Why the Allies Won World War II

Through the greater part of World War II, the Axis held significant advantages. Hitler’s rapid takeover and domination of the European continent early in the war made it difficult for the Allies to even get to the Germans. The often-used euphemism “Fortress Europe” was all too accurate; with France, Scandinavia, and the lowland countries defeated and fortified by the Germans, an Atlantic attack was made nearly impossible. Axis nations to the south and east, as well as the natural obstacle of the Alps similarly made Mediterranean entry into Europe unfeasible. How then did the war end in Allied victory?

Richard Overy in his book Why the Allies Won cites the war at sea as one decisive factor. Early in the war, Germany dominated in this arena, threatening Great Britain through submarine warfare. In 1939, England was in a position of dependence upon imports. Half of her food and nearly two-thirds of her raw materials came from overseas. Germany, perhaps in a lesson learned by the hardships caused by British blockades in WWI, saw this dependency as a weakness they could exploit to obtain the upper hand. If enough ships could be sunk, the British would not have the supplies to continue the war and would be forced to surrender. In 1939 Germany’s navy seemed rather insignificant with only three pocket battleships, eight cruisers and eighteen submarines. The advance of technology dramatically changed the face of naval warfare; it was no longer a matter of big ships and big guns. Instead of spectacular and decisive battles, naval war now meant a war of attrition. What really mattered now was aircraft, and in 1941 alone German aircraft destroyed one million tons of British shipping.

Combined with the eight million tons sunk by submarines between, 1939-1941, British losses were crippling, both logistically and to the morale of the British with their long tradition of naval pride and superiority. German losses in the Atlantic during this period were insignificant, and production was rapidly increasing. In the first four months alone of 1942, the Allies lost 2.6 million tons of shipping while managing to sink three U-boats in January and only two in February . By the end of 1942 the Germans had 400 U-boats and prospects for Britain began to seem grim; by January, a two-month supply of oil was all that remained.

Something had to be done, and so British Admiral Horton was called upon to provide “a breath of fresh air” to the submarine campaign. He instigated important changes in the way the British were fighting the war. Horton demanded more aircraft to fill the Atlantic gap, and perhaps even more importantly, he insisted that all submarine hunting aircraft be fitted with Leigh lights and centimetric radar. These significant new items of technology dramatically increased the effectiveness of submarine hunting aircraft, but until this point had been only sporadically implemented. Horton also recognized the importance of training for escort commanders, and this increased the defensibility of British envoys. With Horton’s changes in place, 19 U-boats were sunk in February of 1943, increasing to a maximum of 41 submarines sunk in May . Conversely, sunken British tonnage was the lowest since 1941. Morale and effectiveness of submarine crews rapidly declined along with their life expectancy, and soon Donitz had little choice but to retreat, effectively ending the Atlantic submarine threat.

Stalingrad marked another major turning point in the war. After quick and easy victories on the eastern front, Hitler made the decision to divide his army into two groups, sending one to the south while the other continued to push eastward. His military staff saw little point in sending forces southward into minimally committed southern Russia, but little debate with the fÃ?¼hrer was permitted. Meanwhile, panic was setting in among the Russians as the seemingly unstoppable Germans continued on toward Moscow and Stalingrad. Stalin put forward order #227, which categorized any retreat as criminal , and to be labeled a criminal in Stalinist Russia did little for one’s livelihood. In a brilliant move, Stalin used extensive propaganda to convert the fear and panic of the Russian people into an intensely determined hatred of Germany that would push forward the struggle both on the front lines and in production at home. Even Stalin, though, was not entirely immune to fear as the Germans approached Stalingrad. He relinquished a degree of control for the first time in the war and appointed Zhukov as deputy commander to help him deal with the situation. Exhibiting far better planning than the Russians had seen up until this point. Zhukov’s plan was to leave a bare bones defensive force in Stalingrad and assemble a large reserve force outside the city and mount a counter offensive outside of the reach of the Panzer divisions in order to cut the Germans off from their supply lines. The move proved effective, and Paulus surrendered, giving Russia their first real victory of the war.

