in order to quiet the voices of resistance.

Why did Mugabe attempt such broad and obviously unethical political practices? Many reasons accompany the obvious answer of insecurity in political standing. Mugabe has been under fire since the early 1990s, when he managed to push legislation through the House of Assembly that would eradicate the remains of the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, which will be discussed later in this paper. Mugabe was capable now of forcing legitimacy in his one party approach. He dismantled white representation and resumed land reapportionment to the black majority. But Mugabe’s hold on the public became tenuous with the violent manner he took back farmland and the promises that would never be fulfilled. Mugabe’s Marxist-Leninist philosophy had turned into a very Machiavellian approach to politics.

The antagonist against Mugabe’s push toward totalitarianism was the Movement for Democratic Change, led by Morgan Tsvangirai. The MDC managed to win one third of the parliamentary seats in the 2000 elections, weakening the mandate of ZANU-PF. Previous to the 2002 presidential election, surveys had said that the MDC had a significant lead over Mugabe’s party. Mugabe could not stand such opposition and had gone to great lengths to put out the flame of reform. Tsvangirai was imprisoned following the elections (and subsequent questions of legitimacy), a move for Mugabe that drew the ire of Western nations. The High and Supreme Courts were stuffed with pro-Mugabe justices; the state-run portion of the press ran a full assault on the MDC for inciting violence; police oppression ran rampant as military commandos were put in charge of domestic security and public safety. The beginning of the 21st century was much like the previous century for this young nation: an uncertain environment that was rife with violence and government infidelity.

The question begged by this brief analysis of Zimbabwean electoral scandal is how a nation with so much promise and potential failed to achieve many of its goals. Beginning in 1980 with the election of the Zimbabwe African National Union as the ruling party, the promise of “socialism for the blacks” was ringing in the ears of the public. The social stratification that had been created in British colonial Rhodesia would be shattered, making way for promises of socialist education, equality of rights for all, and many other changes that were aligned with Marxist-Leninist thought. Robert Mugabe was elected for his uncompromised leadership as a revolutionary commander and a voice for political change.

Several reasons can be named for the negative development of socialism in Zimbabwe. Primarily, the basis of Zimbabwean politics, the Lancaster House agreement, held many speed bumps for development; the three parties involved were on three different planes of thought and a moderation approach was taken to this constitution. Second, Zimbabwe had become too dependent on South Africa as a source of imports as well as trade infrastructure. Since the mid-1970s, Zimbabwe used South African ports for trade as well as securing many natural resources from their neighbor. This created a weakness in the economy that would continue to this day.

Issues of internal security and conflict also arise when talking about socialism’s success in Zimbabwe. From the years 1910-1964, 283,000 inhabitants had been displaced by warfare; by independence, this number rose to 1.2 million people. The serious lack of manpower and constituency made the fruition of many socialist efforts, especially agricultural reapportionment, nearly impossible. The country was also not in the clear from rebels and guerrilla warfare following independence, with the two rival parties possessing quasi-military groups, there was the chance of armed conflict after the nation’s freedom. This suspicion is a common one; a nation given its freedom on short notice is more incendiary than a nation that is under the thumb of colonialism. The flames could have been fanned by any one specific policy.

A closer analysis of the 1980 election may help illustrate a few of these points, as well as bring up others. In the first free elections for black government in Zimbabwe, the three competing parties were ZANU-PF, PF-ZAPU (Political Front-Zimbabwe African Political Union), and the UANC (United African National Council). To the average Zimbabwean, these three parties seemed to have different perspectives on what to do with the independent nation. But a critical analysis of the three platforms shows that there is little difference in the policies of the three groups. The ZANU-PF platform preached “revolutionary” change and government, PF-ZAPU spoke of the need for a “self reliant economy,” and the UANC sought an “industrial, democratic mixed economy.” The real problem with these platforms was that they were vague rhetoric instead of tangible policy solutions for the problems facing the nation. The nation did not need revolutionary rhetoric that was generalized and unrealistic within the confines of the inherited system.

Facing this last statement, why did so many vote for Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF? The first reason is that many wanted war to end and putting in a group that could control the combat was a significant advantage to Mugabe being elected over others. Some sought the need for uncompromised, albeit unchallenged, rule by Mugabe. Many Zimbabweans were disappointed by the unfulfilled promises of the regime of previously elected Bishop Muzorewa, whose election was questioned as illegitimate in 1976. Many wanted a liberation army with very idealistic ideas to be at the head of the newly independent government because they sought drastic change toward a more equal social structure. Mugabe also had the benefit of being popular among the Shona people, who made a stronger showing at the ballot box than the Ndebele population. Ethnic divisions split along party lines, with the Ndebele largely voting for PF-ZAPU as the ruling party and the Shona voting for Mugabe. This is a show of “clear tribalism” that still exists today in Zimbabwe’s electoral and societal practices.