Bombing also played an important role in Allied victory. It has often been disputed what effect bombing really had against Germany, as industrial production nationwide was only decreased by 10%. The important thing to note here is that while production was not stopped, it was severely limited and diverted. German industry had been growing rapidly throughout the war, with production levels increasing every year of the war. This means that while production may only have been decreased by 10% over the previous year, output certainly would have been far more than 10% higher had bombing not occurred. In fact there do exist some statistics that may shed light on this subject. Looking at German production schedules, we find that actual production vs. planned was 31% lower for aircraft, 35% lower for tanks, and 42% lower for trucks . Repair and maintenance of the current industrial system became the foremost task and industrial expansion and improvement was put on hold.

The nature of German production was also changed in the face of bombing; it became necessary to produce mass numbers of defensive weapons to halt the damage caused by the ongoing bombing campaign. Given the limited resources, both of materials and manpower, this diversion would prove critical. By 1944 one-third of all artillery produced were anti-aircraft weapons, and those weapons consumed 20% of all ammunition produced by the Germans that same year. While bombing may not have eliminated German industry, its ability to produce offensive weapons was greatly inhibited. Bombing also degraded the morale of the German people; in postwar surveys 91% of the population ranked bombing as the worst aspect of the war.

The invasion of France was no small task, but one that was crucial to Allied success. While the distance across the English Channel was a mere 20 miles, the passage was rough, and conditions had to be perfect to attempt any type of landing. It was a task Britain could not undertake alone, and by the time America entered the war and both nations prepared for invasion, Hitler had Europe well fortified. The war in the Atlantic also delayed the thought of an Allied invasion; Britain could scarcely get enough supplies to maintain her current position, much less undertake the massive onslaught that would be needed to reclaim Europe. It was America’s equipment that would be needed to invade Europe, and in 1943 most landing craft were still committed to the war in the Pacific . Imposing as the enterprise was, it was perhaps the only thing that could win the war, so after toying with alternative strategies such as an invasion through the Mediterranean, planning and preparations began. It was apparent that this would truly be a battle with the potential to decide the outcome of the entire war. If successful, the Allies would have a foothold in Europe. If, however they failed, German victory would be almost certain. The morale of the Americans and British would be smashed, as would the bulk of their forces. Thus victory against the invasion was as important to Hitler as its success was to the Allies.

Knowing that an invasion would inevitably be attempted Hitler began construction of his main defense, the Atlantic wall, in 1942. His plan included some 15,000 strongpoints. Lack of resources forced him to spread defenses somewhat thinner. German military success relied on mobility and concentration of effort, which did not come easily when resources are limited and the exact location of the impending invasion is unknown. Hitler was forced to spread his Panzer divisions across the entire French coastline. His decision, against Rommel’s recommendation, to hold back four divisions in reserve would prove to fatally weaken the German coastal defense. The German’s best hope was to win the battle before it left the beaches. This would not work out in their favor. German submarines would be swept aside, and the Luftwaffe would be overwhelmed by greater numbers of better-trained Allied pilots. Allied bombing and reconnaissance would also play critical parts in allowing troops off the beaches before German reinforcements could arrive. The strategy, good luck, and well-maintained secrecy of the Allies would lead them to a decisive victory in France.

To fight a war a nation must have the tools to do so. Methods of production therefore become extremely important. If we compare the productive methods of Russia, America, and Germany we see distinct differences. Stalin’s five-year plans had created an economy that was second only to the United States. Russia also had the advantage of a command economy; no negotiations with laborers or business deals with capitalist owners were necessary. Absenteeism was treated as desertion, and forced labor was commonplace. If one didn’t want to go to work, then one could work in the gulags. In addition to the threat of prison or death, the Russian labor force also found dedication through a combination of nationalism and intense hatred of the Germans. Soviet production also benefited from simplicity of planning; only two types of tanks and five types of aircraft were produced . If Russian production was the most simple, Germany’s was certainly the most complex. At one point Germany was producing 425 different types of aircraft, 151 different trucks, and 150 different motorcycles. Germany produced technologically superior weapons through constant updates, and deliberately avoided mass production, which they associated with poor quality. German preferred their tools of war to be manufactured by skilled craftsmen who would be sensitive to a greater degree of complexity and more frequent changes than mass-production allowed. Production was not centrally controlled as it was in Russia; instead the military dictated selection, development and ordering of weaponry. This would have made mass-production impossible even if it had been desired. The typical German factory operated at about half of its full capacity as a result of sporadic military run demand-based ordering.

Too late to save the German war effort, Speer was appointed Minister of Armaments in 1942. He assembled a team of industrialists and engineers to direct Germany’s industrial output. By adopting mass production for some items and drastically reducing the number of different models produced, Speer’s team doubled manpower productivity and tripled weapon output . When America entered the war, there was catching up to do. Axis nations had been arming heavily for nine years, some devoting half of their national product to the war effort. The United States would quickly exceed their industrial output. What was already the worlds biggest economy would double in just five years. Wartime economic planning would be run largely by businessmen, and they did not shy from mass-production. The government allowed private companies to profit from the war effort, which proved instrumental in increasing production. Assembly line methods would be adapted to work for everything from aircraft to ships. Ford developed plans and facilities to produce 10 bombers per day, a miraculous rate for such complex machines. The burgeoning auto industry’s familiarity with yearly model changes allowed rapid refitting of machinery to mass-produce weapons, assuring that the latest technology could be incorporated. The United States made efficient use of resources while Germany’s bureaucratic system bogged down production. In a war heavily reliant on machines, this would prove disastrous.

Technology is a matter intricately related to production. World War II was the most mechanized war the world had seen, and so technology of course became a crucial factor. In the 1930’s Germany made a decision for quality over quantity. Rather than slowly upgrade the entire army, forces were divided into two separate armies: a mobile, highly mechanized Panzer army, and a traditional army transported by foot, horse, and rail. This trend continued through the war, with the Germans always holding superior technology, though often in insufficient numbers. More basic items such as transport vehicles and trucks were especially often in shortage. The constant updates of German equipment made repairs difficult as well . This problem reached crisis proportions as complex German equipment faced the harsh Russian winter. Literally millions of spare parts needed to be stocked to accommodate the vast number of models of aircraft, tanks, and weapons used by the German forces. The Soviets on the other hand had a minimal variety of technology, which simplified repair and replacement. Their problem was the level of technology at their disposal. At the beginning of the war, they faced Germany armed with antiquated weaponry. Without advancement the situation would be hopeless.

The development of a superior tank built to withstand Russian conditions, the T34, proved helpful in holding off the Germans, though the Germans continued to push forward due to the incompetence of poorly trained soviet tank commanders. While Germany chose the most advanced technology available, and Russia struggled for any technology at all, the Allies found a workable middle ground. Focus was kept on using the weapons of the 1930’s to their full potential, making slight changes and advancements only as needed. By proceeding in this way, they were able to produce sufficient quantities of serviceable weapons to fight the Axis. Technology is intrinsically linked with oil, and this became motivator for many wartime decisions. Japan’s entry into war had much to do with embargos that cut off 90% of the oil imported. Germans too struggled for oil, synthesizing it from coal and pushing into the Caucasus to obtain oil with which they could continue the war. While German technology was certainly more advanced, they possessed it in insufficient quantities, and never managed to develop or implement anything so advanced as to turn the tables of the war.

Leadership plays a crucial part in any war and this one was no different. Had the British and Americans not found a way to work with the ideologically disparate Soviets, the outcome of the war likely would have been different indeed. Victory in the east came in part from the assistance of American Lend-Lease aid given to the desperate Soviets. The Allies coordinated their efforts through a central staff and thus managed to ensure that good decisions were being made. Hitler on the other hand dictated power more and more as the war went on, and this was fatal to the German cause. Many of the critical mistakes made were his alone, and could have been avoided had he sought council from his staff.