To this point, the analysis has been contained within the realm of independent Zimbabwe’s history, which really does not have significant critical distance from the present in order to gain the full spectrum of analysis. I feel it is important to proceed to pre-independence Zimbabwean history, especially an overview of the 1960s and 1970s. This is necessary in order to gain an appreciation for what Robert Mugabe and Zimbabwe as a whole was experiencing as independence became imminent.

The start of problems in modern Zimbabwe was the unilateral declaration of independence by Prime Minister Ian Smith on November 11, 1965. Smith’s declaration was an affront to the power of the remains of a weakened British empire as well as to the sensibilities of most Western powers. Smith headed the Rhodesian Front, which by their third year in power had solidified segregation even deeper into Rhodesian society by supporting land apportionment policies for white settlers as well as by exiling revolutionary leaders. The floodgates had been opened to right wing philosophy and with Smith’s pronouncement of independence from Great Britain, the Rhodesian Front looked to remain the establishment party for years to come.

The responses to Smith’s declaration of independence were different on two fronts. The first front was the international community, which sought to punish Smith and the Rhodesian Front for derailing the decolonization process that was occurring in full force on the African continent. In 1966, a committee was established within the Commonwealth (an international body of representatives) to commit economic sanctions against Rhodesia. This at first damaged the Rhodesian economy but Smith and his government found ways to circumvent the economic embargo, mostly through South Africa. The first volley against the Rhodesian front had missed badly.

Internally, militant revolutionary groups such as ZANLA (ZANU’s military wing), ZIPRA (ZAPU’s military wing), and guerrillas from FRELIMO (Mozambican rebels) and the ANC attempted to subvert the rule of Ian Smith. Several assaults occurred upon the Rhodesian military, mostly in order to gain weapons and supplies. These assaults did nothing to stop the political rule of Smith, but were able to disrupt and frustrate the totalitarian elite from going about their business peacefully. These groups had been banned in 1964, yet they were active in assaults and protestations. This showed the resiliency of revolutionary thought of leaders such as Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe and the strength of resolve of black Rhodesians.

The mid-1970s saw the explosion of political pressure, as frustrated black Rhodesians mobilized their revolutionary groups and formed one group, called the Political Front. Robert Mugabe was the spokeperson for this movement, which sought a transition into a black majority government as soon as possible. The Political Front was influenced heavily by the 1974 democratic revolution in Portugal, which dissolved its colonial empire. The Political Front saw that if they kept fighting back, there was a chance they too could be independent. The route taken now, however, was a diplomatic one. In 1976, Henry Kissinger met with the Rhodesian government and proposed a majority rule plan within the next two years. This planned was rebuffed but the idea of such a change was kept alive. Anglo-American leaders met with Political Front leaders in January 1978 and by March of that year Political Front leaders and Ian Smith had come to an agreement called the Salisbury Agreement. This agreement ensured the creation of a transitional government that would lead to black majority rule.

The transitional government was soon formed by election in April 1979. By May 29th, 1979, Bishop Muzorewa, a nationalist leader, was elected Prime Minister and sworn in. While black Rhodesians considered this election to be legitimate, many in the Commonwealth and the United Nations disagreed, saying that the election was a sham in place to placate the reform minded Patriotic Front. This concern was incorrect, since even the Political Front saw Muzorewa’s election as a ploy to placate their concerns. The Commonwealth maintained its sanctions against Rhodesia since the change was not legitimately aimed at a black majority government and wrote out the Lusaka communique, which stated conditions for the lifting of sanctions and for the legitimacy of a new majority government.

Following this communique, which seemed to involve some sort of sensitivity by Western governments, Robert Mugabe displayed his cynicism toward such a caring manner. In a broadcast August 8th, 1979, Mugabe stated that he found the concern of Margaret Thatcher and the British, as well as many of the Western governments, to be a farce, a mere practice of politics to ensure good standing in the Commonwealth. Mugabe also demanded that any new constitution be on the terms of the Political Front. These terms included sovereignty through the total transfer of power from the British, the dissolution of the Smith-Muzorewa political regime, and the empowerment of liberation forces to become the Zimbabwean national army.