Overy’s final point is “the moral contest.” He puts forth the idea that the Allied cause was a moral one and this gave strength and motivation to their position. The Allies had a worthy cause in their struggle against injustice and barbarism. Similarly, the Axis morale was weakened by the negative nature of their goals and the fact that they were forced by their leadership to continue the war until the bitter end. I would dispute this point on the grounds that he suggests the Nuremberg trials might have been- that the inclusion of the Soviets among the Allies made a mockery of the notion of “crimes against humanity.” That their leadership did not permit surrender in the face of eminent defeat is a separate issue from moral positioning.

Other historians stand behind many of the points Overy makes. According to John Keegan, the Battle of the Atlantic was one of the most important factors of the war. In order to maintain, Britain needed to import 55 million tons of goods per year. Germany was sinking nearly 7 million tons per year, a rate that exceeded British shipbuilding capacity by a factor of five . Britain managed to negate a year’s worth of these sinkings by adding 7 million tons of foreign ships to her fleet, but the goods aboard the sunken ships were of course still lost. Rapid American construction assisted the British as well, but it did little good to simply produce more ships to be sunk by the voracious packs of U-boats. Keegan also stresses the importance Horton’s changes have on the direction of the submarine war, with U-boat losses beginning to approximate production by 1943.

The Battle of the Atlantic, however, may not have ended here if the war had continued past 1945. In May of 1944 Germany produced the first submarine fitted with schnorkel technology that would allow the sub to cruise while submerged . The implementation of such submarines would have certainly challenged the Allies, who had struggled hard enough to overcome subs they could find with radar and target with spotlights. Fighting a fleet of schnorkel subs would have taken the Allies back to where they began and worse. Had the Nazis not lost important Atlantic ports to the Americans that same year, the Battle of the Atlantic may well have been reopened. It is important to realize what a pivotal and scarcely won struggle this was. If schnorkel boats were introduced a year earlier, if two or three more ships were sunk every month in the previous years, or if Horton had not been allowed to implement the needed strategic changes, it becomes hard to imagine an Allied victory in the Atlantic. Loss of the Atlantic would mean no troops or supplies for an invasion of France, and hope for German defeat would rest solely on the Russians, without so much as a supply line from Britain or America.

Unquestionably, the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was a pivotal moment on the eastern front and for the entire war. The initial struggle to defend the city was of equal consequence. Had the city fallen before Stalin found the sensibility of heeding the opinions of his staff, there would have been no opportunity to strike back at the German forces. The ruins of the city facilitated a different type of war than had previously dominated the Eastern front. German training focused largely on blitzkrieg techniques , which proved largely effective, but in Stalingrad they faced close hand-to-hand combat rather than sweeping tactical maneuvers. Russians in Stalingrad had the determination common to a people defending their homeland. Here among the rubble, the determination and hatred Stalin had encouraged finally became a benefit. The nature of close quarters combat gave bravery as much value as military skill. The Russians held the Germans close, preventing the use of air raids and artillery by the Germans for fear of hitting their own troops. As the Russians held on, a German oversight became apparent.

The Volga River, which had been seen as an asset preventing Soviet retreat or reinforcement, now prevented Nazi forces from encircling the city . Once the counteroffensive began, it became clear that the Russians had learned what they had previously done wrong as well as what the Germans had been doing right. Russian tanks that had until that time only been used only for infantry support now swept through Nazi forces in a pincer movement at their weakest point, the Romanian and Hungarian divisions. By the time the ordeal had ended 250,000 Germans were dead and 91,000 were captured. Of those 91,000 unfortunate, only 6,000 would be seen again .

The cost and effectiveness of Allied bombing is not easy to determine. Estimates vary from 7% to 33% of the manpower of the war was associated with the air war. The cost of the American air offensive is fairly well established at 27.5 billion, 11% of the total war costs to the Americans. Several criticisms raised by Alan Levine are the delay of the use of precision bombing by the British, and poor target selection by the Americans, which resulted in a lack of significant impact to Germany until the spring 1944. The widespread introduction of the Mustang fighter as a bomber escort that year did much to improve defensibility in German airspace. Oil was critical in this war and also represented one of the clearest successes of the bombing campaign. Synthetic oil production decreased from 316,000 to 17,000 tons in the beginning of 1944, while bombing in Ploesti deprived the Nazis of an additional 700,000 tons of oil products. While bombing certainly did disrupt transportation and industry it did so at great cost, and British Bomber Command saw a final death toll of 55,000.

Napoleon, the Spanish, and Hitler had all failed to invade across the English Channel , yet it was crucial that the Allies do just that against a heavily fortified Europe. While Eisenhower had successfully led three assaults by British and American forces in North Africa, Sicily, and Salerno, none of those locations had been fortified. Pacific invasions had solved the problem of resistance through massive barrages of artillery fire lasting a day or more. What worked on an island did not work on a continent where the Germans could rapidly reinforce. More than a few hours of obvious preparation would give Germany a chance to rally defenses to the location of the invasion. Surprise was absolutely necessary for the success of the risky mission. Despite their need to spread defenses across the coast of France, beach defenses were significant, though never more than a few kilometers wide. The Atlantic wall was penetrated in less than an hour at Utah and less than a day at Omaha. German high command had become so dictatorial by this point that officers were forced to spend a good part of the day waiting for orders rather than reacting in the way they knew they should to the situation before their eyes. This, along with the crippled state of the Luftwaffe, contributed greatly to the ease with which Allied forces overtook the positions. Once the beaches and hedgerows were overcome, the Allies found the Germans in steady retreat.

While Hitler dismissed the American threat, Ribbentrop recognized it more realistically in 1941: “If we don’t succeed and the munitions potential of the United Stated joins up with the manpower potential of the Russians, the war will enter a phase in which we will only be able to win with great difficulty.” Indeed by 1944 the United States would be providing 40% of the entire world’s weapons. The Depression actually gave America an advantage. Converting the fully-employed civilian economy in World War I had been a slow task, but with an eager workforce and productive capacity of existing factories at less than 50% , conversion to military production became much more welcome and much less complicated. The United States also benefited from a self-sufficient economy, which was scarcely reliant on foreign imports for anything. As Overy mentioned, know how and productive power of American businessmen was of vast importance. They contributed methods and means for mass production of armaments. While the importance of large corporations is well known and unexaggerated, smaller companies also played an important role. Companies such as Higgins, which manufactured most of the landing craft used in the D-day invasion, were critical. In the end it was the entire mechanism of American industry that mattered.

Linked with the idea of industrial production is the issue of technology. Overy extensively and adequately covers the differences in the technological decisions made by the various powers. The Allies perhaps won the war of technology by always striving for balance and practicality. The focus was on what they could use, rather than what they would be able to develop and produce. Germany produces some spectacular machines, such as the Messerschmitt 163b rocket fighter, which had a maximum speed of 601mph. As impressive as the plane was, it had a range of 50 miles, and used an expensive, unstable fuel , and therefore was not relevant to the real needs of the Luftwaffe. It was a typical example of the amazing yet wasteful technology produced during the course of the war.

While it is not a simple task to boil down years of global war into a few concise and straightforward answers, there are factors that stand out as decisive. In this war of machines, the first of such the world had seen, the balance of technology and ability to produce that technology greatly weighted the direction of victory. The Battle of the Atlantic, though it did not determine Allied victory, did at least demonstrate that the Axis would not inevitably win. With shipping lines again open, it became possible for the Allies to begin preparations for the invasion of France, without which the war never would have been won. When we look objectively at the war and why the Allies won, the frightening answer is that we barely did. At many stages German victory seemed likely, and at many critical moments, the entire outcome seemed hinged upon a single event. Had any one of these flashpoints gone against Allied favor, the world we live in today might be very different.