With the political battleground set, a constitutional conference was called for September 10th, 1979, in Lancaster House in London. The conference was part of the Lusaka communique and included the British delegation, a delegation from the Muzorewa government, and the Political Front delegation. The conference was separated into three distinct stages: agreement on new independent constitution, an agreement on terms for transition government, and a ceasefire agreement. The first stage really showed the true battle lines in the conference; the British and Muzorewa proposals were in conflict with the Political Front proposals.

The constitution came about within a month of the conference beginning but included many difficult decisions on all three sides. The Political Front clashed heavily with British representatives on land apportionment and rights. The British wanted maintenance of the capitalist style of supply and demand while the Political Front wanted the government to have the ability to seize land in order to ensure public good and proper use. Both sides came to compromise and the end agreement on constitutional terms, which allowed the current system for a period of ten years, was agreed upon on October 19th, 1979. The second stage of the conference was to deal with issues of the transitional government.

The issue of transitional government did not seem to be a huge concern for those involved and was resolved rather quickly. The British proposal for an appointed governor with executive and legislative powers seemed heavy handed, but the interim basis for such rule as well as the insurance on electoral fidelity allowed this proposal to win over all the parties involved. The second stage of the conference ended November 15th, with an agreement for an appointed governor to run the transitional government. The third stage of the process dealt with a ceasefire to ensure some semblance of internal security for the transitional government.

The chairman of the conference, Lord Carrington, proposed an immediate ceasefire and the discontinuation of mobilizing forces. He also suggested that there be standards for both sides in communicating the ceasefire, that there be a joint ceasefire committee, and that some Commonwealth leaders act as monitors for both the British and the Political Front. The Political Front offered a heavy involvement for Commonwealth peacekeeping forces, the goal of the ceasefire as an end, not a means, and that the Political Front would not have to surrender certain strategic areas. After much discussion and the reality that independence was near, the Political Front agreed to the British cease fire proposal. The Zimbabwe bill, which held these agreements, passed through Parliament and received royal assent on December 18th, 1979.

The policies laid forth by the first independent government seemed to be fitting for the socialist spirit of the ZANU-PF. A land redistribution was set in November 1982, which established the need to relocate 162,000 families to newly opened lands. This goal has not been reached, but the policy that accompanied it, which has been the expulsion of white farmers, fits along with the “socialism for the blacks” ethos. The Minister Labor, per the Minimum Wage Act of 1980, set wage levels. The mass decentralization of public services was in accord with the need to eliminate regional and racial biases. The control over agricultural prices by the government has allowed some success in the past 20 years for farmers, despite special interest wrangling and high subsidy costs. These have been examples of successful changes in the early Mugabe regime. The economic arena for Zimbabwe was successful for many years.

How has Zimbabwe strayed from the path to successful government? Over-regulation, corruption, and inconsistency have become major issues in the Mugabe government. The courts, in theory, are a blend of British common law and customary law. In practice, however, these courts are confused as to what type of law must be emphasized and synthesis has not been accomplished. The legalization of traditional spirit mediums is an example of over-regulation. With the legalization of such media has come a growing amount of regulation, which seems to diminish the effect of the spirit medium as a spiritual guide. Corruption has been abound in the Mugabe regime for many years, as favorite lieutenants are given preferential placements within the government and are ordered to act in ways not fitting of their offices.

The problems facing Zimbabwe are not necessarily those of one man; rather, it can be seen as a two-fold problem. First, the view of what a democracy is may be distorted in African nations. Many of these nations have gained independence in the past three to four decades and have little experience dealing with democratic structures. This inexperience leads to a skewed view of democracy as some great panacea for Africa; reform minded groups seem to think that a one size fits all solution will work for their nation. These thoughts also lead to the second part of the problem, which is lack of infrastructure. Zimbabwe is not a bustling nation of wealth but rather a shell of itself; bankruptcy has brought about negative turns in foreign trade and production. The socialist policies promised by Mugabe were never achieved full fruition but were rather half solutions to economic problems. Mugabe has been more concerned with maintaining his own power and keeping resources in the hands of his party.

Perhaps we can see a historical parallel with the end of British colonialism in Zimbabwe with the Mugabe regime. There is now a substantial popular resistence to the ZANU party and the rise of the MDC and other grassroots campaigns has shown the cracks in Mugabe’s armor. It can be surmised that will come o this may be similar to what occurred with Rhodesia in 1979; an impasse will be reached and the only solution will be armed conflict or an overwhelming international effort to oust Mugabe. But I do not see a Lancaster House agreement coming out of this conflict. Zimbabwe has a constitution that is sound enough; it needs many leaders to overthrow the shackles of direct and indirect political and social suppression in order to realize the potential of Zimbabwe in the 21st century.